

Memo

**California State University
Northridge
Department of Police Services**



To: Officer Anthony Vargas
From: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police
Date: June 24, 2016
Re: Completion of Internal Affairs Investigation #2016-I.A.-03

On June 21, 2016, Captain Scott VanScoy of the Internal Affairs Unit completed his investigation concerning a citizen's complaint of excessive force used against a CSUN residential life community member and policy violations surrounding your response and handling of a fire alarm activation and concurrent vandalism investigation, with the following results:

Concerning allegations that during the course of your duties as a police officer for the California State University, Northridge (on or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours), you violated the following department policies/performance expectations resulting in a disposition of "Sustained" being reached. The California State University, Northridge Police Department defines the disposition of "Sustained" to mean that the act(s) complained of did occur and constitute misconduct or improper job performance.

- Department Policy/Procedure #05-S.O.-005 Fire and Fire Alarm Response Procedures, Section IV – "Incident Command Post – The first responding officer to a fire scene or alarm of fire shall immediately establish the Incident Command Post and act as Incident Commander (I/C), reviewing the ICS 9 Critical Tasks list. The I/C shall immediately notify CSUN dispatch of the exact location of the Incident Command Post and the name of the Incident Commander." And... "Evacuation of Buildings – Officers shall utilize bullhorns (on a floor by floor basis) as the primary means to direct building occupants to evacuate a building."
- Department Policy/Procedure #08-S.O.-019 Unusual Occurrence – All Hazzard Plan, "It shall be the policy of this department to respond to planned and unplanned disasters or emergencies that occur on this campus, or in our sphere of influence when requested, in a professional and informed manner utilizing Incident Command System (ICS) as incorporated in both California's Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS)."

➤ Department Policy/Procedure #07-O.A.-007 Field Reporting and Management,

Section IV.B.2 – “All reports shall be prepared as directed in this policy and the Criminal Investigation Policy (Policy/Procedure 07-C.I.-005) and within the following guidelines:

- b. All reports shall be detailed, accurate, honest, and factual.”

Section IV.E.e – “Officers are expected to complete reports in a fully detailed manner. Any report written by a member of this department shall be free of false or deliberately incomplete information.”

➤ Department Policy/Procedure #07-C.I.-005 Criminal Investigations, Section IV.D.2.a and k – “Steps to be followed in conducting preliminary investigations include:

- a. Providing for the safety of victims, suspects, and witnesses, rendering aid for injured parties and requesting appropriate medical attention, if necessary.
- k. Preparing the preliminary crime/incident report fully and accurately.”

➤ Department Policy/Procedure #06-L.E.-003 Digital Voice Recording Devices. “All sworn personnel of this Department shall use department-issued digital recorders.” Section IV.B.1 and 3 – “When and How to Use the Digital Recorder.

- 1. The digital recorder shall be activated and remain activated in order to ensure the integrity of the recording unless the contact involves an area restricted by this policy (see Section C, below).
- 3. Incidents in which an officer should activate his/her digital recorder include but are not limited to: b. arrests. c. contacts in which the contacted party is argumentative, unresponsive, or otherwise hostile.”

➤ Department Policy/Procedure #03-P.A.-001 Standards of Conduct (Sworn), Section V – Canon of Ethics:

Subsection A – Canon 1, “Peace Officers shall uphold the Constitution of the United States, the California Constitution, and all laws enacted pursuant to legally constituted authority.”

Standard 1.6 – “Peace officers shall respect and uphold dignity, human rights, and constitutional rights of all persons.”

Subsection B – Canon 2, “Peace officers shall be aware of and shall use proper and ethical procedures in discharging their official duties and responsibilities.

Standard 2.1 – “Peace officers shall be aware of their lawful authority to use that force reasonably necessary in securing compliance with their lawful enforcement duties.”

Standard 2.2 – “Peace officer shall truthfully, completely, and impartially report, testify, and present evidence in all matters of an official nature.”

Subsection C – Canon 3, “Peace officers shall regard the discharge of their duties as a public trust and shall recognize their responsibilities to the people whom they are sworn to protect and serve.”

Standard 3.2 – “Peace officers, during their service, shall diligently devote their time and attention to the effective and professional performance of their responsibilities.”

Standard 3.5 – “Peace officers shall be prepared and shall respond effectively to the demands of their office.”

- Department Policy/Procedure #08-L.E.-011 Use of Force, Section II.C – “It is the policy of this department that officers shall use only that force which is reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event.”

Note: Below is an additional policy violation found to have occurred following the review of all investigatory interviews and documents obtained during the course of this investigation. No further interviews or documentation review were needed as a result.

- Department Policy/Procedure #07-S.O.-011 Police Services Communications, Section VI.C.2.c. – Calling out information - Field officers shall call out over the radio the following information which the dispatcher shall enter into the radio log via the CAD/RIMS system as appropriate. All information received from field officers shall be entered in “real time,” i.e., immediately upon receiving the information. This is done to ensure accuracy in time-stamping activities and officer status as they are received. Information shall include at a minimum:

- ii. En route time to the call.
- (and)
- iv. Their arrival on scene.

Based on the results of this investigation, the investigative file has been forwarded to the CSUN Office of Human Resources for review of recommended accountability actions which may be taken as a result of this investigation. Should you have questions concerning this investigation, you are to direct them to Captain VanScoy for handling.

Cc: Captain Scott VanScoy
IA File

California State University, Northridge Police Department
Internal Affairs Unit
Intra-Departmental Memorandum

To: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

Date: June 21, 2016

From: Scott G. VanScoy, Captain

Subject: Employee Misconduct Investigation – I.A. Case #2016-I.A.-03

Employee Involved: Anthony Vargas
Date of Hire: April 1, 2004
Current Assignment: Officer
Shift – Days off: Community Policing Team – off Sun., Mon., and Tues.
Date of Alleged Violation: April 30, 2016

• **ALLEGATIONS:**

Allegations: That *Officer Anthony Vargas* violated the following department policies during the response and handling of a fire alarm activation and concurrent vandalism investigation (case #161636):

1. Department Policy/Procedure #03-P.A.-001 Standards of Conduct (Sworn), Section V – Canon of Ethics:

Subsection A – Canon 1, “Peace Officers shall uphold the Constitution of the United States, the California Constitution, and all laws enacted pursuant to legally constituted authority.”

Standard 1.6 – “Peace officers shall respect and uphold dignity, human rights, and constitutional rights of all persons.”

Subsection B – Canon 2, “Peace officers shall be aware of and shall use proper and ethical procedures in discharging their official duties and responsibilities.

Standard 2.1 – “Peace officers shall be aware of their lawful authority to use that force reasonably necessary in securing compliance with their lawful enforcement duties.”

Standard 2.2 – “Peace officer shall truthfully, completely, and impartially report, testify, and present evidence in all matters of an official nature.”

Subsection C – Canon 3, “Peace officers shall regard the discharge of their duties as a public trust and shall recognize their responsibilities to the people whom they are sworn to protect and serve.”

Standard 3.2 – “Peace officers, during their service, shall diligently devote their time and attention to the effective and professional performance of their responsibilities.”

Standard 3.5 – “Peace officers shall be prepared and shall respond effectively to the demands of their office.”

2. Department Policy/Procedure #08-L.E.-011 Use of Force, Section II.C – “It is the policy of this department that officers shall use only that force which is reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event.”
3. Department Policy/Procedure #08-S.O.-019 Unusual Occurrence – All Hazzard Plan, “It shall be the policy of this department to respond to planned and unplanned disasters or emergencies that occur on this campus, or in our sphere of influence when requested, in a professional and informed manner utilizing Incident Command System (ICS) as incorporated in both California’s Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).”
4. Department Policy/Procedure #05-S.O.-005 Fire and Fire Alarm Response Procedures, Section IV – “Incident Command Post – The first responding officer to a fire scene or alarm of fire shall immediately establish the Incident Command Post and act as Incident Commander (I/C), reviewing the ICS 9 Critical Tasks list. The I/C shall immediately notify CSUN dispatch of the exact location of the Incident Command Post and the name of the Incident Commander.” And... “Evacuation of Buildings – Officers shall utilize bullhorns (on a floor by floor basis) as the primary means to direct building occupants to evacuate a building.”
5. Department Policy/Procedure #07-O.A.-007 Field Reporting and Management,

Section IV.B.2 – “All reports shall be prepared as directed in this policy and the Criminal Investigation Policy (Policy/Procedure 07-C.I.-005) and within the following guidelines:

- b. All reports shall be detailed, accurate, honest, and factual.”

Section IV.E.e – “Officers are expected to complete reports in a fully detailed manner. Any report written by a member of this department shall be free of false or deliberately incomplete information.”

- 6. Department Policy/Procedure #07-C.I.-005 Criminal Investigations, Section IV.D.2.a and k – “Steps to be followed in conducting preliminary investigations include:
 - a. Providing for the safety of victims, suspects, and witnesses, rendering aid for injured parties and requesting appropriate medical attention, if necessary.
 - k. Preparing the preliminary crime/incident report fully and accurately.”
- 7. Department Policy/Procedure #06-L.E.-003 Digital Voice Recording Devices, “All sworn personnel of this Department shall use department-issued digital recorders.” Section IV.B.1 and 3 – “When and How to Use the Digital Recorder.
 - 1. The digital recorder shall be activated and remain activated in order to ensure the integrity of the recording unless the contact involves an area restricted by this policy (see Section C, below).
 - 3. Incidents in which an officer should activate his/her digital recorder include but are not limited to: b. arrests. c. contacts in which the contacted party is argumentative, unresponsive, or otherwise hostile.”

- **FACTS:**

On or about May 3, 2016, I was assigned an internal affairs investigation by Chief Anne P. Glavin regarding a complaint involving the possible violation of department policy(s) surrounding a citizen’s complaint of excessive force used against a CSUN residential life community member by Officer Anthony Vargas. In addition, the subsequent command staff use of force review found sufficient evidence to suggest Officer Vargas’ use of force was not within departmental guidelines and violated department policy 08-L.E.-011: Use of Force. Chief Glavin provided me the Use of Force Review completed by Captain Alfredo Fernandez (patrol operations commander) dated May 2, 2016. Through my preliminary review of the documentation and radio recordings provided, I advised Chief Glavin that there may be additional policy violations

involved on the part of Officer Vargas during the response and handling of a fire alarm activation and concurrent vandalism investigation (case #161636) in question. All suspected policy violations are noted within the allegations section of this investigative report.

Incident: On or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours, CSUN police dispatcher [REDACTED] received a fire alarm pull station activation at the University Park Apartment building 12 (UPA 12), east side second floor. Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] were dispatched to UPA 12 while Officer [REDACTED] was assigned to meet the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) at the intersection of Lassen Street and Lindley Avenue. Officer [REDACTED] role was direct LAFD through the complex to UPA 12. While in route to the fire alarm call, Officer Vargas instructed police dispatch, "Boy 1 (unit call sign) stand by on fire until we get there." Dispatcher [REDACTED] acknowledged and did not call LAFD to have them dispatched to the fire alarm activation call.

Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] arrived on scene and initiated their investigation.

- **INVESTIGATION:**

A check of night watch on-duty personnel for April 30, 2016, showed that Sergeant [REDACTED], Officer Anthony Vargas, Officer [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED] were working. Dispatcher [REDACTED] was working the 911 PSAP communications position for the times in question. Radio and daily shift logs showed that on or about April 30, 2016, about 0057 hours, Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] were working as the Community Policing Team and received a radio call of a fire alarm at University Park Apartment (UPA) 12, second floor east side pull station. It is unknown as to what time Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] arrived on scene as they failed to notify dispatch via the police radio of their arrival status. About 0102 hours, Officer Vargas instructs Officer [REDACTED] to silence the fire alarm system. It is at this point in time, Dispatcher [REDACTED] logged Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] into the CAD system as having arrived on scene.

Copies of the Use of Force Review (attached section "A"), all available incident and crime reports (attached section "B"), daily shift logs (attached section "C") were reviewed by me and have been attached to this report.

A CD containing all related telephone, radio, and digital recorder recordings have been attached to this report. See pages 4 through 6 for select audio and video recordings that reflect the progression of events and key transmissions.

AUDIO & VIDEO EVIDENCE:

Applicable CSUN DPS Telephone Recording Timeline:

00:59:05 hours – LAPD dispatch calls CSUN PD dispatch and advises they received a call from a person in UPA [REDACTED] regarding a male and female Hispanic banging on doors attempting to get in to the complex.

01:03:47 – B1 Officer Vargas asks if B2 Officer [REDACTED] has the tool to reset the fire alarm pull station. Dispatcher [REDACTED] advises units that LAPD called reporting an incident at UPA 12 on the second floor matching the description of what the Officers Vargas and [REDACTED] were handling. Officer Vargas advised that he was at room 203 next to where the incident occurred and found a wallet at the scene with identification inside.

01:03:55 – B2 Officer [REDACTED] acknowledges and requests Officer Vargas to respond to his location for assistance.

01:04:51 – P56 Officer [REDACTED] advises dispatch he's backing B2 Officer [REDACTED] at UPA 12 on the first floor.

01:05:08 – B1 Officer Vargas advises dispatch to contact an on-duty resident advisor (RA) to respond to their location.

01:07:20 – (around the 1:08:00 mark) B1 Officer Vargas advises dispatch he's detaining one person (Note: no location given).

01:08:14 – Dispatch acknowledges B1 Officer Vargas detaining one.

01:08:35 – Dispatch advises units that the RAs are on scene.

01:09:33 – B1 Officer Vargas requests S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] (shift supervisor) to respond to the scene. S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] advises she's in route.

01:15:10 – S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] arrives on scene.

01:25:44 – B1 Officer Vargas advises S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] that no witnesses to the crime at hand were located.

01:37:54 – S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] advises dispatch that a drunk female is being left in the care of a [REDACTED]

01:44:30 – B1 Officer Vargas advises dispatch to contact LAFD for response to a male in custody complaining he can't breathe.

01:48:23 – S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] clears the scene.

01:53:08 – B2 Officer [REDACTED] advises that LAFD RA70 (Rescue Ambulance) is on scene.

02:03:41 – B2 Officer [REDACTED] advises the report number pulled is for their in-custody (arrest).

02:03:52 – Dispatcher [REDACTED] asks B2 Officer [REDACTED] if (their in-custody) is the same person detained as she only has a detained time stamp, not an in-custody time stamp noted within CAD/RIMS.

02:04::00 – B2 Officer [REDACTED] advises dispatch that the detained time is the same as the time of arrest.

02:05:31 – B1 Officer Vargas advises dispatch their transporting one (in-custody) from housing to the DPS (Department of Police Services).

02:08:48 – B1 Officer Vargas advises dispatch their out at the police station.

After the two people left, the caller advised they saw an act of vandalism had occurred. LAPD dispatch also advised they heard an (fire) alarm in the background.

01:07:19 hours – Per B1 Officer Vargas’ request, Dispatcher [REDACTED] calls the on-duty resident advisors (RAs) who advise they are already on scene with the Community Director (CD) [REDACTED].

01:45:10 hours – Dispatcher [REDACTED] calls the Los Angeles Fire Department dispatcher for a medical response to UPA 12.

02:06:34 hours – S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] requests Dispatcher [REDACTED] to connect her phone call with L1 [REDACTED].

03:01:22 hours – S1 Sergeant [REDACTED] requests dispatch to contact the two RAs for a meet in the lobby of UPA 14.

03:02:02 hours – Dispatcher [REDACTED] calls the RAs and advises them of the request to meet to which they accept.

Applicable CSUN DPS Radio Recording Timeline:

00:57:02 – Dispatcher [REDACTED] announces over the police radio a fire alarm pull station activation at UPA 12, second floor.

00:57:18 – Dispatcher [REDACTED] assigns P56 Officer [REDACTED] to meet the Los Angeles Fire Department at Lassen St. and Lindley Ave. to escort them into the complex to UPA 12.

00:57:23 – P56 Officer [REDACTED] acknowledges the assignment.

00:57:27 – B1 Officer Vargas instructs dispatch to hold off on calling fire until he arrives.

[Note: no radio transmission was found showing Officer Vargas/Officer [REDACTED] going “Code 6” (i.e., arriving on-scene) at UPA 12]

00:58:18 – P56 Officer [REDACTED] advises dispatch he is clear from the Art and Design complex and that it checks ok.

01:01:37 – B1 Officer Vargas advises B2 Officer [REDACTED] to silence the fire alarm. No response given by Officer [REDACTED].

01:02:15 – B1 Officer Vargas again advises B2 Officer [REDACTED] to silence the fire alarm.

[Note: According to the RIMS radio log time stamp, this is when dispatch logged Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] as being “Code 6”.]

01:02:37 – B2 Officer [REDACTED] advises dispatch the situation is Code 4 (all is ok) and that he’s out with the individual(s) who pulled the fire alarm pull station.

Applicable LAPD Radio Recording Timeline:

Nothing found relating to the incident in question.

Available CSUN DPS Officer Issued Digital Recorder Recordings:

Officer [REDACTED] – recordings begin a few minutes prior to the officers moving involved parties [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] outside UPA 12 through the south lobby doors. Recordings provide evidence of [REDACTED] level of intoxication and the difficulties they had in dealing with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as a result of their consumption of alcohol. At no time do the recordings indicate [REDACTED] as uncooperative or aggressive in nature. [REDACTED] however is clearly resistant towards the officers' investigation much of the time the officers were with him.

Officer Anthony Vargas – recordings begin shortly after the alleged use of force incident whereby Officer Vargas performed what he referred to as a leg sweep on involved party [REDACTED]. Recordings clearly provide information on the communication between Officer Vargas and involved parties [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] shortly after the use of force incident whereby they question him on why he "kicked" [REDACTED]. In addition, communication between Officer Vargas and CD [REDACTED] is clear regarding [REDACTED] extreme concern over the use of force tactics employed by Officer Vargas. At no time do the recordings indicate [REDACTED] as uncooperative or aggressive in nature. [REDACTED] however is clearly resistant towards the officers' investigation much of the time the officers were with him.

Officer [REDACTED] – nothing recorded.

Sergeant [REDACTED] – nothing recorded.

INVOLVED PARTY INTERVIEWS:

Interview with [REDACTED] (on-duty resident advisor and witness to the complaint):

On or about May 9, 2016, about 1247 hours, I met with [REDACTED] as a witness relating to this investigation. [REDACTED] was advised that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

[REDACTED] told me the following information in essence:

On or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours, [REDACTED] was working as an on-duty resident advisor (RA) for University Park Apartment building 12 (UPA 12). On the evening in question, [REDACTED] was working as a combined RA team with RA [REDACTED].

That evening (04-30-16, about 0055 hours) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were on their way to another call for service when they received a call from the Community Director (CD) [REDACTED] to respond to UPA 12 due to a fire alarm activation. [REDACTED] could hear the fire alarm siren activating from UPA 12 so they proceeded to that location. They passed a crowd of residents who had evacuated the building and entered the first floor lobby through the south lobby doors. As she entered [REDACTED] noticed a male [REDACTED] and female student [REDACTED] sitting down on the ground in the lobby. Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] were speaking with the two heavily intoxicated students and both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stood next to [REDACTED] who was already there, as the officers conducted their business. When they asked questions of the officers, Officer [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that the incident was "no longer a housing thing, (as) it's now with the police department." [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] subsequently backed away to await instructions from their community director, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated that Officer Vargas was speaking with [REDACTED] while Officer [REDACTED] was speaking with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were sitting on the ground against opposite walls facing each other, separated by about a 12-foot distance. [REDACTED] was extremely drunk to the point he could not stand up and required assistance walking. [REDACTED] was quiet at first and then became belligerent and aggressive as time passed, to the point [REDACTED] began screaming at the officers as they attempted to speak with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was quite drunk as well however [REDACTED] had better balance and could stand up and walk requiring little assistance. Although [REDACTED] could stand and walk, it was [REDACTED] opinion that [REDACTED] still required someone to care for [REDACTED] safety due to [REDACTED] level of intoxication.

[REDACTED] stated the officers were very patient as they attempted to speak with both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] never became belligerent, aggressive, or challenged the officers. Throughout their encounter, [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] verbally attempting to calm [REDACTED]. At one point, Officer [REDACTED] had to tell [REDACTED] to sit down multiple times before gaining compliance. However, soon after [REDACTED] began to stand up in what [REDACTED] thought was an attempt by [REDACTED] to gain [REDACTED] attention and get him to calm down. At no time did [REDACTED] interpret [REDACTED] movements as an attempt to leave the scene.

According to [REDACTED] she observed Officer Vargas maintaining his attention and communication with [REDACTED] and did not see or hear any interaction at this point occurring between Officer Vargas or anyone else in the lobby including the CD, [REDACTED]. Officer [REDACTED] arrived and stood with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] while Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] conducted their investigation. At no time did [REDACTED] feel the situation involving [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was out of the Officers' (Vargas and [REDACTED]) control.

Officer Vargas was standing to the left side of [REDACTED] when she stood up and braced [REDACTED] against the wall, maintaining focus on and communicating with [REDACTED] continuously telling [REDACTED] to stop and calm down. As [REDACTED] leaned forward in an attempt to walk towards [REDACTED] (no steps were taken), Officer Vargas directed [REDACTED] to sit down

multiple times; and without allowing [REDACTED] a chance to sit down, Officer Vargas kicked [REDACTED] left calf a few times in an apparent attempt to get her to sit on the ground. According to [REDACTED] the kicks were hard and forceful in nature. [REDACTED] knees eventually buckled and she fell to the ground, immediately yelling at Officer Vargas questioning why he kicked her. [REDACTED] could not recall if Officer Vargas grabbed hold of [REDACTED] shoulder(s) or arm(s) while kicking her calf. CD [REDACTED] saw what happened and immediately raised his voice in an assertive manner toward Officer Vargas, angry over Vargas kicking a student who was also a woman.

About 0300 hours, Sergeant [REDACTED] called to meet with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Sergeant [REDACTED] inquired about the incident and [REDACTED] provided brief comments about Officer Vargas kicking [REDACTED]. Sergeant [REDACTED] asked whether or not [REDACTED] was mad and she acknowledged that he was upset. At no time did Sergeant [REDACTED] attempt to question any part of the incident or use of force in detail with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. She just wanted to know how [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] felt about the incident and if they were ok; and if they witnessed CD [REDACTED] "run the thing" after the kick happened (i.e., interfering with the officers' investigation). [REDACTED] advised that she did not witness CD [REDACTED] become angry or belligerent with the officers at any time prior to the kick, only after.

[REDACTED] was unable to provide any further information regarding the incident.

I asked [REDACTED] about their training and response to fire alarm incidents. [REDACTED] advised that all housing staff are trained at the beginning of each semester. As an RA her role is to ensure all the students are evacuated to a designated evacuation meeting point for that particular building. The RAs stay with the residents as they wait for the police officers to arrive and provide the all clear to re-enter the building.

Interview with [REDACTED] (on-duty resident advisor and witness to the complaint):

On or about May 10, 2016, about 1638 hours, I met with [REDACTED] as a witness relating to this investigation. She was advised that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

[REDACTED] told me the following information in essence:

On or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours, [REDACTED] was working as an on-duty resident advisor (RA) for University Park Apartment building 12 (UPA 12). On the evening in question, [REDACTED] was working as a combined RA team with RA [REDACTED]

That evening (04-30-16, about 0055 hours) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were on their way to complete their duty rounds when they heard the sound of a building fire alarm. At first they didn't know what building it was coming from so they started walking towards the sound, however prior to locating it the sound ceased. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then received a call from the Community Director (CD) [REDACTED] to respond to UPA 12 however they didn't know the reason for the request until after they arrived. As they approached UPA 12, they saw all the building (UPA 12) residents had evacuated and gathered at the designated waiting area. [REDACTED] looked inside the first floor lobby and saw two students [REDACTED] sitting on the ground and CD [REDACTED] standing off to the side. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

████ entered the building and waited until █████ approached to speak with them. Shortly after Officer █████ arrived and stood with them as Officers Vargas and █████ dealt with █████.

████ were sitting against opposite walls facing each other and were seated about six feet apart. Officer █████ was standing next to █████ while Officer Vargas was standing next to █████. Both █████ and █████ were heavily intoxicated (under the influence of alcohol). █████ was allegedly quite aggressive and verbal constantly yelling that "he didn't do it." █████ was annoyed but with a more passive, relaxed, and quiet demeanor, constantly telling █████ to be quiet as he was making a scene.

At some point, one of the officers told █████ they were going to take him to the patrol car. It was at this point █████ demeanor became more upset than annoyed and attempted to stand up from the ground. █████ continued to maintain her focus and attention on █████ continuing to tell him to be quiet. Officer Vargas told █████ to sit down and upon giving Officer Vargas an angry facial expression she made some unknown comments to him. She immediately however directed her attention back towards █████ and began speaking to him once again. At some point █████ asked the officers what was happening and where they were going to take █████. It was █████ perception that █████ was talking in a drunken stupor and not comprehending what the officers were telling her (i.e., "confused and upset with what was happening").

Upon █████ standing up, Officer Vargas directed █████ to sit down, while immediately placing a hand on █████ left shoulder and attempting to kick her legs out from under her. With a sweeping motion of his foot, Officer Vargas kicked (in a "rapid and forceful manner") what appeared to be both legs of █████ (in the calf area) in an attempt to get her to the ground. The force used was hard enough that █████ heard prominent "thud" sounds as Officer Vargas kicked █████ legs. It took Officer Vargas about three attempts at kicking █████ legs while pushing down on her shoulder before she fell to the ground. █████ stated that at no time did Officer Vargas' actions attempt to help █████ to the ground as she fell. █████ instead used her arm to brace herself against the wall and then quickly slid to the ground. Officer Vargas then used his feet to push (not a kick) █████ legs together and out in front of her. Once on the ground in a seated position, █████ returned to a passive and quiet demeanor. █████ stated that at no time did █████ take a step forward or to her sides after standing up and being confronted by Officer Vargas. And at no time did █████ go behind or attempt to go behind Officer Vargas after standing up.

Immediately upon █████ falling to the ground, CD █████ became agitated expressing his anger with what he saw, telling Officer Vargas that he wasn't ok with what he did (the kicking of █████). █████ stated that the actions of Officer Vargas "freaked her out a little bit" and when she and █████ looked at each other immediately after, it was "like oh my God, like this just happened?"

████ stated that at no point during their interactions did █████ approach Officer Vargas at a distance closer than 6 feet. CD █████ began to lecture Officer Vargas, in essence, that they're (as university employees) supposed to take care of our students and protect them, not subject them to such force. Officer █████ then moved █████ and █████

further away from the area next to the elevator room. Meanwhile, [REDACTED] continued to argue the fact with Officer [REDACTED] he wasn't ok with Officer Vargas' actions and that he was going to file a complaint.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were then moved from the lobby to outside the south entrance of the building and CD [REDACTED] was allowed to sit next to them and talk about the incident. Officer [REDACTED] Officer [REDACTED] and Sergeant [REDACTED] were present during this time. Eventually it was decided that [REDACTED] was being arrested and [REDACTED] would be escorted to her dorm room whereby one of her roommates would take responsibility in caring for her safety. Prior to leaving, [REDACTED] turned to Officer [REDACTED] and again stated that he was going to make a complaint about what transpired between Officer Vargas and [REDACTED]. Sergeant [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then walked [REDACTED] to her room and relinquished custody of her to a roommate.

A couple hours later, police dispatch called [REDACTED] advising that Sergeant [REDACTED] requested to meet with her and [REDACTED] regarding the incident. Upon meeting, Sergeant [REDACTED] inquired about the incident to which [REDACTED] provided a brief overview of the events in question. Sergeant [REDACTED] asked about the use of force incident involving Officer Vargas, however the discussion was more general in nature versus one to elicit specific details.

I asked [REDACTED] about their protocols in responding to fire alarm incidents. [REDACTED] advised that all housing staff are trained and as an RA her role is to ensure all the students are evacuated to a designated evacuation meeting point for that particular building. The RAs stay with the residents as they wait for the police officers to arrive and provide the all clear to re-enter the building. The Community Director (CD) meets with responding law enforcement personnel and passes along information as needed. During this incident the fire department never arrived to the scene of the fire alarm.

Interview with Samuel Prater (on-duty community director and complainant):

On or about May 12, 2016, about 1410 hours, I met with [REDACTED] as a witness and complainant relating to this investigation. He was advised that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

[REDACTED] told me the following information in essence:

On or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours, [REDACTED] was working as the on-duty community director (CD) for University Park Apartment building 12 (UPA 12). [REDACTED] lives in [REDACTED] which is a building adjacent to UPA 12. He heard the fire alarm sirens activate and initially couldn't determine whether it was coming from UPA 12 or UPA 14. As he exited [REDACTED] immediately recognized the alarm as coming from UPA 12. He saw fifty plus students standing outside the building that had already evacuated and then heard the fire alarm silence. [REDACTED] proceeded to enter UPA 12 through the north doors of the first floor lobby. He looked for the on-duty resident advisors (RAs) and didn't see them. He saw Officer Vargas and [REDACTED] in the lobby trying to get a male student [REDACTED] to sit on the ground. A female student [REDACTED] then stumbled into

the lobby and fell face down. Both students were heavily intoxicated (under the influence of alcohol) and the officers seated them against opposite walls facing one another. [REDACTED] then heard one of the officers mention something about a hole being punched into a wall. At some point, Officer Vargas told [REDACTED] to let him finish his investigation, however [REDACTED] could not recall what triggered Officer Vargas to make such a statement as that has never been an issue in their working together before.

Resident advisors (RA) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] arrived on scene per [REDACTED] request to document the fire alarm, alleged vandalism, and drunk students. As [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas were talking, [REDACTED] stood up. [REDACTED] couldn't remember if he saw her stand up or how she stood up. He just saw Officer Vargas quickly tell [REDACTED] to sit down, while grabbing onto her left side (either the arm and/or shoulder) and attempting to kick her legs out from under her. [REDACTED] heard a distinct thud sound with each kick and stated he was "shocked" at what he was witnessing. He thought "whoa... is this happening right now." At no point was [REDACTED] belligerent (i.e., flailing her arms around, yelling at the officer to get off her, etc.), she was more in a passive resistant state. From what [REDACTED] witnessed, [REDACTED] was focused almost entirely on [REDACTED] and wasn't paying much attention to Officer Vargas. At no time did he feel the safety of the officers or any member of the community was in danger.

After the use of force incident [REDACTED] told Officer Vargas that he wasn't comfortable and didn't agree with the physical actions taken against [REDACTED] didn't say the use of force was excessive, but in his opinion it was completely uncalled for given the circumstances; that [REDACTED] actions did not provoke such a response from Officer Vargas. [REDACTED] admitted he was upset and made some strong comments toward Officer Vargas after the use of force incident; and when Officer [REDACTED] stated something to him, [REDACTED] commented that he didn't want to hear any excuses for what had happened. Just prior to the use of force incident, Officer [REDACTED] had entered through the south lobby doors. Officer [REDACTED] pulled [REDACTED] and the two RAs back from the lobby area and [REDACTED] told Officer [REDACTED] that he was not accepting Officer Vargas' actions and wanted to make a complaint.

Prater then left the area and went upstairs to the area of the alleged vandalism to continue his job of investigating any housing violations. As he was talking to the residents who lived outside the location of the vandalism, Officer Vargas approach him stating, in essence, that he was interfering with their investigation. [REDACTED] became even more agitated in that he felt Officer Vargas followed him after [REDACTED] left the lobby area to get out of the way of the officers' investigation. [REDACTED] responded telling Officer Vargas that he doesn't take orders from him and to stop ordering him around. He told Officer Vargas that he only takes orders from [REDACTED] (Housing Director) and [REDACTED] (Housing Associate Director) and again reiterated that he was not "cool" with the physical actions he took against [REDACTED] that they were inappropriate; and he was going to tell Captain VanScoy and Lieutenant Benavidez about what he witnessed.

[REDACTED] returned to the lobby area and Sergeant [REDACTED] arrived. A decision was made to allow the residents back to their dorm rooms and to move [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] outside while the investigation continued. [REDACTED] was permitted to sit with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

██████████ and shortly after ██████████ was taken to her room by Sergeant ██████████ and ██████████ was taken to the patrol car upon being arrested.

Shortly after ██████████ returned to his apartment he received a call from Lieutenant Benavidez. He and Lieutenant Benavidez briefly talked about the incident, however ██████████ chose not to discuss the use of force incident with him at that time. About an hour later, ██████████ received a call from ██████████ and ██████████ stating that they were requested to meet with the police supervisor to discuss the incident. ██████████ was surprised that he was not called to provide his observations and/or statements. Later in the week ██████████ saw ██████████ and ██████████ at a banquet. They didn't discuss details of the incident but in talking with them ██████████ learned that both ██████████ and ██████████ were glad ██████████ mentioned something about the use of force part of the incident as they were too uncomfortable in doing so themselves.

I asked ██████████ about housing's protocols in responding to fire alarm incidents. ██████████ advised that all housing staff are trained and drill on such a response each semester. As a community director (CD) his role is to meet with the police and work with them in coordinating the evacuation process. He coordinates the work of the RAs until such time they are given the all clear to re-enter the building. During the housing evacuation drills, the CD meets with responding law enforcement personnel at an established Incident Command Post (patrol vehicle showing an incident command flag) and receive instructions from there. ██████████ advised ██████████, the DPS Emergency Manager, coordinates such drills using a script which the CDs follow. In this particular incident, the fire alarm was turned off just prior to ██████████ arrival so he didn't look for the Incident Command Post. From what he saw, it appeared Officer ██████████ turned off the fire alarm. At no time did he observe fire personnel on scene.

Interview with ██████████ (involved party to the complaint):

On or about May 9, 2016, about 1649 hours, I met with ██████████ as a involved party relating to this investigation. She was advised that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder

██████████ told me the following information in essence:

██████████ stated she was quite intoxicated (under the influence of alcohol) and could not remember much about the incident in question. Earlier that evening, she attended a dorm party in which she drank vodka and other mixed drinks for about one to two hours. ██████████ could not recall where the party was at. Below is what she could recall.

On or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours, she recalled sitting on the ground within the first floor lobby of UPA 12. Her friend ██████████ was with her as well as some police officers. ██████████ recalled the police officers telling her to be quiet as she was telling ██████████ to relax because he was getting angry and aggressive towards the officers. ██████████ had no recollection of the conversation she alleged had with the officers nor standing up from her seated position at any time. The only information she could vaguely recall was during those moments after being handcuffed, not before. At some

point [REDACTED] was escorted back to her dorm room by a female officer [REDACTED]. In the morning, she advised she noticed a bruise to one of her hands, a scrape on a knee, her shoulders were sore, and a feeling of pain to the thigh area of one of her legs. She also stated that her right ankle was swollen. Anything else about the night in question she heard from [REDACTED] and could not remember any more than what she already provided.

Interview with [REDACTED] (involved party to the complaint):

On or about May 12, 2016, about 1632 hours, I met with [REDACTED] as an involved party and witness relating to this investigation. He was advised that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

[REDACTED] told me the following information in essence:

[REDACTED] could recall the fire alarm activation in UPA 12 that occurred on or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours. Unfortunately, he was extremely intoxicated (under the influence of alcohol) and could not remember much about the incident in question. Below is what he could recall.

Earlier that evening, he and [REDACTED] were at a party in the UPA 12. In about a two-hour period, [REDACTED] drank between four or five red Solo cups of "jungle juice" comprised of gin and hawaiian punch. The next thing [REDACTED] remembers is sitting on the floor (lobby of UPA 12) directly across from [REDACTED] looking at her as she sat in handcuffs. [REDACTED] stated he was angry at the fact [REDACTED] was in handcuffs and had hurt herself earlier that evening, however [REDACTED] kept telling [REDACTED] to sit, relax, and listen to the police officers who were standing over them. [REDACTED] also remembered being handcuffed himself. He stated one police officer stood to his right side, possibly another to his left, and then another officer stood by [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] did not recall any of his activities prior to being contacted by the police. He did not recall seeing [REDACTED] ever stand up, nor any officers touch her during their contact with them. [REDACTED] could not recall any of the conversations he had with the police officers, however he did remember feeling claustrophobic in the patrol car and that his handcuffs were too tight hurting his wrists. Everything else about the night in question he heard from other people but did not remember any more than what he had provided.

Interview with CSUN Officer [REDACTED]

On or about May 11, 2016, about 1836 hours, I met with Officer [REDACTED] as a witness relating to this investigation. Officer [REDACTED] was advised that he was being interviewed as a witness and not the subject officer involved in this internal investigation; and that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

Officer [REDACTED] told me the following information in essence:

Officer [REDACTED] was working on the night watch patrol shift on or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours (as verified on the officer shift logs and in the RIMS reports). Logs indicate Sergeant [REDACTED] was the shift supervisor and Officer Anthony Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] were working as the Community Policing Team within the University Park complex.

About 0055 hours, Officer [REDACTED] was on foot patrol at the Art and Design Center. He heard dispatch issue a fire alarm activation call at UPA 12 to the Community Policing Team. Officer [REDACTED] then heard over the radio Officer [REDACTED] make contact with two individuals who may have been involved in the fire alarm activation(s). At this point in time, Officer [REDACTED] cleared his foot patrol and began heading toward UPA 12 upon hearing a request for Officer Vargas' assistance by Officer [REDACTED].

Officer [REDACTED] arrived at the north side of UPA 12 and as he walked toward the main lobby entrance, he could hear the fire alarm sounding (note: later during the interview [REDACTED] stated he couldn't recall actually hearing an alarm but then did recall hearing it over the police radio). He also saw a large group of residents (about 40 students) standing outside the building. As he walked into the lobby from the north entrance doors, Officer [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] sitting on the ground against the northeast wall. Officer Vargas was standing in front of her with his attention focused on Community Director (CD) [REDACTED] (standing just north of Vargas). [REDACTED] was sitting on the south wall with Officer [REDACTED] standing next to him. Two resident advisors (RAs), identified as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were standing behind [REDACTED] near the elevators.

Officer [REDACTED] could hear Officer Vargas and [REDACTED] talking but could not understand what was being said. He then saw [REDACTED] stand up. Officer Vargas however was not looking at [REDACTED] as he speaking with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was now standing on Vargas' right side out of his view. Officer [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] to sit down at which time she began to move forward. [REDACTED] could not recall how many step(s) were taken. Officer Vargas quickly turned his attention to [REDACTED] told her to sit down; and placed his right hand on her left shoulder. [REDACTED] didn't listen to either of the officers direction and kept walking forward. Again [REDACTED] could not recall how many step(s) were taken only that her body moved forward. He recalled [REDACTED] looking "stone-faced" and was speaking incoherently as he could not understand what she was saying.

[REDACTED] stated he could see Officer Vargas trying to assist [REDACTED] to the ground without using force, telling [REDACTED] to sit down multiple times. She was "not complying and kept walking and walking." [REDACTED] could not recall how many step(s) were taken as [REDACTED] walked. Officer [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] focus was on Officer Vargas as she was making incoherent comments. It was at this point, Officer Vargas used a single (one) foot sweep swinging his right foot against the back side of [REDACTED] left foot/tennis shoe. [REDACTED] lost her balance and began falling backward onto her buttocks. Officer Vargas however still had control of her arm and assisted her to the ground as she slid down the wall. Officer [REDACTED] stated that this entire incident did not happen "really quick" and that Officer Vargas allowed adequate time for [REDACTED] to comply with sitting down. [REDACTED] estimated that the time estimated between him hearing Officer [REDACTED] tell [REDACTED] to sit down to Officer Vargas' foot sweep was within a 7 to 10 second period.

Officer [REDACTED] then approached [REDACTED] telling him to step back and asking what was going on. With an angry demeanor and voice, [REDACTED] turned toward [REDACTED] stating "I am not ok with this!" Officer [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] who he was to which [REDACTED] advised he was the Community Director. [REDACTED] acknowledged his position and again asked that he step away from the situation the officers were handling. [REDACTED] didn't make a comment but wasn't cooperating with him. Eventually [REDACTED] walked with Officer [REDACTED] to the elevator area where the RAs were standing by. Once at the elevator area, [REDACTED] began to talk with Officer [REDACTED] in a firm tone using profanity multiple times making statements such as, "this is not fuckin ok!... These are students. I don't care what they've done. They don't deserve to be treated this way!" Officer [REDACTED] acknowledged his anger and reasoning behind it (i.e., the foot sweep of [REDACTED]), however he asked that [REDACTED] calm down so he could go help Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] handle the situation. After making a few more comments regarding the matter, [REDACTED] walked away and up the north lobby staircase.

Officer [REDACTED] went to the area of Officers Vargas and [REDACTED] and began assisting with [REDACTED] as he had become extremely angry and belligerent over the use of force incident taken against his girlfriend ([REDACTED]). Officer [REDACTED] quickly placed [REDACTED] in handcuffs after [REDACTED] attempted to stand up. Officer Vargas then asked Officer [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] was headed upon seeing him leave up the north stairway. Officer [REDACTED] advised he did not know.

Officer [REDACTED] then went to [REDACTED] and advised her that he was there to help and just wanted to talk with her. [REDACTED] acknowledged stating something to the effect of, "ok, I just don't want to be kicked." It was about this time Officer Vargas left the lobby to go to the second floor via use of the north stairway for follow-up investigation. Officer [REDACTED] approached and took over Officer [REDACTED] conversation with [REDACTED]. It was at this point Officer [REDACTED] took the position of primary contact officer with [REDACTED].

Shortly after, [REDACTED] returned to the first floor lobby (UPA 12) stating, "I don't understand why we have these guys still here. We need to get everybody (evacuated students) back in." Officers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed taking both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] outside through the south lobby doors and allowing the residents to return to their dorm rooms. Once outside [REDACTED] became more uncooperative and failed to listen to the officers' instructions. Eventually Officer [REDACTED] managed to get [REDACTED] to calm down and sit on the outside steps next to [REDACTED]. Sergeant [REDACTED] arrived soon after this point. [REDACTED] exited the building and sat next to [REDACTED] left side. He started talking to [REDACTED] saying, "You had a bad night, huh? Let me tell you what's going to happen." [REDACTED] continued to tell [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that they were both going to get released as they just had too much to drink. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] declined that option as they wanted to go to the same room since they wanted to sleep together. [REDACTED] turned to Officer [REDACTED] for confirmation that the two were going to be released, to which [REDACTED] stated that may not be the case as it is up to the discretion of Officers Vargas and [REDACTED] to make the final decisions on matters relating to the incident being investigated. [REDACTED] was then called over to Officer [REDACTED] and Sergeant [REDACTED] location. After his conversation with them, [REDACTED] left the scene.

When asked about knowing whether or not an incident command post was established, Officer [REDACTED] stated he did not recall hearing one being established over the police radio nor seeing one while on-scene. When asked about knowing whether or not officer bullhorns were deployed and/or used, Officer [REDACTED] stated he could not recall seeing them. Officer [REDACTED] was able however to confirm that the establishment of a command post and use of bullhorns in evacuating a building are required for such incidents as a fire alarm per department policy.

When asked about hearing anyone cancel the response of fire personnel (i.e., LAFD), Officer [REDACTED] stated he recalled the officers advising dispatch "Code 4" (i.e., all is ok), that there were no signs of a fire, and it was a false alarm. It was at that point fire was cancelled but he could not recall by whom. From what [REDACTED] could recall hearing over the radio, Officers Vargas and [REDACTED] checked the area, that there were no signs of smoke or fire, and it was a false alarm via a pull station. When asked if he recalled anyone being dispatched to escort fire, [REDACTED] stated he could not recall but that he would have been the one dispatched if such an assignment was made.

When asked about officer issued digital recorders, [REDACTED] stated he did not activate his at any time during the incident. He recalled Officer Vargas using his recorder however couldn't recall if Officer [REDACTED] used his. Officer [REDACTED] stated he simply didn't think about using his recorder in that he was solely focused on quickly arriving to assist Officer [REDACTED]

In reviewing the reasonableness standard for use of force incidents with Officer [REDACTED] (as per the Graham vs. Conner U.S. Supreme. Court ruling), it was Officer [REDACTED] opinion that both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (at different times) became an officer safety concern/threat; that both had resisted arrest and/or in being detained (for [REDACTED] when she failed to follow Officer Vargas' instructions when she stood up and approached him); that the situation was uncertain as to the direction it was heading; that the severity of the crime being investigation was low level in nature; that the situation didn't seem to be evolving rapidly requiring split second decisions; and that at no time were either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] attempting to evade arrest. Officer [REDACTED] stated he wasn't on scene long enough to make a decision as to whether or not the incident was stressful in nature. From the time he was there to assist, he didn't feel stressed.

Interview with CSUN Officer [REDACTED]

On or about May 11, 2016, about 1945 hours, I met with Officer [REDACTED] as a witness relating to this investigation. Officer [REDACTED] was advised that he was being interviewed as a witness and not the subject officer involved in this internal investigation; and that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

Officer [REDACTED] told me the following information in essence:

Officer [REDACTED] was working as a member of department's community policing team with Officer Anthony Vargas on or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours (as verified

on the officer shift logs and in the RIMS reports). Sergeant [REDACTED] was the shift supervisor and Officer [REDACTED] was working on the night watch patrol shift. About 0055 hours, Officer [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas received a fire alarm activation call at UPA 12 and responded to the north side of the building. They saw a large group of student residents standing outside the building who had already evacuated. Officer [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas established the incident command center and Officer [REDACTED] remained on the first floor as the incident commander while Officer Vargas went to the second floor of the building. Officer Vargas' role was to go to the location of the pull station activation and look for signs of smoke, fire, or active dangers present.

Upon checking, Officer Vargas advised Officer [REDACTED] there were no signs of smoke or fire so Officer [REDACTED] reset the fire alarm panel. As the panel was being reset, Community Director [REDACTED] approached Officer [REDACTED]. Officer [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] of what was happening when suddenly a male [REDACTED] and female [REDACTED] ran into the lobby from the east floor hallway. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were laughing and yelling. [REDACTED] fell facedown and [REDACTED] fell over her. An unknown male then entered the lobby wishing to remain anonymous and stated that he observed [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] pull the fire alarm pull station. The male then exited the lobby and out of view of Officer [REDACTED].

Officer [REDACTED] detained both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for further investigation having [REDACTED] sit on the east side of the lobby/hallway and [REDACTED] sit on the west side of the lobby/hallway. Officer [REDACTED] advised dispatch he was detaining two individuals and began to acquire preliminary information from the two detainees. Officer Vargas returned to the first floor with [REDACTED] identification card and said he found it next to the fire alarm pull station. Officer [REDACTED] then arrived on scene to assist.

Officer Vargas assumed responsibility for interviewing [REDACTED] while Officer [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED]. A heavy odor of alcohol emitted from both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] persons; both had bloodshot, watery eyes; and [REDACTED] had trouble following Officer [REDACTED] questions and consistently failed to follow instructions given him of keeping his hand out of his pants pocket and to remain seated.

Two resident advisors (RAs) arrived on scene, later identified as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stood off to the side of the lobby by Officer [REDACTED] while CD [REDACTED] stood between them and Officer Vargas and [REDACTED] approached Vargas while he was speaking to [REDACTED] and began suggesting they should let [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] return to their rooms and go to sleep in that they were drunk. Officer Vargas directed his attention away from [REDACTED] and towards [REDACTED] taking a step towards him and instructing [REDACTED] this wasn't a housing matter and to let them (police) figure out what happened with the fire alarm activation. Officer Vargas then ordered [REDACTED] to back away from their investigation.

Officer [REDACTED] clarified that at no time was the conversation between [REDACTED] and Vargas heated (prior to the use of force incident). Instead it appeared as if [REDACTED] was controlling the conversation, while Officer Vargas was telling [REDACTED] to let him finish what he was dealing with and they could talk about the housing issues a little later.

As Officer Vargas was speaking to [REDACTED], Officer [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] quickly stand up. In that Officer Vargas was addressing [REDACTED] and out of position to maintain a visual on [REDACTED] immediately directed her to sit down at least two times. [REDACTED] began approaching Officer Vargas by taking one step forward, when Vargas quickly re-directed his attention back to [REDACTED] placing a hand on her left shoulder in an attempt to guide her back toward the wall. [REDACTED] appeared to place her weight into Officer Vargas as he instructed her to sit down multiple times to which she refused. Officer [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as defiant, uncooperative, and passive resistant. She was extremely verbal but not aggressive in either a verbal or physical manner. [REDACTED] advised that it was difficult to understand [REDACTED] due to her intoxication level but she seemed to continuously reiterate they weren't the ones who pulled the fire alarm, that they were only partying, and all they wanted to do was go home. At the same time, she kept telling [REDACTED] to stop talking and calm down.

Meanwhile [REDACTED] was attempting to talk to Officer Vargas however Officer [REDACTED] could not hear what [REDACTED] was saying. Officer Vargas continued to tell [REDACTED] to sit down, when Officer [REDACTED] noticed [REDACTED] attempting to stand up. Officer [REDACTED] placed a hand on [REDACTED] left shoulder in an attempt to keep him on the ground. [REDACTED] complied remaining seated on the ground.

Officer [REDACTED] redirected his attention to Officer Vargas and upon seeing [REDACTED] refusing to sit down on the ground, Officer Vargas took his right foot from a stationary position and performed a foot sweep of [REDACTED] feet. [REDACTED] fell backwards as Officer Vargas guided her down the wall to the ground on her buttocks. One of [REDACTED] legs was folded underneath her so Officer Vargas used his foot to scoop her leg out from under her and push it straight forward next to her other extended leg.

[REDACTED] suddenly stood up and began yelling, clearly angry at Officer Vargas' actions toward [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] began to yell as well and was obviously angry over the incident, however Officer [REDACTED] could not hear what he was saying in that his focus was on that of [REDACTED]. Officer Vargas moved to assist Officer [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] handcuffing him for everyone's safety. Meanwhile Officer [REDACTED] stepped in and pulled [REDACTED] off to the side and out of Officer [REDACTED] view. When everything was under control, Officer Vargas left the lobby and returned to the second floor for further investigation.

Officer [REDACTED] approached Officer [REDACTED] and suggested they move [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] outside the building lobby and allow the residents to return to their rooms. Officer [REDACTED] agreed and they subsequently moved them outside the south lobby entrance. Sergeant [REDACTED] arrived on scene and Officer [REDACTED] briefed her on the incident.

Officer [REDACTED] monitored both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] sat next to them talking about the incident. Officer [REDACTED] eventually called [REDACTED] to his location to brief him on the incident, while Sergeant [REDACTED] changed positions to assist Officer [REDACTED]. Officer [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] they didn't have any named witnesses to place [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as the ones who pulled the fire alarm. Officer Vargas advised there was evidence of a vandalism in the same location in which [REDACTED] identification was found. As the ranking residential life staff member, Officer [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if he was willing to press charges against [REDACTED] for the vandalism to which [REDACTED] declined.

As they talked, [REDACTED] told Officer [REDACTED] that he understood he was interfering (with their investigation) however he really didn't like the manner in which [REDACTED] was made to sit down. Officer [REDACTED] responded advising that the matter would be documented and addressed to which [REDACTED] said he wanted to make a complaint. [REDACTED] commented on being sensitive to police brutality due to being a black man (rubbing the top of his hand with his finger). [REDACTED] became increasingly more calm and collected as he expressed himself and then left their location reentering UPA 12.

Officer [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED] moved [REDACTED] into a patrol vehicle once it was decided he was going to jail for disorderly conduct (PC 647f). Sergeant [REDACTED] along with RAs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] walked [REDACTED] back to her dorm room leaving her under the care of a roommate. Officer [REDACTED] then went to the second floor of UPA 12 to reset the fire alarm pull station. Once clear from the preliminary investigation, Officer Vargas transported [REDACTED] to the LAPD Van Nuys jail while Officer [REDACTED] returned to his regular community policing assignment.

When asked about the establishment of an incident command post in accordance with department policy, Officer [REDACTED] admitted that he and Officer Vargas "missed a few steps." Officer [REDACTED] went on to explain that once the incident command post is established, the location and incident commander should have been broadcast over the radio. If staffing is available, then one can respond to the scene to assess the situation. Officer [REDACTED] confirmed that the university police department does conduct regular fire evacuation drills with the residential community (i.e., staff and residents). He continued saying that the importance of an incident command post is to ensure everyone's safety by ensuring that all residents are evacuated with no one being missed. Officer [REDACTED] also confirmed that at no time were bull horns deployed by himself or Officer Vargas during this incident.

Officer [REDACTED] advised that at the time of the fire alarm call, they were walking on foot. They responded to their patrol vehicle first in that it contained the incident command equipment needed for the response to such an incident. Some of the equipment needed included the green incident command flag, the bull horn, the incident command ready board/bag, and safety vests. When asked about whether or not anyone canceled the response of fire personnel, he confirmed that they did. Officer [REDACTED] however could not recall who called off the fire department.

When asked about the use of his issued digital recorder, Officer [REDACTED] advised that he activated it after he recognized the incident was greater than a fire alarm activation. (However, it wasn't until sometime after the leg sweep incident in which Officer [REDACTED] actually turned his recorder on.) Officer [REDACTED] advised that he simply didn't think the recorder was needed to be turned on at that point. In the recording Officer [REDACTED] did take during the incident, [REDACTED] made a statement to Sergeant [REDACTED] "... originally they weren't listening. That one went to stand up and then he put her down a little hard in front of people, so, (indiscernible at this point)." Officer [REDACTED] clarified that it was not his intention to allege the use of force was that "hard." It was the way she fell and he felt she fell to the ground as hard as she did due to her high level of intoxication and the

fact she didn't have full control over her body. As for the "people," he was referring to CD [REDACTED] and the RAs [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

In reviewing the reasonableness standard for use of force incidents with Officer [REDACTED] (as per Graham versus Conner), it was Officer [REDACTED] opinion that CD [REDACTED] interfered with their investigation, thus becoming a hindrance to their law enforcement duties and responsibilities. He believes that had [REDACTED] not interfered, Officer Vargas' attention would not have been drawn away from his detainee [REDACTED] which resulted in the need to use force against her to regain control. In as such [REDACTED] believes both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (at different times) became an officer safety concern; that both had resisted arrest or being detained (for [REDACTED] when she stood up and approached Officer Vargas); that the incident was stressful, yet not uncertain; the incident rapidly evolved requiring split second decisions; that the severity of the crime being investigation was low level; and at no time were either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] attempting to evade arrest.

Interview with CSUN Sergeant [REDACTED]

On or about June 17, 2016, about 0037 hours, I met with Sergeant [REDACTED] as a witness relating to this investigation. Sergeant [REDACTED] was advised that she was being interviewed as a witness and not the subject officer involved in this internal investigation; and that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

Sergeant [REDACTED] told me the following information in essence:

Sergeant [REDACTED] was working as the shift supervisor for night watch patrol on or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours. Officer [REDACTED] was working as a patrol officer on her shift while Officers Vargas and [REDACTED] were working as the residential Community Policing Team (all verified via officer shift logs and within the RIMS reports). About 0055 hours, Sergeant [REDACTED] heard the community policing team (Officer [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas) receive a fire alarm activation call at University Park building 12 (UPA 12) to which they responded. [REDACTED] noted that they had received three or five false fire alarm activations within the last seven-day period. At this point in time, Sergeant [REDACTED] was in Lieutenant Benavidez' office discussing work related matters.

Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] announced over the police radio their arrival on scene and one of the officers announced they had located an activated fire alarm pull station. Sergeant [REDACTED] then heard, whom she believed was Officer Vargas, detaining two individuals however at that time she did not know why. She assumed it may be due to another false fire alarm activation. Shortly after (about 0111 hours), a request was made by one of the officers to respond to the scene. Both Lieutenant Benavidez and Sergeant [REDACTED] recognized the request was most likely for something of concern with whatever the officers were dealing with. Sergeant [REDACTED] subsequently cleared the police station and responded to UPA 12.

Sergeant [REDACTED] arrived on the north side of UPA 12. The building appeared to have already been evacuated and she couldn't see any of the police units in the area. The first person she saw was Community Director (CD) [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] approached [REDACTED] and she asked to confirm if he was the CD on-duty. [REDACTED] became upset with that statement as apparently he had been promoted and had a different working title. Sergeant [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] physical and verbal demeanor was at a heightened agitated state prior to their contact, however she had no idea why.

Sergeant [REDACTED] asked if [REDACTED] knew where her police units were. [REDACTED] advised they were on the south side of the building and they in turn walked to that location. [REDACTED] walked up to a male and female student (later identified as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) whom Officer [REDACTED] was detaining. Sergeant [REDACTED] asked where Officer Vargas was, to which Officer [REDACTED] stated on the second floor of the building (UPA 12). [REDACTED] looked at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and saw they were exhibited signs of heavy intoxication under the influence of alcohol. [REDACTED] was sitting on the entry way steps while [REDACTED] was standing leaning against a wall.

Sergeant [REDACTED] asked Officer [REDACTED] to explain what they were investigating. Officer [REDACTED] told her to speak with Officer Vargas about the matter. Eventually, Officer Vargas came to their location. It was about this time Sergeant [REDACTED] witnessed [REDACTED] giving orders in an apparent attempt to direct the course of events to come. [REDACTED] began by telling [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in a firm and direct voiced (as if he was ordering them) that they were going to go home and nothing further was going to happen to them that night.

Sergeant [REDACTED] looked at Officer Vargas and asked him what was happening. Officer Vargas advised they had arrived and thought it was another false pull station activation similar to the ones they had been receiving. He continued by stating they saw damage upstairs in the building; that there was a hole in the wall and blood all over the place. Sergeant [REDACTED] questioned whose blood they had observed as she had observed no signs of blood on any of the involved parties or in the area. Officer Vargas stated that it must have been from whoever punched the wall. Sergeant [REDACTED] asked if anyone was injured to which Vargas replied there was not. [REDACTED] then checked the involved parties for injuries for which there were none.

Officer Vargas also advised Sergeant [REDACTED] of a use of force incident in which he was involved with [REDACTED]. Vargas stated that while he was downstairs in the lobby of UPA 12, [REDACTED] wasn't going along with the program and didn't want to listen to him. He had both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] sitting down and that [REDACTED] was arguing with him back and forth. [REDACTED] was arguing over the fact he didn't want [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] to go to jail. As Officer Vargas was speaking with [REDACTED] started to get up off the ground and he performed a foot sweep and helped her down to the ground. Officer Vargas advised he checked [REDACTED] for injuries to which there were none complained of and that he offered medical response if [REDACTED] so desired. Sergeant [REDACTED] questioned [REDACTED] on the use of force incident to which [REDACTED] advised nothing happened. In as such, [REDACTED] could not obtain a statement from [REDACTED] about what had transpired.

At one point, [REDACTED] (who was handcuffed and heavily intoxicated) stood and walked over to [REDACTED] in an apparent attempt to give her a hug. He lost his balance and fell flat on

his face. Sergeant [REDACTED] took control of the situation and ensured [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were separated due to the fact [REDACTED] kept attempting to calm and console [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was persistent in sitting close to [REDACTED] and their levels of intoxication was creating added problems in their attempts to control the situation.

[REDACTED] made further comments to the officers stating [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had done nothing wrong and that they needed to be let go. Officer [REDACTED] commented to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] did not want to press charges on behalf of housing for the vandalism. Sergeant [REDACTED] heard [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas (who were standing at a distance) arguing but she could not discern what was being said. [REDACTED] then approached Sergeant [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED] apologizing for his statements and/or actions, yet Sergeant [REDACTED] wasn't clear on what exactly his role and actions were during the incident in question.

Officer Vargas told Sergeant [REDACTED] that he would tell her later and they proceeded with addressing how they were going to handle [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. It was determined [REDACTED] would be taken into custody with [REDACTED] being escorted back to her dorm room and released to the care and control of a roommate. [REDACTED] told Sergeant [REDACTED] that he would take [REDACTED] back to her room, to which [REDACTED] asked if he was willing to accept responsibility for her care overnight. [REDACTED] stated that he would not and to take her to jail if need be. Sergeant [REDACTED] advised that was not an option and would be taking her back to her dorm room to be cared for by her roommate. [REDACTED] agreed at which time Sergeant [REDACTED] and an unknown resident adviser escorted [REDACTED] to her dorm room. [REDACTED] was then taken and placed within the prisoner compartment of a patrol car.

After leaving [REDACTED] dorm, Sergeant [REDACTED] heard over the police radio one of the community policing team units request paramedics to respond to their location. By the time Sergeant [REDACTED] returned, the paramedics had already cleared [REDACTED] for booking. The officers told Sergeant [REDACTED] that he began hitting his head against the car window and yelling uncontrollably. At this point the officers took [REDACTED] to jail with no further contact by Sergeant [REDACTED].

Sergeant [REDACTED] returned to the police station and briefed Lieutenant Benavidez on the incident. Lieutenant Benavidez commented that it came to his attention [REDACTED] possibly told the resident advisors (RAs) who witnessed the incident not to say anything about what had transpired that evening. In as such, he instructed Sergeant [REDACTED] to make contact with the RAs and attempt to learn more about what they had witnessed. Sergeant [REDACTED] made contact with them at which time they advised they thought they were simply responding to a fire alarm call. They had no idea why [REDACTED] was present and had no idea he was on-duty that evening. The RAs confirmed there was an argument that ensued between [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas however they could not provide specifics on what they were arguing about. Sergeant [REDACTED] noted however that both RAs appeared as if they didn't want to talk about the incident. [REDACTED] couldn't recall if the RAs mentioned the foot sweep used by Officer Vargas, however a brief description of the use of force taken by Officer Vargas (as provided by RA [REDACTED]) was provided in her supplemental case report (supplement 3 of case #161636). The RAs kept their comments very vague.

According to Sergeant [REDACTED] she was instructed by Lieutenant Benavidez to talk to the RAs without asking about specifics. Her goal was not to interview them but to see what they would tell her freely. Her explanation regarding the direction given by Lieutenant Benavidez stemmed around the issue of [REDACTED] telling the RAs not to speak about the incident. The questions she asked included such inquiries as "What exactly did you see? Where were you standing? Could you guys hear what was happening?" [REDACTED] again reiterated she didn't ask any specifics.

Sergeant [REDACTED] was shown the completed Use of Force report form as completed by Officer Vargas; reviewed and approved by Sergeant [REDACTED] and approved by Lieutenant Benavidez. Sergeant [REDACTED] confirmed she reviewed and approved the use of force form. When shown the section on the form in which the shift supervisor is to check the yes or no box to the question of, "Do the actions of the officer involved in the incident indicate a need for additional training?", Sergeant [REDACTED] noticed it wasn't complete and stated that she had no idea why it wasn't completed. She advised that she usually places a check in one of the two boxes provided but it must have been an oversight on this particular form. In Sergeant [REDACTED] opinion based on her observations and corroborating statements obtained individually from the officers involved, Sergeant [REDACTED] would have checked "no," that no additional training was needed as the use of force was justified. When asked if there were any other independent statements solicited/obtained from anyone outside the officers' group, [REDACTED] stated no.

Interview with CSUN Lieutenant Mark Benavidez:

On or about June 21, 2016, about 1638 hours, I met with Lieutenant Benavidez as a witness relating to this investigation. Lieutenant Benavidez was advised that he was being interviewed as a witness and not the subject officer involved in this internal investigation; and that the interview was being recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

Lieutenant Benavidez told me the following information in essence:

Lieutenant Benavidez recalled just arriving home from work, sometime after 0100 hours, on April 30, 2016, when the shift supervisor, Sergeant [REDACTED] had called him to advise that CSUN officers (later determined to be Officers [REDACTED] and Vargas) received a fire alarm pull station activation call at University Park building 12 (UPA 12). The officers responded and found that it also involved an act of vandalism.

The only sworn officer (involved in the incident) whom Lieutenant Benavidez spoke with during and immediately after the incident in question was Sergeant [REDACTED]. Sergeant [REDACTED] briefed Lieutenant Benavidez on the incident, however at no time could he recall her mentioning that a use of force incident had occurred. He was told that the officers on scene were investigating a pull station fire alarm investigation in relation to a vandalism that the Community Director (CD) [REDACTED] intervened or obstructed in the investigation being conducted by the officers.

Lieutenant Benavidez hung up his cell phone and immediately called the on-duty Community Director's phone which happened to be [REDACTED] who answered. In speaking with [REDACTED] and "in the spirit of maintaining and continuing to have good relations; good working relations with the community professional staff; the residential life professional staff, I asked [REDACTED], quite directly, what happened with the situation. That I had heard things didn't go well." [REDACTED] explained that he had an issue with Officer Vargas in particular but declined to elaborate on what the issue was. He confirmed that he and Officer Vargas worked it out and that the problem was no longer an issue. During that conversation, [REDACTED] mentioned he told his two resident advisors (who were present at the time of the incident) not to specifically document whatever incident had occurred between [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas. Lieutenant Benavidez interpreted [REDACTED] comment(s) to indicate that an argument, disagreement, or some other matter of conflict occurred between [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas. It is Lieutenant Benavidez' opinion [REDACTED] chose not to speak about the details of that conflict to protect Officer Vargas for some unknown reason. That was the end of the conversation Lieutenant Benavidez had with CD [REDACTED]. At this point, Lieutenant Benavidez still had no information or idea that a use of force incident had occurred.

Later, Lieutenant Benavidez called Sergeant [REDACTED] and instructed her to speak with the two resident advisors (RAs) who were present at the time of the incident (fire alarm pull station and vandalism) and whom had allegedly been directed by [REDACTED] not to document that which had transpired between [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas. This concerned Benavidez as he didn't want any reports involving CSUN officers omitted in any way or not documented properly in accordance with housing policy. Lieutenant Benavidez stated he knows housing policies well in that he participates annually in the RA training(s) and knows how great the emphasis is placed on being thorough in their documentation of incidents as they occur. Lieutenant Benavidez directed Sergeant [REDACTED] to confirm with the RAs that [REDACTED] had in fact told them to omit said incident from their report and that if that were the case, to ask them (RAs) not to omit it and document whatever happened as they observed or experienced it.

When Lieutenant Benavidez returned to work and was reviewing reports, he came across a CSUN police use of force report form which involved the incident in question and a female subject (attached under tab B). Officer Benavidez stated he was notified of a use of force incident involving a male individual who had been taken into custody during the incident, however there was never any mention of a use of force taken against a female subject. At no time was there ever any mention by Sergeant [REDACTED] of a leg sweep or foot sweep used by a CSUN officer against a member of the public during the incident in question.

I asked Lieutenant Benavidez if he had provided any direction to Sergeant [REDACTED] regarding a supervisory investigation into the use of force incident, to which he replied he did not.

Interview with CSUN Officer Anthony Vargas (subject officer to the complaint):

On or about May 9, 2016, I issued a personnel order (attached section "D") to Officer Anthony Vargas notifying him that he was being required to schedule an appointment with me for an investigatory interview regarding the above listed allegations stemming from a use of force incident and citizen's complaint made to an on-scene officer (Officer [REDACTED]).

On May 25, 2016, about 0830 hours, I met with Officer Vargas for purposes of the investigatory interview. Since Officer Vargas was also a named subject of this complaint, he was advised of his right to have a representative of his choice at the interview to which he brought [REDACTED] Attorney at Law. The interview was recorded via my assigned department Olympus digital recorder.

I advised Officer Vargas of the Miranda advisement to which he refused to answer any questions (attached section "E"). I subsequently advised Officer Vargas that I was ordering him to answer all of my questions in a truthful and accurate manner after issuing him the Lybarger warning and Garrity admonishment (see attached section "E" for both documents). I advised Officer Vargas that a failure to do so may result in administrative discipline up to and including termination. He said he understood this order and would therefore answer those questions asked of him. Prior to the interview (i.e. the asking of questions) I provided Officer Vargas a copy of the documentation involving the complaint (i.e., RIMS incident and applicable case reports). Officer Vargas reviewed and confirmed that the CSUN PD reports presented to him were accurate and reflected the incidents surrounding the incident in question to the best of his knowledge.

Officer Vargas told me the following information in essence:

Officer Vargas was working as a member of the Community Policing Team on or about April 30, 2016 (as verified on the officer shift logs and in the RIMS reports). Sergeant [REDACTED] was the patrol night watch supervisor with Officer [REDACTED] assigned to the night watch patrol shift. About 0055 hours on the aforementioned date Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] responded to a fire alarm activation call within the University Park Apartment complex at building 12 (UPA 12). Dispatch advised the activation was coming from the second floor fire alarm pull station. They drove their patrol vehicle to the north side of UPA 12 and then entered the building through the main lobby. Upon arrival they saw no signs of smoke or fire and a large group of residents had already evacuated to the north side of the building.

Upon entering, Officer [REDACTED] remained in the lobby as the incident commander while Officer Vargas responded to the second floor to check that there was no signs of fire. Officer [REDACTED] advised that the lobby fire alarm panel was only indicating a second floor pull station activation. Officer Vargas checked the second floor fire alarm pull station, saw no evidence of smoke or fire, and made a determination it was a false alarm activation. At no time did Officer Vargas check the remaining floors or areas of the dorm building.

Next to the fire alarm pull station (by room 203) Officer Vargas saw a large hole punched in the dry wall, insulation pull from within the wall, and the spatter of blood. Officer Vargas announced over the radio his observations and confirmed the alarm activation was false. He then instructed Officer [REDACTED] to silence the fire alarm. Shortly after this, Officer Vargas heard dispatch report that LAPD called to report someone attempting to break into room [REDACTED] in UPA 12 causing damage.

Due to the situation, Officer Vargas requested dispatch call for a resident advisor (RA) to respond. He knocked on the door to room [REDACTED] and the residents opened stating that someone had just attempted to break into their dorm room. The suspects were described as a male and female who were drunk (under the influence of alcohol) and at first attempted to access the room using the door's card reader. The suspects then banged and kicked on the door and hallway walls. It was at this time the fire alarm activated and the suspects left. The residents then opened the door and found a wallet on the floor containing an ID card in the name of [REDACTED]

Officer [REDACTED] then announced over the police radio that he had made contact with two individuals in the lobby. Officer Vargas responded and found Officer [REDACTED] detaining a [REDACTED] (female) and [REDACTED] (male). He also saw Community Director (CD) [REDACTED] in the UPA 12 lobby as well. [REDACTED] was sitting on the ground against the east wall while [REDACTED] was sitting against the southwest wall. [REDACTED] was heavily intoxicated evidence in the fact her speech was slurred, smelled of the odor of alcohol, eyes were bloodshot and watery, and she didn't know where she was at. [REDACTED] also appeared heavily intoxicated as his balance was completely unsteady, had slurred speech, extremely argumentative, and refused to follow directions.

Officer Vargas handed Officer [REDACTED] the wallet found by the activated pull station that contained an ID matching the male subject being detained ([REDACTED]). He then walked to [REDACTED] to initiate confirmation of her identity. It was at this time CD [REDACTED] approached Vargas stating, "Hey, this is what's going to happen Vargas. You're gonna let them go. They're gonna go to their room. And they're gonna sleep it off."

As a result, Officer Vargas stepped away from [REDACTED] and pulled [REDACTED] off to the side. Officer Vargas clarified he was handling a police investigation and to stand back. It was Officer Vargas' opinion that CD [REDACTED] was interfering with their investigation, thus becoming a hindrance to their law enforcement duties and responsibilities. And while his focus and back were turned away from [REDACTED] stood up and began to walk up behind him. Officer [REDACTED] directed [REDACTED] to sit back down, and as Officer Vargas turned he observed [REDACTED] on her feet and walking towards him. Officer Vargas could not recall or approximate how many steps were taken by [REDACTED] toward him.

Officer Vargas immediately told [REDACTED] to sit down at least twice to which she refused and continued to walk towards him. Again, Officer Vargas could not recall or approximate how many steps were taken by [REDACTED] toward him. He subsequently placed his hands on [REDACTED] grabbing her left arm and pushing her against the wall. He then pushed downward to get her back into a seated position on the ground. [REDACTED] resisted by tensing up into a rigid state and then began pulling away from Vargas' grasp.

In that he was unable to put her down to the ground with his hands, Vargas felt [REDACTED] may get combative with him and subsequently chose to use a foot sweep to gain compliance. According to Officer Vargas, this is deployed by placing a foot behind the foot of another person and pushing it out from under them, causing the person to lose their balance. By employing this technique against her left foot, [REDACTED] lost her balance and fell to the ground. Officer Vargas stated he held onto [REDACTED] so she would not fall as hard. In Vargas' opinion, at no time did the foot sweep place [REDACTED] safety in danger of physical harm in that he assisted her to the ground to soften the fall. Officer Vargas stated he recognized that [REDACTED] was drunk and made sure to hold on to [REDACTED] as she fell to, in essence, limit the risk of injury. [REDACTED] did not complain of any pain and Vargas believes Sergeant [REDACTED] examined her later in the investigation. Officer Vargas stated that this entire incident happened rapidly requiring split second decisions. He estimated that the time between hearing Officer [REDACTED] directing [REDACTED] to sit down and his foot sweep occurred within a couple second time period.

Immediately after the leg sweep, CD [REDACTED] became upset and began to argue with him. [REDACTED] told Officer Vargas that the use of force didn't need to happen and Vargas replied, "this wouldn't have happened had you not interfered." [REDACTED] then walked away and spoke with Officer [REDACTED]. Officer Vargas stated he had no idea when Officer [REDACTED] arrived on scene to assist.

Officer Vargas' attention was then drawn to [REDACTED]. He attempted to stand up to which Vargas approached and immediately placed handcuffs on him, meanwhile keeping a close watch of [REDACTED] who remained seated on the floor. From this point forward [REDACTED] showed no acts of resistance, only cooperation with the officers.

Officer Vargas stated that it was his opinion, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] actions and intoxicated demeanor at times placed all the officers' safety in jeopardy and that of the community. However, he stated that [REDACTED] didn't become agitated to the point of concern until he left the building. Vargas described [REDACTED] as calm while he was in the lobby, he was just non-compliant with instructions being provided him by Officer [REDACTED]. It wasn't until [REDACTED] was placed in the prisoner compartment of the patrol car when he became violent.

Officer Vargas clarified that prior to the use of force incident, he did not turn his officer issued digital recorder on as he saw no need for it at that time. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were very cooperative and they were still investigating the situation. However, once the use of force incident occurred both he and Officer [REDACTED] immediately activated their digital recorders.

When asked about who was responsible for conducting the preliminary investigation, Officer Vargas stated that he initially thought Officer [REDACTED] was. This was because [REDACTED] made first contact with both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the alleged suspects. However once the use of force occurred Officer Vargas said he became the primary officer.

When asked if the Los Angeles Fire Department responded to the fire alarm call, Officer Vargas said they did not. When asked if they were notified to come to the scene, Officer Vargas believed the fire department was called (by dispatch) but he then called them off (from responding) as he told dispatch "to hold off until we get there, until we determine

what was going on.” He justified this decision by stating that almost every night the past two to three weeks they had responded to falsely activated pull stations and “didn’t want to waste resources” responding to yet another possible false alarm. When asked if this is common practice to cancel the fire department (in this manner), Officer Vargas stated that he didn’t cancel them, just instructed dispatch in holding off on calling them. Vargas did state that this practice was common.

When asked if an incident command post (ICP) was established for this call, Officer Vargas provided a firm “yes.” Officer Vargas described this practice as when the first officers arrive on the scene they announce activation of the ICP over the police radio to which he believes that he did; and that he notified dispatch it was located north of UPA 14. He continued stating that one officer stays at the ICP while one goes in the building to make sure there’s no actual signs of fire which they determined right away. When asked to describe how an ICP is established, Officer Vargas stated that upon arrival they set up the command post by setting up a green flag (on the patrol car), to which Vargas stated wasn’t done in this case because they quickly determined there was no fire and in fact a false alarm.

In reviewing department policy on fire and fire alarm response procedures (05-S.O.-005), I asked Officer Vargas if he reviewed the 9 critical tasks card for such an incident to which he stated he believed that he did. Officer Vargas stated that the first item on the card is to quickly assess the situation to determine what the officer(s) were dealing with. In this case, he stated that is exactly what they did. I again asked Officer Vargas if he in fact notified dispatch that the ICP was established and he said, “yes.” When asked if he notified dispatch of the incident commander’s identity, Officer Vargas stated that since he put it over the radio, it was obviously either himself or Officer [REDACTED]. When asked if they deployed/used bullhorns (for evacuation purposes) as required per the policy, Officer Vargas stated they did not in that the building had already been evacuated before their arrival. And Officer Vargas continued stating his role/purpose was to enter the building to determine if there was an actual fire (inferring not the evacuation of occupants). Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Vargas saw no RAs in the area.

When asked if in his opinion the use of force taken was justifiable under the circumstances presented, Officer Vargas stated, “I believe it was.” Vargas stated that they had an intoxicated female who was uncooperative not following instructions and could have been combative if they didn’t control her; they were investigating two criminal acts (tampering with a fire alarm & vandalism) and possibly others as there was blood present at the scene; it was unknown at that point as to the involvement of [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] (i.e., the blood could have been the result of a violent act such as a domestic violence incident); and it was unknown if they had a principal aggressor.

I then asked if he felt the use of force taken was objectively reasonable given the circumstances presented. Officer Vargas stated, “I believe it was. That was the lowest force I could have used at the time.” Vargas said he tried verbalization and that didn’t work. He tried using his hands to get her down to ground and that didn’t work. Therefore, he tried the foot sweep which worked and no further use of force was needed.

In reviewing the reasonableness standard for use of force incidents with Officer Vargas (as per Graham versus Conner U.S. Supreme Court ruling), Vargas believes [REDACTED] posed an immediate threat to officers and others; that she actively resisted being (lawfully) detained; that she attempted to evade arrest (as evidenced by [REDACTED] actively pulling away from Vargas); that the circumstances surrounding the incident were stressful, uncertain, and rapidly evolving requiring split second judgements and decisions; and that the severity of the crime being investigation was potentially at a higher level (i.e., felony vandalism, domestic violence due to the blood found).

When asked if Officer Vargas felt his command presence had everything under control during the incident in question, he stated that he did not. It wasn't until after the use of force that control was gained. Officer Vargas believes that had [REDACTED] not interfered, his attention would not have been drawn away from his detainee [REDACTED] which resulted in the need to use force against her to regain the control that was lost. I asked Officer Vargas a few questions to elicit his familiarity and/or working relationship with CD [REDACTED] Vargas advised he has known [REDACTED] for only a few years as a residential life community director. Allegedly he was recently promoted but Vargas did not know to what position. Vargas has known [REDACTED] to be a very vocal person but not a violent or aggressive person. Vargas has only worked directly with [REDACTED] on one other occasion involving a loud party call. In his opinion [REDACTED] is anti-police. He stated this is his personal opinion based on this incident coupled with a couple previous ones in which [REDACTED] became upset with Officer Vargas for bringing his police K-9 around an event [REDACTED] was hosting (which Vargas believed may have been a Black Lives Matter type of event).

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION, OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS:

On or about April 30, 2016, about 0055 hours, Community Policing Team Members Officer Anthony Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] received a radio call of a fire alarm activation in the University Park complex building 12 (UPA 12). Dispatcher [REDACTED] received the information via the department's fire alarm monitoring station and coordinated officer response accordingly. Dispatcher [REDACTED] assigned Officer [REDACTED] the duties of escorting the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) from Lassen Street and Lindley Avenue to which he acknowledged over the police radio. Immediately after, Officer Vargas instructed dispatch to hold off on calling the fire department until their arrival. Dispatcher [REDACTED] in turn failed to call the fire department as required by department policy.

Department policy 05-S.O.-005 states that LAFD must be notified and should University Police officers arrive on scene first and determine there is no fire, the dispatcher shall directly transmit such information to the LAFD. LAFD is the only entity who can determine whether or not they will continue their response to campus. [Note: Although there is no specific Fire Code requiring an immediate response by the fire department, California State Fire Marshall [REDACTED] (assigned to CSUN - phone [REDACTED]) stated that it is best practice to immediately call for fire response and have a policy/practice in place similar to the one the CSUN Department of Police Services has. He stressed that in not

having such a policy, especially for an occupied residential complex, creates extreme risk and liability to the safety of the community. Fire Marshall [REDACTED] provided a few examples of universities across the country in which student fatalities occurred even upon the immediate dispatch of fire crews. The Seton Hall University fire in 2000 was one example he provided in just how quickly a fire within a dormitory can get out of control, resulting in student deaths, despite the quick and professional response of police and fire personnel.

Upon arrival, Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] parked their patrol vehicle on the north side of UPA 12 and immediately entered the main lobby of the building where the fire alarm panel is located. Despite Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] testimony that an incident command post was established as noted in Officer Vargas' crime report, an incident command post was in fact not established as required by department policy, of which extensive training has and is continuously being provided by the department to its officers (see below for Officer Vargas' incident command training overview). In failing to do so, the officers also failed at meeting the policy requirements of notifying dispatch of the location of the incident command post and providing dispatch the identity of who the incident commander was. As the senior officer (12 years experience as compared to Officer [REDACTED] one year), Officer Vargas had the responsibility of taking a leadership role in ensuring department policy was being adhered to for the safety of both themselves and that of the community.

Through further review of the incident, it was noted the officers failed to take their issued bull horn into the building to assist in ensuring UPA 12 was evacuated, as is also required for safety purposes by department policy 05-S.O.-005. Instead, Officer Vargas testified that the bull horn was not needed in that all (residents) had been evacuated prior to their arrival, as evidenced by the large number of people standing outside the north entrance of the building (an obvious assumption and extremely poor judgement and decision). Officer Vargas also reiterated he saw no need to evacuate in that there were no immediate signs of smoke or fire. What is known, not all residents had evacuated as Officer Vargas made contact with the residents of UPA 12, room 203 shortly after checking the fire alarm pull station. At no time did Officer Vargas or Officer [REDACTED] ensure the remaining floors were checked for signs of fire or residents who had not evacuated the building.

Upon making entry into the lobby of UPA 12, Officer [REDACTED] responded to the first floor fire alarm panel and came in contact with two CSUN students ([REDACTED]) who were heavily intoxicated (alcohol). Officer [REDACTED] separated the two on opposite sides of the lobby by having them sit on the ground with their backs against the wall. Quickly he found the need to maintain control over [REDACTED] given his agitated and presumed unpredictable state.

Officer Vargas responded to the second floor (location of the activated pull station) and observed significant damage to the hallway wall as well as blood on the door to room 203 and adjacent wall area(s). A wallet was found at the scene with an ID inside for [REDACTED]. Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] quickly discerned that the two

students Officer [REDACTED] was in contact with were the ones most likely involved in the vandalism and fire pull station activation.

Eventually Officer Vargas met Officer [REDACTED] in the lobby upon [REDACTED] request. At this point, [REDACTED] made constant verbal attempts at calming her boyfriend [REDACTED] and getting him to stop talking/yelling as he was becoming increasingly agitated and boisterous. At this point, all witnesses agree [REDACTED] was not out of control but he was definitely not complying with the officers' requests.

While interviewing [REDACTED] in the first floor lobby, Community Director [REDACTED] made contact with Officer Vargas in an attempt to speak with him about releasing both the students, in that they were drunk and should be allowed to return to their dorm rooms. Based on my investigation, it is my opinion [REDACTED] was not in an agitated or aggressive state. He was fairly cordial in his attempts to talk with Officer Vargas about the situation. Officer Vargas however directed his attention toward [REDACTED] and told him to back away as he was dealing with a police investigation. [REDACTED] failed to move away and continued his attempts at speaking with Officer Vargas. [Note: per Officer Vargas' own statement, he knows [REDACTED] fairly well and only knows him to be a vocal person, never one who acts out aggressively or violently toward others.]

At this point, Officer Vargas' back was facing towards [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stood up from the ground, at which time Officer [REDACTED] instructed her to sit down. Although there are conflicting statements between the police officers and witnesses at the scene on what transpired next, I formed the following conclusion.

As a result of Officer [REDACTED] statement to [REDACTED] Officer Vargas was alerted to the fact [REDACTED] stood up behind him. Officer Vargas was no more than three to five feet in front of [REDACTED] and as he turned, he immediately grabbed a hold of [REDACTED] right shoulder and arm. As Officer Vargas directed [REDACTED] to sit down, he attempted to pull down on her left arm and/or push down on her left shoulder allowing her no time to comply with his requests to sit. [REDACTED] was drunk with an unsteady balance, and as she leaned into Officer Vargas he believed she was resisting her detention and formed the opinion she could become combative. I however found no evidence to suggest or indicate that was the direction she would have headed in this situation. It is my opinion based on the officer and witness statements, [REDACTED] was most likely attempting to move toward her boyfriend who was seated immediately across the lobby from her. Officer Vargas just happened to be standing in between them.

Upon feeling [REDACTED] resistance against his attempt to get her to sit down, Officer Vargas quickly chose to use a "foot sweep" on [REDACTED] left foot to cause her to lose her balance. This caused [REDACTED] to fall back into the wall from which she had been sitting against and down to the ground onto her buttocks. Although Officer Vargas stated he maintained control of her arm and safely assisted her to the ground, I find this highly unlikely in that trying to safely control a drunk person's dead weight from dropping to the ground, from his position, is virtually impossible. Officer Vargas, supported by Officer [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED], stated Vargas used a single sweeping motion of [REDACTED] left foot. The two

resident advisors and community director stated Officer Vargas used a kicking motion to strike [REDACTED] left calf area three times due to the fact [REDACTED] didn't move/fall after Vargas' first two attempts. Based on equal and conflicting statements, I was unable to prove or form an opinion as to how the "foot sweep" was actually performed by Officer Vargas.

After the "foot sweep" [REDACTED] became agitated questioning Officer Vargas why he kicked her. [REDACTED] level of agitation quickly rose, also yelling at Officer Vargas for kicking his girlfriend. Community Director [REDACTED] also became quite angry and began commenting on the excessive treatment he took toward [REDACTED]. If the situation wasn't out of the officer's control before the "foot sweep" it most certainly became a concern at this point in time in that the use of force incident created tensions, shock, and anger of the witnesses and detainees to heighten immensely. De-escalation tactics with this situation in my opinion were either dismissed or completely overlooked by Officer Vargas in the proper management of this incident.

It is my opinion from the information obtained through this investigation, neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] created an officer safety concern for Officer Vargas prior to or when he took his attention away from [REDACTED] and focused it toward [REDACTED]. However, based on Officer Vargas' statement, that had [REDACTED] not interfered with his investigation his attention would not have been drawn away from his detainee [REDACTED] which resulted in the need to use force against her to regain the control that was lost, I believe Officer Vargas displayed poor judgement, officer safety skills, and command presence in turning his focus on [REDACTED]. There were many other options Officer Vargas could have employed to deal with [REDACTED] that could have prevented what led to his use of force against [REDACTED]. Given his knowledge and experience with [REDACTED] simply ignoring him or moving the detainees to another location until such time as he could have safely addressed [REDACTED] "interference" would have been a better decision. I personally believe Officer Vargas garnered a feeling of "contempt of cop" toward [REDACTED] and that Officer Vargas wasn't going to let it go without addressing it on the spot.

Officer Vargas used his department digital recorder in this case, however it was not activated until after his use of force incident with [REDACTED]. Officer Vargas made a judgement call that the recorder was not needed early on in the situation as he and Officer [REDACTED] were still investigating the situation, no one was under arrest, and their initial contact with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was non-confrontational in that their demeanor was cooperative. Witness testimony however conflicts with Officer Vargas' explanation, especially as it relates to [REDACTED]. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at times, even early on in the situation, were unresponsive and/or argumentative to the requests and/or direction of officers. That coupled with the elevated levels of intoxication [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were exhibiting, the possibility that conflict could quickly escalate if not managed appropriately by the officers greatly increases. In as such, it is my opinion that the department policy on the use of digital recorders applies and should have been activated early on in the incident, not after the use of force incident occurred.

SPECIFIED FINDINGS/OPINIONS –

Given the facts of this investigation, it is my opinion that Officer Anthony Vargas exhibited a severe lack in judgement and decision-making ultimately violating multiple department policies and performance expectations. As a patrol officer and preliminary investigating officer of the incident in question, Officer Vargas was required to adhere to all expectations of said position as stipulated in the department's Policies and Procedures manual.

First, Officer Vargas failed to comply with department incident command protocols, failing to establish an incident command post and then failing to thoroughly and accurately prepare the preliminary crime/incident report as required by department policy. Through this investigation it was learned that Officer Vargas falsely reported in his official police report, and then through his testimony, that an incident command post was in fact established. As the senior officer in his team of two (12 years versus just over 1 year), it is my opinion Officer Vargas had a responsibility for ensuring this was accomplished in the proper manner for which he has been appropriately trained; not only to meet policy requirements but to maintain a professional response and approach to a fire alarm call in an occupied residential dormitory. In failing to do so he placed the safety of the residents of UPA 12 in harms way by failing to respond in a professional and informed manner utilizing Incident Command System (ICS) protocols as incorporated in both California's Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) – all of which Officer Vargas has been consistently trained in for many years.

As the investigation progressed, I learned that Officer Vargas told dispatch to hold off on sending the fire department until he arrived. In doing so, Officer Vargas knowing violated department policy on his own accord; placed the community's safety in further harms way; and set an extremely poor example to a new officer of the department in maintaining a level of professionalism and excellence expected of the officers within the CSUN police department. Officer Vargas' mindset should have been primarily focused on taking a lead role at ensuring the measured and controlled approach in managing the incident versus the haphazard approach he commenced with.

Second, I formed the opinion that Officer Vargas' actions throughout the incident (ie., failing to activate an incident command post; failing to use a bullhorn to properly clear the floors in UPA 12; failing to take control over a situation whereby Office Vargas felt the community director was interfering; and enacting a use of force technique against a drunk non-combatant who in my opinion was not actively resisting) placed undue risk and liability exposure of the university, department, and himself in neglecting to ensure the safety of all.

Of most concern was the use of force taken against [REDACTED] Officer Vargas. It is my opinion the force taken was not reasonable and was most definitely avoidable given the circumstances. As stated within department policy 08-L.E.-11, the United States Supreme Court in Graham vs. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989) ruled that the use of force by police officers must be "objectively reasonable" and that officers must consider the following factors when considering what level of force, if any, to use.

1. Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers and/or others.
2. Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest.
3. In circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving ("pace" of events) which require split-second judgments.
4. The severity of the alleged crime at issue.
5. Whether the suspect is attempting to evade arrest by flight.

(and) It is the policy of this department that officers shall use only that force which is reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event. An officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life, including the officer's own life, or in the defense of any person in danger of serious physical injury. In addition to recognizing the appropriate level of force option, officers must also make a conscious decision to de-escalate that force once the suspect submits or is under control.

Based on my investigation, I believe the [REDACTED] never posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers and/or others. [REDACTED] most certainly did. I also believe that [REDACTED] was not actively resisting her detention, nor attempting to evade the possibility of arrest by flight. From all accounts, [REDACTED] was very concerned over her boyfriend [REDACTED]. Prior to and after the use of force incident she struggled at trying to communicate with him in remaining quiet and calm for the officers. I believe that when she stood up behind Officer Vargas, she was attempting to go sit with him to help control his emotions and concerning behaviors toward the officers. And when she moved toward Officer Vargas and "resisted" his attempts at moving her to the ground, I believe [REDACTED] was merely being a typical drunk person who has difficulty maintaining their balance and moves in odd ways in an attempt to retain their balance so as not to fall.

I do however believe the circumstances surround this incident were tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving which were mostly the result of [REDACTED] level of intoxication and concerning demeanor; not that of [REDACTED]. I however didn't believe there were any times which required split-second judgments to be made, especially when dealing with a non-combative drunk individual such as [REDACTED].

As for the severity of the alleged crime(s) being investigated, it is obvious the officers were investigating a misdemeanor vandalism, misdemeanor tampering with a fire alarm, and public intoxication; all of which are low grade crimes. For Officer Vargas to state they may have had a domestic violence incident which elevated the severity of the situation, I find nonsensical. None of the officers or witnesses articulated any such actions on the part of [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] nor evidence suggesting such a crime had or was occurring during their initial response and subsequent investigation. Throughout this investigation the officers knew this was the case of a severely intoxicated couple who were creating mischief in their drunken stupor.

It is as a result of this investigation I have formed the opinion Officer Vargas did not use that force which was reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event. I believe he overreacted with a split-second decision that wasn't necessary upon letting his emotions control his judgements,

decisions, and actions after becoming agitated by Community Director [REDACTED] and suddenly seeing [REDACTED] standing up behind him.

Third, Officer Vargas made the decision to not use his department issued digital audio recorder early in his preliminary investigation, and only activated it after his use of force incident. Department policy requires that all sworn personnel shall use their department issued digital recorders, and are to be activated in such incidents as “arrests” and/or “contacts in which the contacted party is argumentative, unresponsive, or otherwise hostile.” In the arrest situation of [REDACTED], it is my opinion Officer Vargas was required by department policy to activate and record his entire interaction with the two detainees as they were unresponsive and in [REDACTED] position argumentative. The purpose of the digital recorder as stated within policy is to accomplish several primary objectives:

1. *Digital recorders allow for accurate documentation of statements made during police/public contacts, arrests, and critical incidents. They also serve to enhance the accuracy of officer reports and testimony in court.*
2. *Voice recordings also enhance this Department’s ability to review probable cause for arrest, officer and suspect interaction, evidence for investigative and prosecutorial purposes, and to provide additional information for officer evaluation and training.*
3. *The digital recorder may also be useful in documenting crime and accident scenes or other events to include the confiscation and documentation of evidence or contraband.*

In my opinion, based on Officer Vargas’ fairly recent discipline involving a failure to use his recorder, he should have used better judgement in forming a reasonable belief that a recording on this incident, from the initial contact with [REDACTED], would have been of use in documenting the incident/contact as stated within department policy 06-L.E.-003. Had digital audio recordings been properly obtained as required during the investigation and ultimate arrest of [REDACTED] and detention of [REDACTED], a more accurate and thorough account of the incident in question would have been available; especially in areas of concern involving the reasonable use of force.

Fourth, Officer Vargas failed to keep police dispatch properly advised of his status during the incident. Officer Vargas recently received discipline for a similar problem and as a result of this investigation has shown continued difficulty in meeting the requirements of department policy, 07-S.O.-011 – Police Services Communications. In relation to this particular situation, Section VI.C.2.c. (Calling out information) applies.

Field officers shall call out over the radio the following information which the dispatcher shall enter into the radio log via the CAD/RIMS system as appropriate. All information received from field officers shall be entered in “real time,” i.e., immediately upon receiving the information. This is done to ensure accuracy in time-stamping activities and officer status as they are received. Information shall include at a minimum:

- ii. *En route time to the call.*
- (and)
- iv. *Their arrival on scene.*

Based on the radio recordings reviewed and information obtained through my interviews, it is my opinion that Officer Vargas continues to be careless in his radio transmissions and thus did not maintain proper awareness as to department radio communication protocol/expectations. For example, Officer Vargas failed to advise dispatch he and Officer [REDACTED] had arrived on scene. He also failed to provide an en route time to the call for service. As a result, Dispatcher [REDACTED] was unable to complete her performance expectation of time stamping their arrival on scene. In addition, failing to provide the information needed for a time stamp in CAD, creates a significant time lapse in departmental response time statistics for critical incidents (in this case the response to a fire alarm call in an occupied dormitory). Another example of a failure to adhere to proper communication protocols involved the situation whereby Officer Vargas failed to notify dispatch of the establishment of an incident command post to which he stated he did. Although evidence was found to prove an incident command post was never established in accordance with department policy, this proves yet again Officer Vargas continues to operate well-below standards without due regard for the factors that affect his role and responsibilities as it relates to communicating effectively.

In summary, it is my opinion Officer Vargas continues to exhibit behaviors and actions representative of a failure to devote the time and attention necessary to the effective and professional performance of his responsibilities, and in being prepared to respond to the demands of his office/position (both of which are canons of ethics in department policy 03-P.A.-001). Based on the numerous policy violations associated with the incident in question, many of which were violations Officer Vargas recently received formal discipline for, it is apparent Officer Vargas has not spent the time necessary to know, comprehend, and/or maintain consistency in compliance with those policies/rules/practices the department requires which meet best practices in the law enforcement profession. Based on Officer Vargas' lengthy training history on each of the applicable policies and procedures in which violations were noted, as well as applicable training courses (see below for policy review and training details), there is little more the department can do to ensure compliance with that which is expected of Officer Vargas. And in that Officer Vargas was in my opinion dishonest about the establishment and activation of an incident command post (both in his official police report and through his testimony under oath during this investigation), I believe Officer Vargas' ethics and integrity are of great concern and have no place as a sworn peace officer with an accredited agency such as the CSUN Department of Police Services.

OFFICER TRAINING REVIEW:

POLICY REVIEWS

Below is an itemized list of applicable policy reviews in which Officer Vargas was instructed on or had reviewed department policies and procedures on the

topics of use of force, standards of conduct for sworn personnel, fire and fire alarm response procedures, digital voice recording devices, field reporting and management, criminal investigations, unusual occurrence-all hazard plans, and police communications. (month/year)

- Department Policy/Procedure #03-P.A.-001 Standards of Conduct (Sworn)
10/'15, 10/'14, 10/'13, 10/'12, 4/'11, 1/'10, 2/'09, 2/'08, 2/'07, 2/'05,
6/'04
- Department Policy/Procedure #08-L.E.-011 Use of Force
12/'15, 12/'14, 1/'14, 12/'12, 8/'11, 1/'10, 6/'09, 8/'08
- Department Policy/Procedure #05-S.O.-005 Fire and Fire Alarm Response
Procedures
4/'16, 4/'15, 5/'14, 4/'13, 4/'12, 10/'11, 1/'10, 9/'09, 2/'08
- Department Policy/Procedure #06-L.E.-003 Digital Voice Recording
Devices
3/'16, 4/'15, 5/'14, 3/'13, 3/'12, 7/'11, 1/'10, 9/'09, 2/'08, 3/'07, 6/'06
- Department Policy/Procedure #07-O.A.-007 Field Reporting and
Management
4/'16, 4/'15, 5/'14, 4/'13, 4/'12, 4/'11
- Department Policy/Procedure #07-C.I.-005 Criminal Investigation
3/'16, 4/'15, 5/'14, 3/'13, 3/'12, 10/'11, 1/'10, 8/'09, 2/'08, 7/'07
- Department Policy/Procedure #08-S.O.-019 Unusual Occurrence – All
Hazzard Plan
2/'16, 12/'14, 11/'13, 11/'12, 12/'11, 11/'10, 11/'09
- Annual In-Service Training - Policy Reviews (note: ALL department
policies are reviewed with both civilian and sworn employees to discuss
revisions that affect their work assignments/responsibilities).
1/7/15, 1/8/14, 1/9/13, 1/11/12, 2/16/11, 1/27/10, 3/18/09, 10/15/08,
9/19/07

Below are applicable policy reviews in which Officer Vargas was instructed on or had reviewed department policies and procedures on the topic of police services communications.

- Department Policy/Procedure #07-S.O.-011 Police Services
Communications
8/'15, 7/'14, 7/'13, 7/'12, 10/'11, 10/'10, 10/'09, 11/'08

COURSES

Below is an itemized list of applicable training courses post-police academy in which Officer Vargas was instructed on topics relating to that of incident command, report writing, use of force, control, and tactical communication. (month/year)

➤ Incident Command

- Incident Command System (ICS) Practical Exercises (In-Service)
11/'15, 8/'15, 5/'15, 2/'15, 11/'14, 9/'14, 7/'14, 4/'14, 10/'13,
8/'13, 6/'12, 5/'12, 4/'12, 3/'12
- Incident Command System (ICS) Biennial Reviews (In-Service)
5/'13, 10/'12, 4/'12, 10/'11, 4/'11, 10/'10, 4/'10, 11/'09, 4/'09,
10/'08, 4/'08, 10/'07, 12/'06
- Incident Command (IC) Ready Bag, ICS Critical Tasks Check
List, and Incident Command POST Flag (In-Service) 2/'12
- Incident Command System (ICS) for Sworn Personnel Remedial
Training (In-Service) 12/'11
- Patrol Vehicle Incident Command (IC) Ready Bag 8/'10
- Introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS-100 L.E. –
FEMA) 7/'07
- Introduction to the Standardized Emergency Management System
(SEMS – FEMA) 7/'07
- Introduction to the National Incident Management System (NIMS
– ICS-700 – FEMA) 7/'05

➤ Report Writing

- The Power of the Pen – Report Writing 8/'13
- Report Writing for Increased Convictions 7/'07

➤ Use of Force, Control, and Tactical Communication

- POST Arrest & Control 9/'14
- POST Use of Force (including Electronic Control Devices & In-
Custody Deaths) 12/'13
- POST Arrest & Control/Tactical Communications Combo
11/'11, 10/'09, 4/'08
- POST Tactical Communication 8/'07

• **MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:**

None

- **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

Allegations: **Sustained** - for a violation of the following department policies involving the response and handling of a fire alarm activation and concurrent vandalism investigation:

- Department Policy/Procedure #05-S.O.-005 Fire and Fire Alarm Response Procedures, Section IV – “Incident Command Post – The first responding officer to a fire scene or alarm of fire shall immediately establish the Incident Command Post and act as Incident Commander (I/C), reviewing the ICS 9 Critical Tasks list. The I/C shall immediately notify CSUN dispatch of the exact location of the Incident Command Post and the name of the Incident Commander.” And... “Evacuation of Buildings – Officers shall utilize bullhorns (on a floor by floor basis) as the primary means to direct building occupants to evacuate a building.”
- Department Policy/Procedure #08-S.O.-019 Unusual Occurrence – All Hazzard Plan, “It shall be the policy of this department to respond to planned and unplanned disasters or emergencies that occur on this campus, or in our sphere of influence when requested, in a professional and informed manner utilizing Incident Command System (ICS) as incorporated in both California’s Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).”
- Department Policy/Procedure #07-O.A.-007 Field Reporting and Management,

Section IV.B.2 – “All reports shall be prepared as directed in this policy and the Criminal Investigation Policy (Policy/Procedure 07-C.I.-005) and within the following guidelines:

- b. All reports shall be detailed, accurate, honest, and factual.”

Section IV.E.e – “Officers are expected to complete reports in a fully detailed manner. Any report written by a member of this department shall be free of false or deliberately incomplete information.”

- Department Policy/Procedure #07-C.I.-005 Criminal Investigations, Section IV.D.2.a and k – “Steps to be followed in conducting preliminary investigations include:

- a. Providing for the safety of victims, suspects, and witnesses, rendering aid for injured parties and requesting appropriate medical attention, if necessary.
 - k. Preparing the preliminary crime/incident report fully and accurately.”
- Department Policy/Procedure #06-L.E.-003 Digital Voice Recording Devices. “All sworn personnel of this Department shall use department-issued digital recorders.” Section IV.B.1 and 3 – “When and How to Use the Digital Recorder.
- 1. The digital recorder shall be activated and remain activated in order to ensure the integrity of the recording unless the contact involves an area restricted by this policy (see Section C, below).
 - 3. Incidents in which an officer should activate his/her digital recorder include but are not limited to: b. arrests. c. contacts in which the contacted party is argumentative, unresponsive, or otherwise hostile.”
- Department Policy/Procedure #03-P.A.-001 Standards of Conduct (Sworn), Section V – Canon of Ethics:

Subsection A – Canon 1, “Peace Officers shall uphold the Constitution of the United States, the California Constitution, and all laws enacted pursuant to legally constituted authority.”

Standard 1.6 – “Peace officers shall respect and uphold dignity, human rights, and constitutional rights of all persons.”

Subsection B – Canon 2, “Peace officers shall be aware of and shall use proper and ethical procedures in discharging their official duties and responsibilities.

Standard 2.1 – “Peace officers shall be aware of their lawful authority to use that force reasonably necessary in securing compliance with their lawful enforcement duties.”

Standard 2.2 – “Peace officer shall truthfully, completely, and impartially report, testify, and present evidence in all matters of an official nature.”

Subsection C – Canon 3, “Peace officers shall regard the discharge of their duties as a public trust and shall recognize their responsibilities to the people whom they are sworn to protect and serve.”

Standard 3.2 – “Peace officers, during their service, shall diligently devote their time and attention to the effective and professional performance of their responsibilities.”

Standard 3.5 – “Peace officers shall be prepared and shall respond effectively to the demands of their office.”

Department Policy/Procedure #08-L.E.-011 Use of Force, Section II.C – “It is the policy of this department that officers shall use only that force which is reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event.”

Note: Below is an additional policy violation found to have occurred following the review of all investigatory interviews and documents obtained during the course of this investigation. No further interviews or documentation review were needed as a result.

- Department Policy/Procedure #07-S.O.-011 Police Services Communications, Section VI.C.2.c. – Calling out information
 - Field officers shall call out over the radio the following information which the dispatcher shall enter into the radio log via the CAD/RIMS system as appropriate. All information received from field officers shall be entered in “real time,” i.e., immediately upon receiving the information. This is done to ensure accuracy in time-stamping activities and officer status as they are received. Information shall include at a minimum:
 - ii. En route time to the call.
 - (and)
 - iv. Their arrival on scene.

It is under the evidence presented within this investigation, which includes the continued poor judgement, decision-making, blatant dishonesty in the false and deceptive reporting both in written form and through testimony under oath, and considerable risk and liability exposure Officer Anthony Vargas placed upon himself and the Department through his actions and/or inactions, in addition to his previous formal discipline history, that I recommend Officer Vargas be considered for termination from employment with the California State University Department of Police Services.

In addition, termination from employment is being recommended based on the recent *People v. Superior Court (Johnson)* 2015 61 Cal.4th 696 ruling which promulgated an October 13, 2015 California Attorney General (AG) published opinion (No. 12-401) citing that law enforcement agencies can notify the prosecuting attorney of names of officers against whom findings of dishonesty, moral turpitude, or bias have been sustained, and the dates of the earliest such conduct. Given the facts of this case as it relates to compliance with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in *Brady v. Maryland*, a Brady disclosure to the prosecuting attorney places a law enforcement officer's (i.e., government witness) credibility in dire question which can be used as impeachment evidence in the criminal cases he/she is involved in. For further details, see attachment "H" for a copy of the CPOA client alert notice issued on this matter.

- **PREVIOUS FORMAL DISCIPLINE HISTORY:**

2015 – Served a fifteen (15) day suspension which was later reduced to a five (5) day suspension through a state personnel board settlement for failing to provide a standard of care expected in providing for the safety of suspect; failing to properly document all information obtained during the preliminary investigation within the case reports (i.e., reports not thorough and accurate); failing to keep police dispatch properly advised of his status throughout the incident; and failing to use his department issued digital audio recorder when department policy requires him to do so.

2014 – Written reprimand issued for unauthorized use of emergency vehicle equipment to violate rules of the road (i.e., California Vehicle Code).

2006 – Written reprimand issued for a failure to complete tasks as assigned by his shift supervisor.

2006 – Twelve (12) day suspension for leaving the scene of at-fault traffic collision involving a pedestrian while on duty.

2005 – One (1) day suspension for leaving the scene of an at-fault traffic collision while on duty and failing to notify the shift supervisor.

2000 – Written reprimand issued for leaving a department firearm unsecured and unattended in a patrol vehicle.

S.G. VanScoy, Captain
Special Services Division Commander
Internal Affairs

A



California State University, Northridge
Department of Police Services

From the Desk of the Chief of Police

To: Captain Van Soy

From: Chief

Date: 5/2 /16

Subj: Internal Affairs Invest.

Please see the attached
Use of Force Review report by
Captain Fernandez concerning
an incident in housing this
past weekend.

The Use of force is
concerning. I am assigning to
you an internal affairs
investigation on this matter.



California State University, Northridge Police Department Investigative Report

To: Chief Anne P. Glavin
From: *Alfredo B. Fernandez*
Captain Alfredo Fernandez
Date: May 2, 2016
Subject: Use of Force Review- CR#161636

Employee Involved: Officer Anthony Vargas
Current Assignment: Patrol Operations – Night Watch
Shift / Days off: 1800 - 0600 hours; off Sunday, Monday, Tuesday and e/o Wednesday

• **SUMMARY:**

Review of Officer's Reports

On April 30, 2016 at about 0057 hours Officer Vargas was involved in a Use of Force incident. According to officer's reports, Officer Vargas and his partner, Officer [REDACTED] responded to University Park Apartment (UPA), Building 12 for a fire alarm pull station activation on the second floor of the east hallway. They set up an Incident Command Post and Officer Vargas proceeded to the second floor where he observed no sign of smoke but noticed damage to the hallway wall and blood on a door and on the wall. He then heard dispatch broadcast a call from LAPD that said there was a vandalism to Building 12, second floor. At that point, Vargas made contact with two residents that told him that a drunk male and a drunk [REDACTED] had attempted to enter their room and had punched the holes in the wall and pulled the fire alarm pull stations. One of the residents gave Vargas a wallet that was left behind by the male suspect. Inside the wallet was an identification that belonged to a person by the name of [REDACTED]. Vargas advised dispatch that the vandalism that was reported by LAPD was related to the fire alarm activation. Shortly thereafter, he heard [REDACTED] broadcast that he was on the first floor of building 12 and he was out with two individuals that were responsible for fire alarm activation.

When he arrived on to the first floor lobby, he observed a male and a female sitting down with their backs against the wall (later identified as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]). He used the identification in the wallet to identify [REDACTED] as the person he believed had committed the vandalism and had pulled the fire alarm pull station. Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] formed the opinion that both suspects were highly intoxicated and under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (slurred speech, red eyes, etc.). Vargas wrote in his report that [REDACTED] Community Director (CD) was on the scene with two on-duty resident advisors (RA). He said that CD [REDACTED] was interfering with his investigation by being argumentative and demanding that Vargas release [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Because Vargas' attention was pulled away from the two suspects, [REDACTED] was able to stand up without his being aware and began to

walk behind him. Vargas was alerted by his partner that [REDACTED] was walking towards him and he ordered her multiple times to sit down but she failed to comply with his orders. According to the report, in an effort to gain control of the situation, he placed his hands on [REDACTED] shoulder and directed her back to the wall. He applied pressure to her shoulder to get her to sit down but she resisted so he used a “foot sweep” so she would lose her balance. As she fell he kept a hold of her to lessen her fall. Once on the ground she once again attempted to get up and he used his right foot to push her legs in front of her into an extended position so she wouldn’t be able to get up.

The Use of Force Report filled out by Vargas is incomplete as the supervisor ([REDACTED]) has failed to mark the box asking if the actions of the officers involved in the incident indicate the need for additional training. However, Lt. Benavidez has filled out the portion for command level review. In his findings he has marked “Assigned for follow up internal investigations.”

Review of Officer’s Recordings

In reviewing the officer’s recordings provided to me by Lt. Benavidez, it becomes quickly evident that Officer [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas failed to activate their recorders until after the use of force incident. Anything leading up to event is not recorded. Neither Officer [REDACTED] nor Sergeant [REDACTED] (both of whom arrived later) activated their recorders at all. What can be gained from the recorders are some exchanges between Vargas and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

In the exchange between [REDACTED] and Vargas there is disagreement between the two. [REDACTED] who is extremely agitated curses and tells Vargas that he used excessive force and kicked [REDACTED]. Vargas tries to explain to [REDACTED] that he did not kick her but used a foot sweep. Vargas also tells [REDACTED] that he is interfering with his investigation.

In [REDACTED] recording, he is heard speaking to Sergeant [REDACTED]. Although there is a large amount of background noise that obscures parts of the conversation he is heard saying, “...put her down a little hard in front of a lot of people.” [REDACTED] tells him that everything should be documented and they are not trying to hide anything.

The rest of the audio well documents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are intoxicated, particularly, [REDACTED] but does not add any further detail into the use of force.

OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS:

Based on the report and audio recording there is sufficient cause to believe that Officer Vargas failed to properly apply the standards to which this use of force was necessary. The suspect, although is resistive and failing to comply with his commands, is non-combative. Nowhere in the report is there any documentation that justifies a “foot sweep” to cause an intoxicated person to fall down. On the contrary, the suspects seem fairly incapacitated and are already unsteady on their feet and do not appear to threaten the officers or anyone else.

Furthermore, statements made on the recordings indicate that a professional staff member in Housing was upset over the level of force used. Unfortunately, there is no actual recording of the use of force incident to document to what level the CD was interfering. Follow up interviews with the witnessing officers and housing staff at the scene that may have seen the incident will be needed to clarify exactly what took place.

Finally, there is [REDACTED] statement that presumably Vargas, “put her down a little hard in front of people.” This seems to indicate that the use of force observed by [REDACTED] was questionable and perceived by onlookers as excessive.

- **FINDINGS:**

Use of Force was **not** within departmental guidelines and violated the following policy:

- 08-L.E.-011: Section II. C “It is the policy of this department that officers shall use only that force which is reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event.”

Based on review I found that the policies of the department adequately explain use of force. All officers at a minimum review the Use of Force policy annually with a quiz given. It is also reviewed twice a year during firearms training.

- **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

I recommend that a formal internal affairs investigation be opened in this case.

USE OF FORCE REPORT

UNIVERSITY POLICE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE




RIMS Case Number 161636	SUSPECT	Name (Last, First, M.I.) [REDACTED]			
Date of Incident 4-30-16		DOB [REDACTED]	Age [REDACTED]	Sex [REDACTED]	Race [REDACTED]
Time of Incident 0100		Suspect appeared to be under the influence of <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Alcohol <input type="checkbox"/> Narcotics <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing Apparent			
Classification of Incident 14B.4 (A)(1) PC		Location of Incident 17950 LASSE ST UPA 12			

LEVEL OF RESISTANCE (may <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> more than one) <input type="checkbox"/> Unarmed suspect resisted control, had to be physically handled with minimal force, no blows were struck, all parties remained standing. <input type="checkbox"/> Plus - at least one more officer was needed for assistance. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unarmed suspect resisted control, officer or suspect fell to the ground or blows were struck, NO police weapons were used. <input type="checkbox"/> Plus - at least one more officer was needed for assistance. <input type="checkbox"/> Unarmed suspect resisted control, police weapon(s) used. <input type="checkbox"/> Plus - at least one more officer was needed for assistance. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a club or similar weapon and threatened or attacked officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a knife or similar weapon and threatened or attacked officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a firearm threatened officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a firearm shot at officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	PURSUIT REPORT - See section V, pg. 7-8 of Vehicle Pursuit policy regarding reports Length of time of the pursuit: _____ Distance Traveled: _____ Involved Officers: _____ Initial Reason for Pursuit: _____ Starting point: _____ Ending point: _____ Disposition [arrest/citation/etc.]: _____ Other Jurisdictions involved/assisted: _____ Property damage: _____	Charge(s) Resulting from Suspect's Resistance <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No If Yes, list pending charge(s): _____ Location of Incident <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> On Campus <input type="checkbox"/> Off Campus <input type="checkbox"/> Parking Lot <input type="checkbox"/> Roadway <input type="checkbox"/> Inside a Building <input type="checkbox"/> Inside PD Temporary Holding Facility <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other UPA 12 DORM
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Police Force Used (may <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> more than one) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Fists / Hands / Feet <input type="checkbox"/> OC Spray <input type="checkbox"/> Baton / ASP <input type="checkbox"/> Service Weapon pointed at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> Service Weapon fired at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> AR 15 pointed at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> AR 15 fired at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> TASER X26P <input type="checkbox"/> 40mm Launcher <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	Effect of Force / Resistance on Suspect / Police <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Suspect</th> <th>Police</th> <th>Observations</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/></td> <td>No visible injury; no complaint of pain.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>No visible injury; complaint of minor pain; no medical treatment required.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Minor visible injury (redness, swelling, abrasion); no medical treatment required.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Injury requiring outpatient medical treatment (stitches, x-rays, doctor's exam).</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Injury requiring hospitalization.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Death</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Suspect	Police	Observations	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; no complaint of pain.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; complaint of minor pain; no medical treatment required.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Minor visible injury (redness, swelling, abrasion); no medical treatment required.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring outpatient medical treatment (stitches, x-rays, doctor's exam).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring hospitalization.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Death	Witnessing Officer(s) [REDACTED] 1536 [REDACTED] 1538 Shift Supervisor: Do the actions of the officer involved in the incident indicate a need for additional training? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If yes, provide additional written memorandum with specifics.
Suspect	Police	Observations																					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; no complaint of pain.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; complaint of minor pain; no medical treatment required.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Minor visible injury (redness, swelling, abrasion); no medical treatment required.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring outpatient medical treatment (stitches, x-rays, doctor's exam).																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring hospitalization.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Death																					
Involved Officer VARGAS	ID # 1504	Date of Report 4-30-16	Supervisor [REDACTED]	ID # 1452	Date 04-30-16																		

Command Level Review (Signature) Y. M. BENAVIDEZ	Date Reviewed 4-30-16	Finding: <input type="checkbox"/> Level of force/actions taken within departmental guidelines <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Assigned for follow-up internal investigation
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USE OF FORCE REPORT - Page 2UNIVERSITY POLICE
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE**C.E.W. Incident Specific**

APPLICATION <input type="checkbox"/> Display ONLY <input type="checkbox"/> Display & Laser <input type="checkbox"/> Display, Laser, & Arc <input type="checkbox"/> Drive-Stun <input type="checkbox"/> Probes		CYCLES <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____	CYCLE DURATION <input type="checkbox"/> 5 SECONDS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____ <hr/> DURATION BETWEEN CYCLES _____									
RANGE (Feet) <input type="checkbox"/> 0' - 5' <input type="checkbox"/> 6' - 10' <input type="checkbox"/> 11' - 15' <input type="checkbox"/> 16' - 21'	MISSED PROBES? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF YES, DESCRIBE LOCATION: _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____											
EFFECTIVE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF NOT, WHY? <table style="width: 100%;"><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Heavy Clothing</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Subject Moved</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> One Probe</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Close Probe Strikes</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Missed</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Other : _____</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> Low Muscle Mass</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> Malfunction</td><td>_____</td></tr></table>				<input type="checkbox"/> Heavy Clothing	<input type="checkbox"/> Subject Moved	<input type="checkbox"/> One Probe	<input type="checkbox"/> Close Probe Strikes	<input type="checkbox"/> Missed	<input type="checkbox"/> Other : _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Low Muscle Mass	<input type="checkbox"/> Malfunction	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Heavy Clothing	<input type="checkbox"/> Subject Moved	<input type="checkbox"/> One Probe										
<input type="checkbox"/> Close Probe Strikes	<input type="checkbox"/> Missed	<input type="checkbox"/> Other : _____										
<input type="checkbox"/> Low Muscle Mass	<input type="checkbox"/> Malfunction	_____										
DID PROBES PENETRATE SKIN? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF YES, REMOVED BY: _____		 <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; margin-top: 10px;"><div style="text-align: center;"> Front</div><div style="text-align: center;"> Back</div></div>										
CHECKED BY MEDICAL <table style="width: 100%;"><tr><td>Suspect</td><td>Officer</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> YES</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> YES</td></tr><tr><td><input type="checkbox"/> NO</td><td><input type="checkbox"/> NO</td></tr></table> MEDICAL CLEARANCE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO HOSPITAL / RA Unit: _____		Suspect	Officer	<input type="checkbox"/> YES	<input type="checkbox"/> YES	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	<div style="margin-bottom: 10px;"><input type="checkbox"/> NO PHYSICAL FORCE USED</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"><div>A - Drive Stun B - Probes C - Baton</div><div>D - OC Spray E - Impact Munition F - Other _____</div></div>				
Suspect	Officer											
<input type="checkbox"/> YES	<input type="checkbox"/> YES											
<input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> NO											

Note: Diagram to
be completed for all
Use of Force
Incidents

TASER CEW Serial No.: _____

B

**CSU NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Page 1

18111 NORDHOFF ST. NORTHRIDGE, CA 91330 818-677-2111
CRIME REPORT - MISDEMEANORCase
161636

OFFENSES	Offenses 647(F) PC 148(A)(1) PC 148.4(A)(1) PC	Description Disord Conduct:alcohol Obstruct Public Officer Tamper/Etc W/Firearm/Etc	Fel/Misd Misd Misd Misd	Date Occurred 04/30/16-04/30/16	Time Occurred 0057 - 0057	Incident # 1604300002	
				Date Reported 04/30/2016	Time Reported 0057		
				Related Cases			
				Date Printed 05/02/2016	Time Printed 07:51:10	Printed By 1442	
				Latitude 34.250370	Longitude -118.524220		
Location Upa 12, [REDACTED] Northridge, CA 91325			Beat 3	Area G9	Disposition		Dispo Date
Location Type Apartment/Condo		Location of Entry	Method of Entry	Point of Entry	Alarm System	Means of Attack (Robbery)	
Victim Csun Housing				Drivers License	Cell Phone	Email	
Residence Address [REDACTED] Northridge, CA 91330				Notified of Victim Rights No	Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB	Age [REDACTED]
Business Name and Address				Business Phone	Height	Wt	Sex M
Assistance Rendered/Victim Disposition Property Crime Does Not Apply				Transporting Agency	Means of Attack (Assaults)		
Description of Injuries Property Crime Does Not Apply				Other Information			
Mentioned [REDACTED]				Drivers License [REDACTED]	Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Email	
Residence Address [REDACTED] Northridge, CA 91324				Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB [REDACTED]	Age 19	Sex M
Business Name and Address				Business Phone	Height	Wt	Race W
Suspect Arrested [REDACTED]				Action Taken BOOKING	Charges 647(F) PC, 148(A)(1) PC		
Residence Address [REDACTED] Los Angeles, CA 90057				Residence Phone	DOB [REDACTED]	Age 18	Sex M
Business Name and Address				Business Phone	Height 5'7"	Wt 150	Race O
Identifying Features Speech: Slurred Build: Average Complexion: Medium Facial Hair: None				Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Drivers License [REDACTED]	Hair BRO	Eyes GRN
Aliases				Arrest Number 3196			
Status		Vehicle Make and Model		License/State		Vehicle Type	
Prepared By 1504 - Vargas, Felix		Date 04/30/2016	Assisted By [REDACTED]		Approved By [REDACTED]		Date 05/01/2016
Routed To		Date	Routed To		Date	Notes	

**CSU NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Page 2

18111 NORDHOFF ST. NORTHRIDGE, CA 91330 818-677-2111
CRIME REPORT - MISDEMEANORCase
161636

Mentioned [REDACTED]	Drivers License [REDACTED]	Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Email [REDACTED]			
Residence Address [REDACTED]	Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB [REDACTED]	Age [REDACTED]	Sex [REDACTED]	Race H	
Business Name and Address [REDACTED]	Business Phone [REDACTED]	Height [REDACTED]	Wt [REDACTED]	Hair [REDACTED]	Eyes [REDACTED]	

Mentioned [REDACTED]	Drivers License [REDACTED]	Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Email [REDACTED]			
Residence Address [REDACTED]	Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB [REDACTED]	Age 19	Sex F	Race H	
Business Name and Address [REDACTED]	Business Phone [REDACTED]	Height 5'4"	Wt 120	Hair BRO	Eyes BRO	

Mentioned [REDACTED]	Drivers License [REDACTED]	Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Email [REDACTED]			
Residence Address [REDACTED]	Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB [REDACTED]	Age [REDACTED]	Sex [REDACTED]	Race [REDACTED]	
Business Name and Address Csun, 17950 Lassen St, Northridge, CA 91330	Business Phone [REDACTED]	Height [REDACTED]	Wt [REDACTED]	Hair [REDACTED]	Eyes [REDACTED]	

Mentioned [REDACTED]	Drivers License [REDACTED]	Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Email [REDACTED]			
Residence Address [REDACTED]	Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB [REDACTED]	Age 19	Sex F	Race H	
Business Name and Address Csun Housing, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Northridge, CA 91330	Business Phone [REDACTED]	Height 5'1"	Wt 110	Hair BRO	Eyes BRO	

Mentioned [REDACTED]	Drivers License [REDACTED]	Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Email [REDACTED]			
Residence Address [REDACTED]	Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB [REDACTED]	Age [REDACTED]	Sex M	Race B	
Business Name and Address CSU Northridge, 18111 Nordhoff St, Northridge, CA 91325	Business Phone [REDACTED]	Height 5'10"	Wt 165	Hair BLK	Eyes BRO	

Mentioned [REDACTED]	Drivers License [REDACTED]	Cell Phone [REDACTED]	Email [REDACTED]			
Residence Address [REDACTED]	Residence Phone [REDACTED]	DOB [REDACTED]	Age 18	Sex M	Race B	
Business Name and Address [REDACTED]	Business Phone [REDACTED]	Height 5'11"	Wt 150	Hair BLK	Eyes BRO	

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**CSU NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Page 3

18111 NORDHOFF ST. NORTHRIDGE, CA 91330 818-677-2111

CRIME REPORT - MISDEMEANOR - PROPERTY

161636

ID No.	Status/Disposition	Property Description	Value	Val Recovered	
1	Safekeeping	1 Wallet - (1) BLK WALLET, (1) CSUN ID CARD, (1) CHASE CREDIT CARD, \$9.00 USD (1) FIVE (4) ONES			
2	Destroyed/Damaged	1 Drywall - HOLE IN DRYWALL			\$1,001.00
					\$1,001.00

**CSU NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT**

18111 NORDHOFF ST. NORTHRIDGE, CA 91330 818-677-2111

NARRATIVE

Page 1

161636

Source:

On 4/30/16 at about 0055 hours, Ofc. [REDACTED] and I (Ofc. Vargas# 1504) responded to University Park Apartments (UPA) building 12 for a fire alarm pull station on the second floor, east side hallway.

Observations:

We set up the incident command on the north side of building 12. I proceeded to the second floor and saw no sign of smoke or fire in the east hallway. I immediately noticed there was major damage to the wall directly outside room 203. I saw a large hole and some insulation had been pulled from the wall. I also saw blood on the door to room 203 and the wall directly outside.

I then heard dispatch broadcast call from LAPD about a vandalism that had occurred on the second floor of building 12. I then heard the door to room 203 open and residents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] came out and told me that a drunk male and female (later identified as [REDACTED]) had just attempted to force their way into their apartment and that one of them had punched holes in the wall and pulled the fire alarm. [REDACTED] gave me a wallet that was left on the floor outside his in door. Inside the wallet was identification for [REDACTED]. I advised units that the fire alarm and vandalism were related.

I then heard Ofc. [REDACTED] broadcast that he was out on the individuals responsible for the fire alarm activation in the first floor lobby. I went down to assist. As I came into the lobby, I saw both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] sitting on the floor with their backs to the wall. I immediately identified [REDACTED] as the vandalism suspect by the CA identification card in the wallet left at the scene. Inside the lobby was also Community Director [REDACTED] and two on-duty resident advisors.

Ofc. [REDACTED] was asking [REDACTED] about the pull station. I told Ofc. [REDACTED] we had a vandalism upstairs and that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the suspects. I directed my attention to [REDACTED] and asked who she was and what had happened. During our conversation, it was apparent that she was very intoxicated. Her speech was slurred and her eyes were bloodshot and watery. As I was talking to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] came up to me and interfered in our investigation. He told me to release [REDACTED] so she could go to her room and sleep it off as she was heavily intoxicated. I told [REDACTED] that this was a police matter and we were investigating a crime and that he needed to step back and let us conduct our investigation. [REDACTED] began to argue with me and that took my focus away from [REDACTED]. Out of the corner of my eye, I saw Ofc. [REDACTED] look behind me and heard him tell [REDACTED] to sit back down.

Use Of Force:

While my attention was on [REDACTED], [REDACTED] had stood up and began to walk up behind me. I turned around and told her twice to sit back down. She refused and continued to advance towards me. I placed my right hand on her left arm and guided her back to the wall. I told her again to sit down and she refused. I attempted to guide her down to the ground using only my arm, but was unable to due to her level of resistance. She began to use her body weight to pull away from me. Due to her level of intoxication and level of resistance, I feared she may become combative with Ofc. [REDACTED] and myself if she remained standing. For her safety and ours, I felt I needed to quickly get her back into the seated position in order to maintain control of her. I held on to her left arm and performed a foot sweep. In one quick motion, I used my right foot and made contact with her left shoe causing her to lose her balance. I held on to her left arm and guided her down in order to lessen her fall. Once she was on the ground, I saw that her right foot was underneath her and she was attempting to get back up. I continued to hold her left arm and put downward pressure to prevent her from standing up. I used my right foot and pushed both her legs straight right out into the extended position so she would not be able to stand up.

[REDACTED] then began to argue with me about the perceived use of excessive force on [REDACTED]. I told him that it would not have happened if he had not interfered with our investigation and had not taken my focus away from

Prepared By:

Date:

04/30/2016

Approved By:

Date:

05/01/2016

**CSU NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT**

18111 NORDHOFF ST. NORTHRIDGE, CA 91330 818-677-2111

NARRATIVE

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Ofc. [REDACTED] arrived on scene and pulled [REDACTED] aside and they walked away towards the elevators. A few minutes later I saw Ofc. [REDACTED] come back into the lobby alone. He maintained to cover position on [REDACTED] while I went upstairs to get further information from the residents of room 203.

As I arrived at the door to room 203 I saw [REDACTED] exiting the apartment. I don't know what conversation he had with the residents. He began to argue with me again and said, "Listen Vargas I know you and I respect You, but I don't approve of what happened downstairs." I again told him that he needed to stop interfering and to let us conduct our investigation. [REDACTED] then walked away from me and I was able to contact the residents of 203.

Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] told me he and [REDACTED] were in their apartment when they heard the sound of someone trying to key into their apartment. He then heard a male voice yelling and banging on their door. [REDACTED] opened the door and immediately [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attempted to push their way into the apartment. [REDACTED] said they appeared to be intoxicated. [REDACTED] did not know who they were and had never seen them before. [REDACTED] put his hand on [REDACTED] chest and pushed him back into the hallway. He then closed the door and heard loud banging outside the door and then heard the fire alarm activating. He looked outside the door and saw the damage to the wall and that the pull station activated. The pull station is directly outside their door in the hallway. He did not actually see either person commit the vandalism or pull the fire alarm but is pretty sure it was one of them because there was no other people in the hallway.

Statement of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] told me he and [REDACTED] were in their apartment when they heard someone trying to key into their apartment. He then heard yelling and loud banging on their door. When [REDACTED] opened the door, He saw [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attempt to push their way into the apartment. [REDACTED] did not know who they were and had never seen them before. He saw [REDACTED] push [REDACTED] out the doorway and back into the hallway. [REDACTED] closed the door and he heard loud banging as if someone was kicking or punching the walls. He then heard the fire alarm activating. He and [REDACTED] looked outside and saw the damage to the wall and the blood on the wall and door. He did not actually see either person commit the vandalism or pull the fire alarm but is pretty sure it was one of them.

Arrest:

Due to the fact that [REDACTED] was very intoxicated and unable to care for [REDACTED] and his unwillingness to follow directions and the multiple times he actively resisting, I placed him under arrest for 647 (f) PC disorderly conduct and 148(a)(1) PC, Obstructing/ resisting a peace officer. Ofc. [REDACTED] placed him in the back of shop 492 and buckled the seat belt. While in the shop, [REDACTED] began to yell out and complained of chest pain and difficulty breathing. He began to bang his head up against the window. As I opened the door to check on him, I saw that he had removed his seat belt and he swung both his legs out and attempted get out of the vehicle. I was unable to close the door due to both his legs being out. I tried to get his legs back in but he had begun to kick his legs back and forth. I had to deflect numerous kicks as he attempted to get out of the vehicle. I called out to Ofc. [REDACTED] to assist and we both were unable to safely get him back into the vehicle. He continued to kick his legs in attempt to exit the vehicle. For his safety, we decided to get him out of the vehicle and had him sit on the steps while waiting for LAFD respond to evaluate him.

Medical:

LAFD Rescue Ambulance 70 paramedics arrived and examined [REDACTED] who refused medical attention. He told them he was fine and just needed fresh air.

Booking:

Prepared By:

Date:

04/30/2016

Approved By:

Date:

05/01/2016

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NARRATIVE

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[REDACTED] and I transported [REDACTED] to LAPD Van Nuys Jail. While en rout to the jail, [REDACTED] began to spit inside the prisoner compartment. There were globs of spit on the floorboard and on the roll bar of the prisoner divider. At Van Nuys jail, [REDACTED] was cleared by the medical staff and booked with approval of Watch Commander [REDACTED]. Booking# 4650313.

Additional:

[REDACTED] wallet was entered into evidence locker# 2 for safekeeping.

Prepared By:

Date:

04/30/2016

Approved By:

Date:

05/01/2016

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SUPPLEMENT 1

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SOURCE

On Saturday April 30, 2016 at approximately 0057 hours Ofc. Vargas and I (Ofc. [REDACTED]) were dispatched to University Park Apartments (UPA) building 12, located on the Cal State University, Northridge campus, for a fire alarm pull station activation.

INVESTIGATION

Ofc. Vargas and I arrived on scene and could hear an audible fire alarm coming from UPA 12. There was a large group of residents standing on the north side of the building. Dispatch advised us the alarm activation was on the second floor east hallway. Ofc. Vargas responded to the second floor to check if there was any active smoke or fire.

While I was standing by on the first floor fire alarm panel the Coordinator of Student/ Residential Success and Community Director [REDACTED] arrived on scene. Ofc. Vargas advised there was no smoke or fire inside the building and I reset the alarm panel. I began to speak with [REDACTED] and explain there was no fire and someone activated the pull station illegally.

As I was speaking to [REDACTED] and SA- [REDACTED] came running into the first floor lobby from the east hallway. [REDACTED] fell face first onto the floor and [REDACTED] stopped running and sat on the ground next to her. She did not appear hurt and both parties immediately began laughing over the matter. I could see [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both had bloodshot red, water eyes and I could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from both. A male who wished to remain anonymous walked into the lobby of UPA 12 and said those are the two that pulled the alarm. At that point I detained both parties and had them sit on the floor with their backs against the wall.

Ofc. [REDACTED] arrived on scene and began to assist me in identifying both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and sort through their statements.

I had to tell [REDACTED] multiple times to keep his hands out of his pocket and to remain seated. On two occasions he put his legs underneath him in an attempt to stand. Both times I had order him to remain seated. [REDACTED] had bruised and blooded knuckles but stated he does not remember how they got that way. [REDACTED] Alvarez continuously stated they did not pull the fire alarm but [REDACTED] out the hole in the wall on accident.

Ofc. Vargas returned to the first floor lobby and provided me [REDACTED] CA ID card and advised he found it on the ground next to a large hole in the drywall next to the activated fire alarm pull station. I stood next to [REDACTED] and continued to speak with him regarding the hole in the wall and the fire alarm. Ofc. Vargas was standing next to [REDACTED] and was speaking with her regarding the incident.

I observed [REDACTED] approach Ofc. Vargas and begin to try and interject in an attempt to get Ofc. Vargas to release [REDACTED] so she could go home and sleep. Ofc. Vargas began to tell [REDACTED] this was a police matter and not a housing matter and he needed to step back and allow us to investigate.

Prepared By:

Date:

04/30/2016

Approved By:

Date:

05/01/2016

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At that time [REDACTED] attempted to stand up for a third time and I was able to place my hand on his shoulder and instructed him to remain seated to which he complied. While I was controlling [REDACTED] I could see [REDACTED] stand up and begin to walk towards Ofc. Vargas while his attention was on [REDACTED]. I instructed her twice to sit back down and she ignored me both times. At that time Ofc. Vargas noticed her and ordered her to sit back down. Ofc. Vargas placed his right hand on her left shoulder and continued to instruct her to sit back down. She did not comply and continued to argue and walk towards Ofc. Vargas. [REDACTED] was told to sit down three times by Ofc. Vargas and did not comply with any instructions.

I observed Ofc. Vargas continue to hold onto [REDACTED] left arm and used his right foot to perform a foot sweep on her. Ofc. Vargas used the appropriate amount of pressure in the foot sweep to cause her to lose her balance. Ofc. Vargas held onto her left shoulder as she slid down the wall and onto her buttocks. [REDACTED] still had one leg underneath her body and I could see she was attempting to shift her weight in an effort to stand up again. Ofc. Vargas used his foot to move her legs into an extended position. [REDACTED] became angry and attempted to stand up but was unable to due to his intoxication level. Ofc. Vargas placed [REDACTED] in handcuffs for his and our safety.

Ofc. Vargas returned to the second floor to speak with witnesses of the damage to the wall. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] relaxed and began to speak freely about what occurred. [REDACTED] stated that there were other people in the hall when the fire alarm was activated but it was neither [REDACTED] nor her. She told me [REDACTED] damaged the wall because he was intoxicated but did not know what he was doing at the time. For their privacy Ofc. [REDACTED] and I moved [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] out to the south side of UPA 12 and out of view of the other residents. [REDACTED] and the two on duty resident advisors came outside with us moments later.

[REDACTED] arrived on scene to assist.

I spoke with [REDACTED] and the resident advisors that there was no evidence or witnesses that could tell us with certainty [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] pulled the fire alarm. I asked [REDACTED] if as the ranking member of the CSUN Housing Department on scene, he had the authority to press charges on [REDACTED] for the vandalism to the wall. [REDACTED] stated he has the authority and he did not desire prosecution for the vandalism and stated the cost for repair would be billed to [REDACTED] at the end of the semester.

[REDACTED] then pulled me aside and began to inform me he understands he was interfering with Ofc. Vargas and [REDACTED] but he did not agree with the way she was made to sit down. [REDACTED] then stated as a black man he is sensitive to the way officers treat people in use of force situations. He told me he wanted to file a complaint and I advised him that he was free to do so and that the incident would be documented in its entirety. [REDACTED] then walked back inside UPA 12.

[REDACTED] continued to attempt to stand up and walk away several times while in the presence of Ofc. [REDACTED]. He was actively shouting "I'll pay for the wall!" Due to the fact there [REDACTED] was causing a disturbance and due to his unwillingness to follow directions and the multiple times he was actively resisting officers, Ofc. Vargas placed him under arrest for 647(f) PC- Disorderly Conduct and 148(a)(1) PC - Obstructing/Resisting Peace

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04/30/2016

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Officers.

Ofc. [REDACTED] placed [REDACTED] into the back seat of shop 492 and closed the door. While officers were getting ready to transport him he began to scream and yell in the back seat. Ofc. Vargas opened the door to check on [REDACTED] and at that time I heard Ofc. Vargas call for assistance. When I came into view I observed [REDACTED] attempting to get out of the vehicle, he was pushing his full weight into Ofc. Vargas and screaming to let him go. [REDACTED] and I assisted Ofc. Vargas in attempting to place [REDACTED] back into the vehicle but he was actively resisting our efforts. We decided to remove him and have him sit on the steps until he calmed down.

[REDACTED] stated he was claustrophobic and began to complain of pain in his chest and trouble breathing. Ofc. Vargas requested LAFD responded to assess [REDACTED] LAFD RA 70 arrived on scene and determined there was nothing wrong with [REDACTED] medically.

Ofc. Vargas and Ofc. [REDACTED] transported [REDACTED] to LAPD Van Nuys Jail for booking. Sgt. [REDACTED] and the resident advisors escorted [REDACTED] back to her room and released her into the care of her roommate.

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04/30/2016

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SUPPLEMENT 2

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Source

On Saturday, April 30, 2016, at approximately 0057 hours, I ([REDACTED]) was in full police uniform conducting a foot patrol of the Art and Design Center (CSUN campus).

[REDACTED] and Officer Vargas were handling a call of a fire alarm at the University Park Apartments building 12 (CSUN campus). At approximately 0103 hours, I heard Officer [REDACTED] communicate to dispatch that he was out with the individuals responsible for activating the fire alarm. Officer [REDACTED] was located on the first floor of the building and was requesting the presence of Officer Vargas. I immediately directed myself to Officer [REDACTED] location to assist.

Investigation

Upon arrival, I observed a large group of approximately 40 students standing outside on the north side of UPA 12. I made my way inside of the building using the north entrance and saw the following:

There was a female identified as [REDACTED] sitting on the east side of the lobby with her back against the wall. Officer Vargas was standing near [REDACTED] but had his attention directed towards another individual identified as [REDACTED] was located approximately 5 to 6 feet north of [REDACTED] location. There was another individual identified as [REDACTED] sitting down on the ground near one of the south walls of the lobby. Officer [REDACTED] was standing near [REDACTED]. There were 2 additional females standing on the northwest side of the lobby by the elevator.

Approximately 10 seconds after I entered the building, I saw [REDACTED] stand up and begin walking toward Officer Vargas. Due to the fact that Officer Vargas had his attention directed towards [REDACTED] he was unaware [REDACTED] had stood up and was walking towards him. I heard Officer [REDACTED] tell [REDACTED] in a loud and clear voice to sit down approximately 2 times. Officer Vargas then turned his body to the right and directed his attention to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not follow Officer [REDACTED] orders to sit down and continued to walk towards Officer Vargas. I then heard Officer Vargas tell [REDACTED] in a loud and clear voice to sit down several times while placing his right hand on her shoulder. I could see Officer Vargas attempting to assist [REDACTED] to the ground without any significant force. [REDACTED] continued to remain standing and refused to follow orders given by either officer. I then saw Officer Vargas use one foot sweep on [REDACTED]'s left foot while maintaining control of her left arm. Officer Vargas lifted his foot off the ground and from [REDACTED] stationary position, used one single fluid motion to make contact with [REDACTED] left foot [REDACTED] lost her balance and began to fall backwards. Officer Vargas maintained control of [REDACTED] right arm to lessen her fall and assisted her to the ground.

At this point I approached [REDACTED] who was still standing relatively close to [REDACTED] (5 to 6 feet away). He turned around and in an angry voice told me "I am not ok with this." He continued to tell me he was the on duty community director and the director of another program which I cannot recall the name of. I calmly asked [REDACTED] to calm down and walk with me towards the entrance away from [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas. [REDACTED] did not listen to me and remained standing at the same location for approximately 20 seconds. I asked him again to follow me to the northwest side of the lobby to talk. He hesitated for a moment but listened the second time and walked near the area of the elevators. [REDACTED] then told me in an angry voice that he disagreed with Officer Vargas's actions and that I knew Officer Vargas had done wrong. [REDACTED] continued and said he was going to file a complaint against Officer Vargas and was going to speak to Captain VanScoy about the incident. He added

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Approved By:

Date:

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"these are students; I don't care what they have done they don't deserve to be treated that way." [REDACTED] continued by saying students and his staff were present and they did not deserve to see what had happened in the lobby. [REDACTED] used profanity several times during our conversation but I cannot recall exactly at what points. I explained to [REDACTED] that it was his right to be upset and file a grievance against Officer Vargas but that he needed to calm down and allow me to help my fellow officers. [REDACTED] then quickly walked away and headed upstairs to an unknown location.

I then approached Officer Vargas and [REDACTED] Officer Vargas left to another floor using the north stairs. Officer [REDACTED] then began talking to [REDACTED] and I assumed the position of contact officer with [REDACTED]. I told Officer [REDACTED] we needed move [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] outside to allow students to re-enter UPA 12. Officer [REDACTED] and I escorted [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] outside of UPA 12 through the south exit. I sat [REDACTED] down on a step and [REDACTED] sat down next to him. [REDACTED] then arrived to our location and sat next [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then told [REDACTED] you've had a bad night huh, let me tell you what's going to happen. [REDACTED] explained to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that they were going to be released to their respective dorms. He told [REDACTED] she needed to go back into her UPA and [REDACTED] needed to go back to UPA 16. [REDACTED] explained his plan to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] several times but they did not agree with him. [REDACTED] then turned around and asked me if we were going to agree with his plan and release [REDACTED]. I explained to [REDACTED] that the incident was being led by Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] and they had the discretion to make that decision. He was then called by Officer [REDACTED] away from my location and I was left to attend [REDACTED]

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SUPPLEMENT 3**

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161636

Source:

On Saturday, April 30, 2016, at about 0111 hours, I ([REDACTED]) received a radio call to respond to UPA12 to meet Officer Vargas and Officer [REDACTED] Who had responded to the location on a fire alarm pull station activation and they were detaining a suspect. Officer [REDACTED] had also responded to the location prior to my arrival.

Upon arrival to UPA 12 on the north entrance, [REDACTED] was walking toward my direction. I asked [REDACTED] if he was the Resident Advisor on duty to which he got very offended and stated that he was the Community Director.

I proceeded to meet with Officer Vargas, Officer [REDACTED] and Officer [REDACTED] they were on the exterior south side of the building. [REDACTED] was sitting on the steps and [REDACTED] was hand cuffed and was sitting next to [REDACTED]. Both parties were intoxicated and the male was not following officer's directions. I spoke to Officer Vargas who stated he had to use force on the female after she had refused to stay seated while they conducted their investigation. Officer Vargas then went to the 2nd floor to attempt to get a private persons arrest by the witness who saw [REDACTED] pull the fire pull-station.

[REDACTED] was next to the two students and he was telling them that they both would be going home, at this point Officer [REDACTED] called him over and advised him that we were still conducting our investigation and that he could not make those statements to the students.

I then advised [REDACTED] that if after the investigation it was determined that the students could go home they would still need a responsible party to care for them. [REDACTED] then stated that he would take them to their dorms. I asked [REDACTED] if he would be the taking responsibility for the students and that I would document that in the report. At this point [REDACTED] put his arms up in the air and stated that he couldn't do that and that if they had to go to jail that was fine.

I spoke to [REDACTED] and I asked her if she was okay or if she need any medical attention and she said she was fine. [REDACTED] also stated she did not want [REDACTED] to be transported to the hospital that she wanted him to go home with her.

During this entire time [REDACTED] was being resistive with officers and at one point he attempted to get up and fell to the ground. [REDACTED] was then taken to the patrol vehicle for transport to the station.

[REDACTED] was drunk however she was able to care for herself and [REDACTED] was advised that if a roommate was home and able to keep an eye on her she could stay in her dorm. Resident Advisors, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and I escorted [REDACTED] to her dorm UPA [REDACTED] while at the location I visually checked [REDACTED] for any injuries, she had scratches to her right leg. I asked her how she had gotten those scratches and she states she had gotten them the prior day. I again asked [REDACTED] if she had any injuries or complain of pain and she stated she did not. [REDACTED] was left in the care of her roommate, [REDACTED] and we cleared the location.

While I was in [REDACTED] Officer Vargas requested LAFD response to UPA 12 for [REDACTED] who stated he was not able to breath. LAFD responded and they determined [REDACTED] did not need medical attention.

Additional:

At about 0300 hours, I responded met with Resident Advisors, [REDACTED], and they both stated in summary

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CSU NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

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SUPPLEMENT 3

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161636

the following:

On April 30, 2016, at about 0100 hours, they received a phone call from [REDACTED] to respond to UPA12. When they arrived they heard the fire alarm and they saw students outside the building on the north side. They saw [REDACTED] inside the lobby with Officers, Vargas, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and a male and a female seated on the floor. They walked in and they stated they didn't hear any of the conversations that were taking place between officers and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that Officer Vargas had [REDACTED] by her arm and that he put her down to a seated position because she was drunk but that she didn't know what was happening. [REDACTED] both would not elaborate on exactly what they observed. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] then was visibly upset but they couldn't hear what was being said between [REDACTED] and Officer Vargas.

Officer [REDACTED] then asked [REDACTED] and both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to move into the elevator area to talk to him while officers completed their investigation. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was very upset and that Officer [REDACTED] asked him to calm down and allow officers to complete their investigation.

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IMAGE GALLERY FOR CASE 161636

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05/03/2016




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
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


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CAD INCIDENT REPORT

1604300002

05/03/2016

Location UPA 12, [REDACTED]				Cross Streets ZELZAH AV/LINDLEY AV			City NORTHRIDGE																																																				
Incident Type INALMF - FIRE ALARM				Call Taker [REDACTED]			Dispatcher [REDACTED]																																																				
Date 04/30/2016	Priority 3	Primary Unit S1	Beat	Fire Zone	Area G9	Map	Source TELEPHONE CALL																																																				
Caller Name				Caller Address				Caller Phone																																																			
Dispositions Assisted, Report Taken					Weapon		Alm Level		Case Number 161636																																																		
Vehicles					Associated Incidents																																																						
Incident Times		Special Circumstances																																																									
Received 00:57:15		[REDACTED]																																																									
Created 00:57:53																																																											
Dispatched 00:58:06																																																											
En Route 00:58:12																																																											
On Scene 01:02:26																																																											
Closed 03:47:29																																																											
Rcvd-Closed 2:50:14																																																											
<table border="1"><thead><tr><th>Unit Times</th><th>Officers</th><th>Dispatched</th><th>Enroute</th><th>On Scene</th><th>Clear</th><th>Disp-On Scene</th><th>Enrt-On Scene</th><th>On Scene-Clear</th><th>Disp-Clear</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>B1</td><td>Felix Vargas/[REDACTED]</td><td>00:58:06</td><td>00:58:12</td><td>01:02:26</td><td>02:15:31</td><td>04:20</td><td>04:14</td><td>1:13:05</td><td>1:17:25</td></tr><tr><td>P56</td><td>[REDACTED]</td><td>00:58:37</td><td>00:59:04</td><td>01:15:25</td><td>02:15:43</td><td>16:48</td><td>16:21</td><td>1:00:18</td><td>1:17:06</td></tr><tr><td>S1</td><td>[REDACTED]</td><td>01:39:48</td><td></td><td>01:39:48</td><td>02:16:44</td><td>N/A</td><td>N/A</td><td>36:56</td><td>36:56</td></tr><tr><td>B1</td><td>Felix Vargas/[REDACTED]</td><td>02:16:05</td><td></td><td>02:16:05</td><td>03:47:29</td><td>N/A</td><td>N/A</td><td>1:31:24</td><td>1:31:24</td></tr></tbody></table>										Unit Times	Officers	Dispatched	Enroute	On Scene	Clear	Disp-On Scene	Enrt-On Scene	On Scene-Clear	Disp-Clear	B1	Felix Vargas/[REDACTED]	00:58:06	00:58:12	01:02:26	02:15:31	04:20	04:14	1:13:05	1:17:25	P56	[REDACTED]	00:58:37	00:59:04	01:15:25	02:15:43	16:48	16:21	1:00:18	1:17:06	S1	[REDACTED]	01:39:48		01:39:48	02:16:44	N/A	N/A	36:56	36:56	B1	Felix Vargas/[REDACTED]	02:16:05		02:16:05	03:47:29	N/A	N/A	1:31:24	1:31:24
Unit Times	Officers	Dispatched	Enroute	On Scene	Clear	Disp-On Scene	Enrt-On Scene	On Scene-Clear	Disp-Clear																																																		
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P56	[REDACTED]	00:58:37	00:59:04	01:15:25	02:15:43	16:48	16:21	1:00:18	1:17:06																																																		
S1	[REDACTED]	01:39:48		01:39:48	02:16:44	N/A	N/A	36:56	36:56																																																		
B1	Felix Vargas/[REDACTED]	02:16:05		02:16:05	03:47:29	N/A	N/A	1:31:24	1:31:24																																																		
Incident Comments eastside pull stn																																																											
TIME	#	EVENT							BY																																																		
00:57:54	1	Incident initiated at Upa 12, 17950 Lassen St #L2, Northridge							[REDACTED]																																																		
00:58:06	2	B1 DISP. Upa 12, 17950 Lassen St #L2, Northridge																																																									
00:58:12	3	B1 ENRT.																																																									
00:58:37	4	P56 DISP. Upa 12, 17950 Lassen St #L2, Northridge																																																									
00:59:04	5	P56 ENRT. LASSEN/LIND MEET LAFD																																																									
01:02:26	6	B1 CODE6.																																																									
01:02:58	7	B1 CODE4.																																																									
01:03:44	8	B1 out with individuals that pulled alarm																																																									
01:06:00	9	B1 req Ra on duties																																																									
01:08:46	10	detaining one																																																									
01:11:33	11	B1 b1 req S1																																																									
01:15:25	12	P56 CODE6.																																																									
01:15:35	13	P56 CODE6. UPA 12																																																									
01:16:49	14	[REDACTED] (09/04/1997) [REDACTED] added to incident																																																									
01:26:25	15	B1 Case number 161636 assigned to 1604300002																																																									
01:39:48	16	S1 DISP. Upa 12, 17950 Lassen St #L2, Northridge																																																									
01:39:48	17	S1 CODE6.																																																									
01:40:47	18	S1 released to the care of [REDACTED]																																																									
01:48:19	19	req lafd for m in custody /c&b 18/complaining of chest pains and that he cant breath																																																									
	20	LAFD incident number 73 ra 70																																																									
	21	boy req meet at zel/las																																																									
01:48:44	22	P56 ENRT. MEET LAFD/RA 70 LAS/ZEL																																																									
01:50:59	23	S1 clr rm 203																																																									
01:53:32	24	B1 RA 70 on scene																																																									
02:06:19	25	B1 ENRT. TO STN W1M/BM29262.8																																																									

TIME	#	EVENT	BY
02:09:05	1	B1 CODE6. STN	
02:13:26	2		
	3	added to incident	
02:15:31	4	B1 CLR. Freed	
02:15:43	5	P56 CLR. Freed	
02:16:05	6	B1 DISP. Upa 12,  , Northridge	
02:16:05	7	B1 CODE6.	
02:16:30	8	B1 ENRT. TO LAPD VANUYS WIM BM 29264.4	
02:16:44	9	S1 CLR. . Disposition AS	
02:27:45	10	B1 CODE6. EM 29273 VAN NUYS JAIL	
03:47:29	11	B1 CLR.	
03:47:32	12	B1 Closed - Disposition AS	

C



SUPERVISOR'S DAILY SYNOPSIS

SUPERVISOR: [REDACTED]		SHIFT: AM <u>PM</u>		DATE: <u>04-29-16</u>	DAY: <u>SU</u> <u>M</u> <u>T</u> <u>W</u> <u>TH</u> <u>F</u> <u>S</u>
OFFICER	PATROL ASSIGNMENT	BEAT(S)	SOW	EOW	OVERTIME/ SPECIAL DETAIL/NOTES
[REDACTED]	BIKE/VEH	1-3	1800	0600	
VARGAS	FOOT/VEH	3	1800	0600	
[REDACTED]	" / "	3	1800	0400	

DIRECTED PATROL: CONTINUE TO MONITOR UPA SDP BY EVENT TO MEET & GREET. FOOT PATROLS OF ART & DESIGN & SIERRA.

BRIEFING TOPICS: REVIEWED RIMS REPORT, BRIEF/VEH BOOK & CRIME STAT BOOK

OFFICER	DETAIL	Total Time	Cites	Warn.	Contacts made	Comments/Notes:
[REDACTED]	C.O.	4 MIN			5	
[REDACTED]	P.E.	1.23 HR	0	2		
OFFICER	DETAIL	Total Time	Cites	Warn.		
[REDACTED]	C.O.	2 HRS.			200	
VARGAS	P.E.	47 MIN	0			F10, F9, G9
OFFICER	DETAIL	Total Time	Cites	Warn.		
OFFICER	DETAIL	Total Time	Cites	Warn.		
OFFICER	DETAIL	Total Time	Cites	Warn.		

Daily Vehicle/Administrative Inspection Report

	Yes	No/BO		Yes	No/BO
Tires	✓	—	Blanket	✓	—
Lighting Equipment	✓	—	Chalk	✓	—
Radio / P.A.	✓	—	Bio-Hazard Bag	✓	—
AED	✓	—	I/C Vest	✓	—
First Aid Kit	✓	—	Teddy Bear	✓	—
Active Shooter F.A.K.	✓	—	Water	✓	—
Fire Extinguisher	✓	—	Bird Flu Kit	✓	—
Bullhorn	✓	—	Mobile Command Board	✓	—
Caution Tape	✓	—	Rear Passenger door lock/Windows	✓	—
Roll-a-Tape	✓	—	TASER Spark Test (Unit # <u>1452</u>)	✓	—
ICP Flag	✓	—	Jail Check	✓	—
Flares	✓	—			

Comments/Notes:

SHOP # <u>491</u>	SOW Miles <u>31,495</u>	TOTAL MILES <u>18</u>
	EOW Miles <u>31,513</u>	

Shift Synopsis:

- REPORT OF KEYS LEFT IN VEHICLE LOT B3 1ST LEVEL RETRIEVED & LEFT NOTE.
- INJURED GOOSE REPORTED CHECKED OKAY HAD DRY BLOOD BUT NO INJURIES VISIBLE ABLE TO MOVE.
- CR161636 FIRE ALARM PULL STATION. 647(F) STUDENTS CONTACTED RESPONSIBLE FOR VANDALISM & PULL STATION ACTIVATION. MALE BOOKED AT VAN NUYS JAIL AND FEMALE ESCORTED TO HER DORM.
- UPA10 LOBBY FOUND 647(F) STUDENT WITH 2 SOBER FRIENDS SHE WAS NOT WANTING TO GO TO HER DORM UPA20 ESCORTED THEM WAS LEFT WITH SOBER FRIENDS IN HER ROOM.
- UNITS ATTENDED HOUSING EVENT NO PROBLEMS OBS.

DISPATCHER ONE: [REDACTED]	SOW	EOW	DISPATCHER TWO: [REDACTED]	SOW 1995	EOW 0545
1) BREAK TIME OUT:	TIME IN:		1) BREAK TIME OUT:	TIME IN:	
2) LUNCH TIME OUT:	TIME IN:		2) LUNCH TIME OUT:	TIME IN:	
3) BREAK TIME OUT:	TIME IN:		3) BREAK TIME OUT:	TIME IN:	
4) BREAK TIME OUT:	TIME IN:		4) BREAK TIME OUT:	TIME IN:	

SUPERVISOR'S INITIALS

JA

COMMANDER'S INITIALS

[Signature]

Supervisor: _____

Type of Inspection (#'s) 12[illegible]

LEGEND

1. Uniform Appearance (Uniform Class _____)
2. Body Armor (Is officer wearing vest?)
3. Personal Appearance
4. Specialty uniform (Bike, Motor, K-9)
5. Firearm and Holster
6. Magazine Holder
7. OC Pepper Spray
8. Handcuff and Cuff Case
9. Radio and Holder
10. Asp Baton and Holder
11. Digital Recorder (batteries)
12. CPR Micro shield and Holder
13. Trauma Shooting Kit
14. SOP-manual
15. Use and Condition of Vehicle(s)
16. Adheres to Dept. Policies/Directives
17. Conditions of Workspace
18. Others (list in comments section)



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

OFFICER DAILY LOG

OFFICERS(S) [REDACTED]				BEAT(S) <u>1 2 3</u>			DATE <u>04/29/16</u>		DAY <u>S M T W T F S</u>	
<u>SHOP</u>	BIKE	T3	# <u>503</u>	EOW Miles <u>15225</u>			SOW Miles <u>15199</u>		TOTAL MILES <u>26</u>	

	Yes	No/BO		Yes	No/BO
Tires	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	Blanket	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Lighting Equipment	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	Water	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Radio / P.A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	Bio-Hazard Bag	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
AED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	I/C Vest	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
First Aid Kit	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	Teddy Bear	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Active Shooter F.A. K	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	Chalk	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Fire Extinguisher	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	ICP Flag	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Bullhorn	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	Mobile Command board	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Caution Tape	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	Rear passenger door locks/windows	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Rol-a-Tape	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	TASER Inspection / Spark Test (Unit # <u>1538</u>)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—
Flares	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—			

Comments/Notes:

#	AT SCENE	CLEAR	SOURCE		REFERENCE REPORT#/ CITATION #	LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE	CODE
			O B S	R A D			
1	1800	—				STATION	10A
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>S.O.W</u>							
2	1800	1830				BREEFING/STATION	10A
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>STATION/BREEFING</u>							
3	1830	1943			FEB 18 75ER919	ALL BEATS	2
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>2 WARNING</u>							
4	1943	2030				B3 LEVEL 1	9B
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>KEYS LEFT IN CAR</u>							
5	2055	2135				HOUSING	11
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>COMMUNITY OUTREACH</u>							
6	2135	2147				LENDLEY/PLUMMER -> R6	9B
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>SAFETY ESCORT</u>							
7	1910	1932				OVERATT	9B
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>PROPERTY RETURNED</u>							
8	2240	2300				CEBRNA HALL	8
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>CHARGE OK</u>							
9	2301	2331				ORANGE GROVE	10F
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>GOOSE WAS OK</u>							
10	2341	2351				MATADOR STATUE	7
ACTIVITY/DISPO <u>CHARGES OK</u>							

#	AT SCENE	CLEAR	SOURCE		REFERENCE REPORT#/ CITATION #	LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE	CODE
			O B S	R A D			
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
11	0015	0100				ART AND DESIGN	8
ACTIVITY/DISPO CHECKS OK							
12	0100	0445				UPA 12 / VAN NOYS	10B/1
ACTIVITY/DISPO BOOKED BODY							
13	0445	0630				STATION	10A
ACTIVITY/DISPO REPORTS							
14	0630	/				STATION	40A
ACTIVITY/DISPO E.O.W							
15							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
16							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
17							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
18							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
19							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
20							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
21							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							
22							
ACTIVITY/DISPO							

Daily Activity Report			
1. Reports	<u>1</u>		
2. Traffic Safety	<u>1</u>	Cited: <u>0</u> Warned: <u>2</u> Total Time: <u>1.23</u>	
3. Parking Enforcement	<u>1</u>		
4. Susp. Person/Veh.	<u>1</u>		
5. Arrests	<u>1</u>		
6. Alarms	<u>1</u>		
a) 911	<u>1</u>		
b) Blue Lights	<u>1</u>		
c) Elevators	<u>1</u>		
d) C-30's	<u>1</u>		
e) Fire	<u>1</u>		
7. Neighborhood Checks	<u>1</u>		
8. Foot Patrols	<u>2</u>		
9. Citizen / Motorist Assist	<u>2</u>		
a) Room Access/ Secure	<u>2</u>		
b) Other	<u>2</u>		
10. Activity	<u>6</u>		
a) Admin	<u>4</u>		
b) Officer Assist/Back-up	<u>1</u>		
c) 961's	<u>1</u>		
d) Training	<u>1</u>		
e) Follow-up Investigation	<u>1</u>		
f) Other	<u>1</u>		
11. Community Outreach			
Contacts: <u>5</u>	Total Time: <u>4 min</u>		

Officer Signature

Supervisor Signature

Page 2 of 2



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY NORTHRIDGE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Housing Community Policing Program
Officer Activity Log

Date: 4/29/16

Day of the week: FRIDAY

Officer Assigned: VAREAS
Officer Assigned: [REDACTED]
Officer Assigned: [REDACTED]
Supervisor On-duty: [REDACTED]

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/> Bicycle	<input type="checkbox"/> Foot	<input type="checkbox"/> T3
<input type="checkbox"/> Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/> Bicycle	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Foot	<input type="checkbox"/> T3
<input type="checkbox"/> Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/> Bicycle	<input type="checkbox"/> Foot	<input type="checkbox"/> T3

COMMUNITY POLICING ADMINISTRATION: Explain any significant e-mail, phone calls, etc. and any continuing projects

NO SIGNIFICANT MESSAGES

HOUSING ACTIVITIES:

Housing Meetings Attended: Please explain in detail the location of the meeting, time, # of people attending, Officers attending, purpose

ATTENDED 2A MEETING; NO ISSUES / NO CONCERNS

Crime Prevention Programs: Please explain in detail the location and time of the program, purpose/topic of the program, # of attendees, Officers who participated

N/A

Building Walk-Through: Please explain in detail the areas patrolled and any problems observed

6, 7, 18, 16, 17, 14, 12, 10

Comments:

Traffic Safety

Community Outreach 2020-2205 @ HOUSING BLOCK PARTY (200) CONTACTS
Parking Enforcement 0010-0051 @ GA, FA, FIO (4) CITES

OFFICER INITIATED CONTACTS:

How many Residents did you contact? 225

Of those, how many were Housing Staff? 3 Students? 222

Reason for contact: FOOT PATROL, COMMUNITY OUT REACH

Where there any concerns or issues raised?: N/A

Did you assist, refer or make a report on any of these contacts? N/A

Were any of these contacts associated with a crime report? 161636

How many NON-Residents did you contact? 0 Explain the type of non-resident (i.e. visitor, trespasser) -

Reason for contact: N/A

Where there any concerns or issues raised?: N/A

Did you assist, refer or make a report on any of these contacts? N/A

Were any of these contacts associated with a crime report? N/A

RADIO CALL LOG:

Narcotics violations _____ Alcohol Incidents 1 Weapons _____

Loud Music _____ Burglary _____ Medical Emergency _____ 415 PC _____ Theft _____

Suspicious Person _____ 5150 WC _____ Smell of Marijuana _____ Roommate Dispute _____ Parking Cites 0

Fire Alarm 1 Welfare Check _____ Suspicious Activity _____ Blue Lights _____ 626.6 PC Given _____

Foot Patrols 2 Elevator Calls _____ 911 Calls _____

Did you make any arrests? YES Judicial Referrals 0 If so, detail what type, offense, circumstances: _____



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY NORTHRIDGE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Housing Security Program
Guard Activity Log

Date: 4/24/16

Day of the week: Friday

Police Supervisor On-duty:

Hard Assigned
Hard Assigned
Hard Assigned
Hard Assigned
Hard Assigned
Hard Assigned

Unit ID: SUP
Unit ID: 61
Unit ID: 62
Unit ID: 63
Unit ID: 64
Unit ID: 65

Transportation: ☒ Foot
Transportation: ☒ Foot
Transportation: ☒ Foot
Transportation: ☒ Foot
Transportation: ☒ Foot
Transportation: ☒ Foot

☐ Bicycle
☐ Bicycle
☐ Bicycle
☐ Bicycle
☐ Bicycle
☐ Bicycle

Start: 1830 End: 0300
Start: 1830 End: 0300
Start: 1830 End: 0300
Start: 1830 End: 0300
Start: 1830 End: 0300
Start: 1830 End: 0300

GUARD OBSERVATIONS:

Equipment Repair or Need: Please explain in detail the equipment in need of repair or purchase (i.e. bicycles, radios, key sets, flashlights, gate locks, etc.).
Unit at post 15 is down. Gate arm at post one is broken.

Public Safety Issues of Concern: Please explain in detail the areas patrolled and any environmental design problems observed (i.e. tripping hazards such as cracks in sidewalk, lights out, dark areas, over-grown bushes and trees, broken fencing, etc.).
Patrolled inside and out of CSUN dorm.

Suggestions for Improving UPA Security: Please explain in detail the areas where you feel the security program within the University Park Apartment Complex can be improved. N/A

Other Comments:

GUARD CONTACTS (only include non-residents who are not registered and residents who are without ID):

How many Residents did you contact? 724 Non-Resident CSUN Students? 0 Non-CSUN Students (i.e. visitors)? 119

Reason for contact(s):

N/A

Were there any concerns or issues raised? N/A

Names of contacted CSUN students? N/A

Were any of these contacts associated with a crime report? N/A

SHIFT ACTIVITY LOG:

Fence Jumpers Observed 14

Fence Jumpers Caught 14

of Peds Refused Access 0

of visitors requesting access to the SSU 0

of visitors requesting access to UPA activities 0 - list what and where

Drunk/Intoxicated Contacts 0

Belligerent/Uncooperative Contacts 0

of Police Assistance Requests 0

of General Inquiries/Questions 0

Gate Unlock Requests 0

of Guard Assistance Requests 0

of Vehicles 0 and Peds 0 rushing past gates

Suspicious Activity 0

Suspicious Persons 0

Criminal Activity Observed 0

If so, detail what type, offense, circumstances:

ALLIEDBARTON™

SECURITY SERVICES

DAILY JOURNAL & OPERATIONS LOG

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION			LOCATION			PERIOD COVERED			
			C SURV			FROM		TO	
						HOUR 19-15	DATE 02/29/16	HOUR 0030	DATE 4/30/16
I AM ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL EQUIPMENT LISTED BELOW									
KEYCARDS		VEHICLE KEYS		CELLPHONES		FLASHLIGHTS		VISITOR BADGES	
RADIOS		KEYS		OTHER					
ITEMS NO. 1 THROUGH 13 MUST BE CHECKED YES OR NO ITEMS CHECKED YES MUST BE EXPLAINED ON LOG				TIME		INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC			
				IN	OUT				
	YES	NO	WERE THERE ANY:						
1	✓		SPECIAL ORDERS		1930	2 African american ^{male} were stopped from jumping fence a #8			
						* 6'4, blue jacket, black pants			
2		✓	FIRE DOORS, EXITS BLOCKED			Black jersey white strips			
3		✓	OTHER FIRE HAZARDS			* 5'8 blue shirt, black glasses			
						skate board			
4		✓	SECURITY, EXIT LIGHTS OUT			2030 5'7 male green shirt			
5		✓	OTHER SAFETY HAZARDS			Blue jeans, black hat			
6		✓	EQUIPMENT LEFT ON			* Afro, red sweater, blue			
7		✓	WINDOW, DOORS UNLOCKED			pants			
8		✓	FILES, SAFES OPEN			* Black and white strip			
9		✓	OFFICES UNLOCKED			shirt			
10		✓	PARKING VIOLATIONS			* jumped gate and exited into 20129h			
11		✓	PROPERTY DAMAGED			exiters through building			
12		✓	DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT			14 towards 20129h			
13		✓	PASS-ON SPECIAL ORDERS			street			
						2100 4 caucasian males			
						1 female			
						had them leave premises			
						RELIEVING SECURITY OFFICER			
						SIGNATURE			

[illegible]

D



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION NOTICE

May 9, 2016

Officer Anthony Vargas
18111 Nordhoff Street
Northridge, Ca. 91330-8282

Officer Vargas,

The Internal Affairs Unit has initiated an investigation into potential policy violations which occurred during the response and handling of a fire alarm activation and concurrent vandalism investigation (case #161636). A citizen complaint over the use of excessive force was documented within the aforementioned case report (Supplement 1 completed by [REDACTED] and upon completion of the required command staff use of force review, recommendations were made for the need of further investigation.

At the present time, potential policy violations being investigated include the following:

- Department Policy/Procedure #03-P.A.-001 Standards of Conduct (Sworn), Section V – Cannon of Ethics:

Subsection A – Cannon 1, "Peace Officers shall uphold the Constitution of the United States, the California Constitution, and all laws enacted pursuant to legally constituted authority."

Standard 1.6 – "Peace officers shall respect and uphold dignity, human rights, and constitutional rights of all persons."

Subsection B – Cannon 2, "Peace officers shall be aware of and shall use proper and ethical procedures in discharging their official duties and responsibilities.

Standard 2.1 – "Peace officers shall be aware of their lawful authority to use that force reasonably necessary in securing compliance with their lawful enforcement duties."

Standard 2.2 – [REDACTED]

Subsection C – Cannon 3, "Peace officers shall regard the discharge of their duties as a public trust and shall recognize their responsibilities to the people whom they are sworn to protect and serve."

Standard 3.2 – “Peace officers, during their service, shall diligently devote their time and attention to the effective and professional performance of their responsibilities.”

Standard 3.5 – “Peace officers shall be prepared and shall respond effectively to the demands of their office.”

- Department Policy/Procedure #08-L.E.-011 Use of Force, Section II.C – “It is the policy of this department that officers shall use only that force which is reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event.”
- Department Policy/Procedure #08-S.O.-019 Unusual Occurrence – All Hazzard Plan. “It shall be the policy of this department to respond to planned and unplanned disasters or emergencies that occur on this campus, or in our sphere of influence when requested, in a professional and informed manner utilizing Incident Command System (ICS) as incorporated in both California’s Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).”
- Department Policy/Procedure #05-S.O.-005 Fire and Fire Alarm Response Procedures, Section IV – “Incident Command Post – The first responding officer to a fire scene or alarm of fire shall immediately establish the Incident Command Post and act as Incident Commander (I/C), reviewing the ICS 9 Critical Tasks list. The I/C shall immediately notify CSUN dispatch of the exact location of the Incident Command Post and the name of the Incident Commander.” And... “Evacuation of Buildings – Officers shall utilize bullhorns (on a floor by floor basis) as the primary means to direct building occupants to evacuate a building.”
- Department Policy/Procedure #07-O.A.-007 Field Reporting and Management,
Section IV.B.2 – “All reports shall be prepared as directed in this policy and the Criminal Investigation Policy (Policy/Procedure 07-C.I.-005) and within the following guidelines:
 - b. All reports shall be detailed, accurate, honest, and factual.”
- Section IV.E.e – “Officers are expected to complete reports in a fully detailed manner. Any report written by a member of this department shall be free of false or deliberately incomplete information.”
- Department Policy/Procedure #07-C.I.-005 Criminal Investigations, Section IV.D.2.a and k – “Steps to be followed in conducting preliminary investigations include:


- a. Providing for the safety of victims, suspects, and witnesses, rendering aid for injured parties and requesting appropriate medical attention, if necessary.
 - k. Preparing the preliminary crime/incident report fully and accurately.”
- Department Policy/Procedure #06-L.E.-003 Digital Voice Recording Devices, “All sworn personnel of this Department shall use department-issued digital recorders.” Section IV.B.1 and 3 – “When and How to Use the Digital Recorder.
- 1. The digital recorder shall be activated and remain activated in order to ensure the integrity of the recording unless the contact involves an area restricted by this policy (see Section C, below).
 - 3. Incidents in which an officer should activate his/her digital recorder include but are not limited to: b. arrests. c. contacts in which the contacted party is argumentative, unresponsive, or otherwise hostile.”

I, Captain Scott VanScoy, have been assigned as the investigator for this case and you are hereby directed to schedule an appointment for us to meet through my assistant, Priscilla Alcocer (818-677-5582). The meeting must occur on or before Thursday, May 26, 2016. You will be interviewed as the subject officer and are allowed one representative at the interview and all applicable rights, in accordance to AB301 – California Police Officers Bill of Rights. A Department Auditor may also be present during the interview.

Through preliminary investigation, allegations of said policy violation(s) occurred during the early morning hours of Saturday, April 30, 2016 in UPA 12. Per this notice, I am ordering you not to discuss this matter with anyone other than myself or any person possessing the lawful right to confidential communication such as a spouse, counselor, psychiatrist, doctor, lawyer, etc.

Should you have any questions at this time, please feel free to contact me directly.

Sincerely,



Scott G. VanScoy
Captain, Special Services



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION NOTICE

May 9, 2016

Sergeant [REDACTED]
18111 Nordhoff Street
Northridge, Ca. 91330-8282

Sergeant [REDACTED]

The Internal Affairs Unit has initiated an investigation into potential policy violations which occurred during the response and handling of a fire alarm activation and vandalism investigation (case #161636). You have been identified as a witness (not a subject officer of the complaint) and I, Captain Scott VanScoy, have been assigned as the investigator for this case. This is to advise that I will be contacting you for an interview while on-duty in the coming week. Again, you will be interviewed as a witness, thus not requiring a representative in accordance to AB301 – California Police Officers Bill of Rights. A Department Auditor may be present during the interview.

Per this notice, I am ordering you not to discuss this matter with anyone other than myself or any person possessing the lawful right to confidential communication such as a spouse, counselor, psychiatrist, doctor, lawyer, etc.

For your reference, the incident in question occurred during the early morning hours of Saturday, April 30, 2016 in UPA 12. Should you have any questions at this time, please feel free to contact me directly.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Scott G. VanScoy".

Scott G. VanScoy
Captain, Special Services



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION NOTICE

May 9, 2016

Officer [REDACTED]
18111 Nordhoff Street
Northridge, Ca. 91330-8282

Officer [REDACTED]

The Internal Affairs Unit has initiated an investigation into potential policy violations which occurred during the response and handling of a fire alarm activation and vandalism investigation (case #161636). You have been identified as a witness (not a subject officer of the complaint) and I, Captain Scott VanScoy, have been assigned as the investigator for this case. This is to advise that I will be contacting you for an interview while on-duty in the coming week. Again, you will be interviewed as a witness, thus not requiring a representative in accordance to AB301 – California Police Officers Bill of Rights. A Department Auditor may be present during the interview.

Per this notice, I am ordering you not to discuss this matter with anyone other than myself or any person possessing the lawful right to confidential communication such as a spouse, counselor, psychiatrist, doctor, lawyer, etc.

For your reference, the incident in question occurred during the early morning hours of Saturday, April 30, 2016 in UPA 12. Should you have any questions at this time, please feel free to contact me directly.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Scott G. VanScoy".

Scott G. VanScoy
Captain, Special Services



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

INTERNAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATION NOTICE

May 9, 2016

Officer [REDACTED]
18111 Nordhoff Street
Northridge, Ca. 91330-8282

Office [REDACTED]

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Scott G. VanScoy".

Scott G. VanScoy
Captain, Special Services

E

MIRANDA ADVISEMENT

1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say may be used against you in court.
3. You have the right to an attorney before and during questioning.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you before questioning, if you wish.

MIRANDA WAIVER


Do you understand each of these rights that I have explained to you?

Response YES

Having your rights in mind, do you wish to answer any questions?

Response NO

I have read and received a copy of the above advisement.


Employee Signature

5/25/16
Date


Witnessing Supervisor

05-25-16
Date

LYBARGER WARNING


(ONLY if Miranda is not waived.)

- Once the Miranda rights have been given, the "LYBARGER" admonishment is applied and the employee **must** be informed of the following:
 1. While you have the right to remain silent with regard to any criminal investigation, you **do not** have the right to refuse to answer my administrative questions.
 2. This is strictly an administrative investigation. I am, therefore, now **ordering** you to discuss this matter with me.
 3. If you refuse to discuss this matter, your silence can be deemed insubordination and result in administrative discipline, up to and including termination.
 4. Any statement you make under compulsion of the threat of such discipline cannot be used against you in a later criminal proceeding.

I have read and received a copy of the above advisement.


Employee Signature

5/25/16
Date


Witnessing Supervisor


5-25-16
Date

GARRITY ADMONISHMENT


(To be given after the Miranda and Lybarger admonishments)

1. You are advised that any statements that you make, under the compulsion of the threat of discipline or termination, cannot be used in any subsequent criminal proceedings.

I have read and received a copy of the above advisement.


Employee Signature

5/25/16
Date


Witnessing Supervisor

5-25-16
Date

F



POLICY/PROCEDURE NUMBER: 07-O.A.-007

Page 1 of 5

SUBJECT: FIELD REPORTING AND MANAGEMENT

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2015

REVIEW DATE: January 7, 2016

AMENDS/SUPERSEDES: January 27, 2010 version; February 16, 2011 version; January 8, 2014.

IACLEA STANDARD: 16.1.1, 16.1.2, 16.1.3

CSU POLICE DEPARTMENTS SYSTEMWIDE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE – YES

APPROVED: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this directive is to establish standardized guidelines for officers to follow in order to prepare consistent, high-quality reports of incidents and events occurring within the jurisdiction of the California State University, Northridge Police Department.

II. POLICY

It shall be the policy of the department that its officers prepare reports for all incidents or events that they are called upon to investigate. While not all routine calls for service will require a report, officers should produce reports whenever possible to maximize the opportunity to record and preserve information, evidence, or any other relevant data that may become of significant value at a later date.

III. DEFINITIONS

RIMS: Records Information Management System

IV. PROCEDURES

A. Events Requiring Case Reports

1. The department will document every incident in the following categories that is alleged to have occurred in its jurisdiction (in either a case report and/or incident log format):
 - a. Citizens' reports of crime or violations of institutional policies;

- b. Citizens' complaints;
- c. Calls for service or assistance to individuals on campus property;
- d. Incidents resulting in an employee being dispatched or assigned;
- e. Criminal and non-criminal cases initiated by law enforcement employees;
- f. Incidents involving arrests, citations or summonses;
- g. Assists to outside agencies performing official duties on campus property.

Note: all incidents or calls for service requiring officer response require a narrative to be written. When using an incident log to document general calls for service (i.e., noise complaints, suspicious subjects, etc. not requiring a detailed RIMS report), officer narratives shall be documented at minimum in the "incident comments" section of the incident log. All names of those involved shall be included in the narrative logged into the RIMS master persons file linking the respective incident log number to the person's record.

2. Officers shall respond to calls for service, investigate activity observed while on patrol, and prepare a report concerning the event or incident whenever any of the following has been established:
 - a. When a person reports a criminal act or violation of institutional policy which may be considered a criminal act per 89031 of the Education Code;
 - b. When evidence indicates that a criminal act may have occurred and there is no victim or witness available to verify the source of the incident;
 - c. When a hazardous condition is observed or reported;
 - d. When an officer renders medical assistance or victims requiring care are transported to a hospital;
 - e. When unusual or suspicious activity is reported and, in the officer's opinion, additional investigation is recommended;
 - f. To record a traffic accident where an involved party is injured or a university vehicle or property is involved;
 - g. To record any event where the university may be required to address circumstances relating to sensitive material or issues;
 - h. When an officer makes an arrest, regardless of the disposition of the arrest;
 - i. When assisting outside agencies performing official duties on campus property;
 - j. When so directed by a supervisor;
 - k. When an incident has occurred and the officer concludes that the best interests of the Department and university will be served by preparing a report.
 - l. Property reports beyond the scope of the Lost and Found policy (e.g., found contraband).

3. Courtesy Reports

Courtesy reports shall be completed when the following conditions exist:

- a. Exigent circumstances: For example, there is an active mutual-aid task force in operation or the travel distance to the concerned jurisdiction is extreme;
- b. The concerned jurisdiction does not complete a telephonic report;
or,
- c. Prior approval is obtained from the Chief of Police, a manager, supervisor or detective.

Courtesy reports shall not be taken telephonically.

B. Case Report Format

- 1. Officers shall use only those report forms and formats authorized by the chief of police. The report writing format used by this department for crime/incident reports is the narrative style.
- 2. All reports shall be prepared as directed in this policy and the Criminal Investigation Policy (Policy/Procedure Number 07-C.I.-005) and within the following guidelines:
 - a. All reports shall be legible and grammatically correct;
 - b. All reports shall be detailed, accurate, honest and factual;
 - c. All reports shall be written in the first-person, using the active voice;
 - d. All reports shall be prepared via computer. If the RIMS system is not functional, reports are to be completed using a word processing program (e.g., Microsoft Word). If computer systems are unavailable, reports are to be handwritten in black ink.

C. Case Report Structure

- 1. The Police Department has developed and maintains a variety of formatted reports designed to expedite investigative and administrative processes. Officers are encouraged to use all available tools within the various report forms, so as to offer the most detailed picture and quickest reference material for the future reader.
- 2. RIMS is software for all crime or incident reports. The first part consists of a "face sheet" that indicates what type of crime or incident is being reported. The case report form has tabs for the various screens: Page 1, Page 2, Persons, Property, Vehicles, Accident Info, Narrative/Supplemental, Officers, and Photos. RIMS automatically assigns a consecutive and unique report number.
- 3. The narrative consists of the officer's chronological documentation of the events as they are known to have occurred or more than likely transpired as a result of the evidence and suspect/witness/victim accounts discovered. A supplemental report shall be used when pertinent information needs to be documented after the original report has been completed or when an officer, other than the reporting officer, needs to write his or her own narrative.
- 4. RIMS shall be used to document all criminal activity including crimes reported, arrests, citation-arrests and cases in which criminal activity is suspected.

- a. In the case of crime reports, officers shall prepare reports as directed in this policy and the Criminal Investigation Policy (Policy/Procedure Number 07-C.I.-005). Other reports shall be produced consistent with the same reporting guidelines for their particular investigative needs. These would include traffic collisions, lost/found property, lost/stolen state keys, etc. In all reports, a first-person, chronological narrative shall be used.
- b. The report shall also be used to record general information as necessary, as well as incidents such as parking disputes, hazardous conditions and other such less critical issues.
- c. All reports shall be in the form of a written narrative, regardless of the type of incident.
- d. Refer to the RIMS User Manual – Chapters 4 – 8, located in the shift supervisor's office, for procedures to follow in completing each field report.

D. Report Writing

- 1. Officers are reminded that their reports oftentimes offer the only source of cohesive information regarding what occurred during an incident and within a given time period.
- 2. To ensure that the Department meets the expectation of providing accurate and timely information to its respective allied agencies, officers are required to accomplish the following:
 - a. Officers shall complete reports as soon as possible, preferably immediately after concluding the on-scene investigation.
 - b. Officers will confine their on-line report writing to the report writing room or where approved by the shift supervisor.
 - c. Officers shall make every effort to complete all reports prior to the end of his/her scheduled shift. No report shall be held over without shift supervisor approval, and under no circumstances shall any report involving an arrest, hazardous situation, or potentially noteworthy event be held over to be finished at a later date without the approval of the applicable Patrol Operations Watch Commander (i.e., Captain or Lieutenant) or the Captain of Special Services in their absence.
 - d. Officers are responsible for forwarding sensitive or important information to the shift supervisor as it is brought to their attention.
 - e. Officers are expected to complete reports in a fully detailed manner. Any report written by a member of this department shall be free of false or deliberately incomplete information.

E. Supervisory Review

- 1. Supervisors shall review all reports submitted prior to the end of their watch to ensure that the specific procedures outlined in this policy and the Criminal Investigation Policy (Policy/Procedure Number 07-C.I.-005) are being adhered to.

2. Critical components that must be reviewed include:
 - a. Overall completeness and accuracy;
 - b. Proper form usage;
 - c. Complete identifying/contact information for all involved parties;
 - d. Inclusion of necessary elements for all crimes being reported;
 - e. Headers and narrative structure consistent with policy (e.g., traffic collision reports);
 - f. Documentation of probable cause leading to the officer's actions;
 - g. Crime scene investigation, where appropriate;
 - h. Detailed account of evidence recovered;
 - i. Proper grammar, tense, and punctuation;
 - j. Presence of all required teletypes;
 - k. Proper sequencing of documents.

F. Routing Procedure

1. Upon completing assigned reports, officers shall check the "Turned in" box on Page 1. Supervisors will review and approve the RIMS report on "Officers" tab and note all routing.
2. Officers are reminded to proofread their work for accuracy as well as detail. Whenever possible, they should summarize points of particular concern, in person, with the shift supervisor to ensure that the finished report does not omit any essential details.
3. Officers may, and are encouraged to, consult with a detective when preparing more complex reports.
4. All reports will be processed through the department records information system as noted in the Records Data Collection Policy (Policy/Procedure Number 07-O.A.-008).



POLICY/PROCEDURE NUMBER: 03-P.A.-001 Page 1 of 11

SUBJECT: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (Sworn)

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2015

REVIEW DATE: January 7, 2016

AMENDS/SUPERSEDES: February 6, 2003 version; January 16, 2008 version; March 5, 2008 version; January 27, 2010 version; February 16, 2011 version; January 8, 2014 version.

IACLEA STANDARD: 4.1.1

CSU POLICE DEPARTMENTS SYSTEMWIDE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE – YES

APPROVED: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

I. PURPOSE

California State University (CSU) system-wide guidelines require that all CSU police officers adhere to the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, the Code of Professional Conduct and the Responsibility of Peace Officers.

This entire guideline has been set forth by the CSU system and is hereby incorporated into the California State University, Northridge University Police Policies/Procedures/Guidelines Manual.

II. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PEACE OFFICERS

(Reference is California Peace Officers' Association, "Creating a Law Enforcement Organizational Values Statement," November 1989)

Preamble

WHEREAS, peace officers are vested with a public trust which requires that they consistently demonstrate the highest degree of integrity and good moral character; and

WHEREAS, the need to maintain high standards of moral character, integrity, knowledge, and trust requires the establishment of a Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility for Peace Officers as a matter of the highest significance to health, welfare, and safety of the citizens of this state; and

WHEREAS, the establishment of a Code of professional Conduct and Responsibility for Peace Officers, which includes canon of ethics and minimum standards, requires the granting of authority to enforce these standards of professional conduct through disciplinary action, as necessary, for the protection of the health, welfare and safety of the public; therefore

BE IT RESOLVED that the need to maintain high standards of moral character, integrity, knowledge, and trust requires that peace officers establish and conform to a Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility for Peace Officers.

III. GENERAL STATEMENT

CSU Peace Officers are granted a public trust, which requires that they consistently demonstrate the highest degree of integrity. To be worthy of this public trust and to ensure that their professional conduct is above reproach, members of the police department must not only conform to a Code of Ethics but must also abide by these Canons of Ethics and Ethical Standards which constitute this Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility as means of internal regulation.

The essence of this profession requires that in addition to prescribing a desired level of performance, it must establish minimum standards of ethical conduct, which prescribes rules of internal discipline to ensure compliance. Accordingly, this Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility is established for the peace officer profession.

Nothing in the Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility for Peace Officers is intended to limit or supersede any provision of law relating to the duties and obligations of peace officers or the unprofessional, this is not to be interpreted as approval of conduct not specifically mentioned.

IV. DEFINITIONS

This Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility for Peace Officers is comprised of nine Canons of Ethics, with explanatory statements in the form of ethical standards. Examples of disciplinary rules and enforcement procedures are included in the appendix for individual agency consideration. Following are definitions of these terms, as used in the context of the code.

- A. "Campus Peace Officer" means a regular employed and full-time police officer, corporal, sergeant, detective/investigator, lieutenant, captain or chief of police.
- B. "CANONS" are statements which express in general terms standards of professional conduct expected of peace officers in their relationship with the public, the criminal justice system and the peace officer profession. They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Standards and the disciplinary rules are derived.
- C. "ETHICAL STANDARDS" are statements that represent the objectives to which every peace officer shall strive. They constitute principles that can be relied upon by the peace officer for guidance in specific situations.
- D. "DISCIPLINARY RULES" specify an unacceptable level of conduct for all peace officers, regardless of their rank or nature of their assignment. Any peace officer that violates any agency rule that applies to these canons and standards is guilty of unprofessional conduct, and is subject to disciplinary action ranging from oral reprimand to termination and/or criminal prosecution or other administrative action sanctioned by law, as dictated by the individual case.
- E. "ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES" are the fundamental rights of an accused officer which are applicable to a disciplinary investigation or proceeding against the officer.
- F. "ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION" is an investigation conducted to determine whether an officer has violated any provision of this code, or any agency rules or regulation, or whether an officer is impaired or unfit to perform the duties and responsibilities of a peace officer.
- G. "FORMAL DISCIPLINE" refers to the final adjudication of administrative or disciplinary charges. Formal discipline shall be deemed final only after an officer has exhausted or waived all legal remedies available and actual discipline has been invoked.

V. CANON OF ETHICS

A. Canon One

Peace Officers shall uphold the Constitution of the United States, the California Constitution, and all laws enacted pursuant to legally constituted authority.

Ethical Standards

Standard 1.1

Peace officers shall recognize the primary responsibility of their profession and of the individual officer is the protection of the people within their jurisdiction through upholding of the laws, the most important of which are the Constitution of the United States and State Constitution.

Standard 1.2

Peace officers shall be aware of the extent and the limitations of their authority in the enforcement of the law.

Standard 1.3

Peace officers shall diligently study new enactments of the laws they enforce.

Standard 1.4

Peace officers shall be responsible for keeping abreast of current case law as applied to their duties.

Standard 1.5

Peace officers shall endeavor to uphold the spirit of the law, as opposed to enforcing the letter of the law.

Standard 1.6

Peace officers shall respect and uphold dignity, human rights, and constitutional rights of all persons.

B. Canon Two

Peace officers shall be aware of and shall use proper and ethical procedures in discharging their official duties and responsibilities.

Ethical Standards**Standard 2.1**

Peace officers shall be aware of their lawful authority to use that force reasonably necessary in securing compliance with their lawful enforcement duties.

Standard 2.2

Peace officers shall truthfully, completely, and impartially report, testify, and present evidence in all matters of an official nature.

Standard 2.3

Peace officers shall follow legal practices in such areas as interrogation, arrest or detention, searches, seizures, use of informants, and collection and preservation of evidence.

Standard 2.4

Peace officers shall follow the principles of integrity, fairness, and impartiality in connection with their duties.

C. **Canon Three**

Peace officers shall regard the discharge of their duties as a public trust and shall recognize their responsibilities to the people whom they are sworn to protect and serve.

Ethical Standards**Standard 3.1**

Peace officers, as professionals, shall maintain an awareness of those factors affecting their responsibilities.

Standard 3.2

Peace officers, during their service, shall diligently devote their time and attention to the effective and professional performance of their responsibilities.

Standard 3.3

Peace officers shall ensure that they are prepared for the effective and efficient undertaking of their assignment.

Standard 3.4

Peace officers shall safely and efficiently use equipment and material available to them.

Standard 3.5

Peace officers shall be prepared and shall respond effectively to the demands of their office.

Standard 3.6

Peace officers, with due regard for compassion, shall maintain an objective and impartial attitude in official contacts.

Standard 3.7

Peace officers shall not allow their personal conviction, beliefs, prejudices, or biases to interfere unreasonably with their official acts or decisions.

Standard 3.8

Peace officers shall recognize that their allegiance is first to the people, and then secondly to their profession and the government entity or agency that employs them.

D. Canon Four

Peace officers will so conduct their public and private life that they exemplify the high standards of integrity, trust and morality demanded of a member of the peace officer profession.

Ethical Standards

Standard 4.1

Peace officers shall refrain from consuming intoxicating beverages to the extent that it results in impairment, which brings discredit upon the profession or their employing agency, or renders them unfit for service.

Standard 4.2

Peace officers shall not consume intoxicating beverages while on duty, except to the degree permitted in the performance of official duties, and under no circumstances while in uniform.

Standard 4.3

Peace officers shall not use any narcotics, hallucinogens, or any other controlled substance except when legally prescribed. When such controlled substances are prescribed, officers shall notify their superior officer prior to reporting for duty.

Standard 4.4

Peace officers shall maintain a level of conduct in their personal and business affairs in keeping with the high standards of the peace officer profession. Officers shall not participate in any incident involving moral turpitude.

Standard 4.5

Peace officers shall not assume financial obligations which they know or reasonably should know they will be unable to meet and shall pay all just debts when due.

Standard 4.6

Peace officers shall not engage in illegal political activities.

Standard 4.7

Peace officers shall not permit or authorize for personal gain the use of their name or photograph and official title identifying them as peace officers in connection with testimonials or advertisements for any commodity, commercial enterprise, or commercial service.

Standard 4.8

Peace officers shall not engage in any activity, which would create a conflict of interest or would be in violation of any law.

Standard 4.9

Peace officers shall at all times conduct themselves in a manner, which does not discredit the peace officer profession or their employing agency.

Standard 4.10

Peace officers shall not be disrespectful, insolent, mutinous, or insubordinate in attitude or conduct.

Standard 4.11

Peace officers shall be courteous and respectful in their official dealings with the public, fellow officers, superiors and subordinates.

Standard 4.12

Peace officers shall not engage in any strike, work obstruction or abstention, in whole or in part, from the full, faithful and proper performance of their assigned duties and responsibilities, except as authorized by law.

Standard 4.13

Peace officers shall maintain a neutral position with regard to the merits of any labor dispute, political protest, or other public demonstration, while acting in an official capacity.

E. Canon Five

Peace officers shall recognize that our society holds the freedom of the individual as a paramount precept, which shall not be infringed without just, legal, and necessary cause.

Ethical Standards

Standard 5.1

Peace officers shall not restrict the freedom of individuals, whether by detention or arrest, except to the extent necessary to legally or reasonably apply the law.

Standard 5.2

Peace officers shall recognize the rights of individuals to be free from capricious or arbitrary acts, which deny or abridge their fundamental rights as guaranteed by law.

Standard 5.3

Peace officers shall not use their official position to detain any individual, or to restrict the freedom of any individual, except in the manner and means permitted or prescribed by law.

F. Canon Six

Peace officers shall assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the peace officer profession.

Ethical Standards

Standard 6.1

Peace officers shall recognize that every person in our society is entitled to professional, effective and efficient law enforcement services.

Standard 6.2

Peace officers shall perform their duties in such a manner as to discourage double standards.

Standard 6.3

Peace officers shall conduct themselves so as to set exemplary standards of performance for all law enforcement personnel.

Standard 6.4

Peace officers shall maintain the integrity of their profession through complete disclosure of those who violate any of these rules of conduct, violate any law, or who conduct themselves in a manner which tends to discredit the profession.

Standard 6.5

Peace officers shall have responsibility for reporting to proper authorities any known information, which would serve to disqualify candidates from transferring within or entering the profession.

Standard 6.6

Peace officers shall be responsible for maintaining a level of education and training that will keep them abreast of current techniques, concepts, laws and requirements of the profession.

Standard 6.7

Chief executive peace officers shall accept the responsibility of utilizing all available resources and the authority of their office to maintain the integrity of their agency and competency of their officers. These Canons and Ethical Standards shall apply to all peace officers regardless of rank.

Standard 6.8

Peace officers shall assume a leadership role in furthering their profession by encouraging and assisting in the education and training of other members of the profession.

G. Canon Seven

Ethical Standards

Standard 7.1

Peace officers, within legal and agency guidelines, shall share with personnel both within and outside their agency, appropriate information that will facilitate the achievement of criminal justice goals and objectives.

Standard 7.2

Peace officers, whether requested through appropriate channels or called upon individually, shall render needed assistance to any other officer in the proper performance of their duty.

Standard 7.3

Peace officers shall, within legal and agency guidelines, endeavor to communicate to the people in their community the goals and objectives of the profession, and keep them apprised of conditions which threaten the maintenance of an ordered society.

H. Canon Eight

Ethical Standards

Standard 8.1

Peace officers shall refuse to offer, give or receive gifts, favors or gratuities, either large or small, which can be reasonably interpreted as capable of influencing official acts or judgments. This standard is not intended to isolate officers from normal social practices, or to preclude gifts among friends, associates, or relatives, where appropriate.

Standard 8.2

Peace officers shall not consider their badge of office as a license designed to provide them with special favor or consideration.

I. Canon Nine

Peace officers shall observe the confidentiality of information available to them through any source, as it relates to the peace officer profession.

Ethical Standards

Standard 9.1

Peace officers shall be aware of and shall meticulously observe all legal restriction on the release and dissemination of information.

Standard 9.2

Peace officers shall treat as confidential the official business of their employing agency, and shall release or disseminate such information solely in an authorized manner.

Standard 9.3

Peace officers shall treat as confidential that information confided to them personally. They shall disclose such information as required in the proper performance of their duties.

Standard 9.4

Peace officers shall neither disclose nor use for their personal interest any confidential information acquired by them in the course of their official duties.

Standard 9.5

Peace officers shall treat as confidential all matters relating to investigations, internal affairs, and personnel.

VI. INVESTIGATIVE PROVISIONS

- A. INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES--- Peace officers under investigation for an alleged violation of any of these standards or agency disciplinary rules shall be afforded, as a minimum, the rights established by law and contract, to ensure fair and just treatment in the enforcement of disciplinary rules of conduct or agency rules.
- B. EXERCISE OF RIGHTS--- By reason of the lawful exercise of rights, officers shall not be discharged, disciplined, demoted, transferred, or denied promotion or reassignment, or discriminated against with regard to employment, nor threatened with any such action.
- C. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS--- When the investigation focuses on an officer for prosecution of a criminal offense, the officer shall be afforded the same constitutional rights, privileges, or guarantees enjoyed by any person. This section, however, shall not deprive the agency of the right to pursue investigation administratively.
- D. AGENCY APPEAL OR REVIEW PROCESS--- To ensure due process, officers shall be provided with an internal administrative appeal or review

process or procedure. This process shall be in addition to any external appeal process.

- E. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INVESTIGATIONS--- To promote the complete investigation and reporting of complaints against peace officers, the CSU finds that the need to preserve and protect personal privacy information of employees and the incomplete work product of the CSU outweighs the public interest in full or partial disclosure, discovery, or production in any manner of the CSU's investigative files pertaining to complaints under investigation against officers. Investigative files, records, reports or other documentation may be subpoenaed in either criminal or civil proceedings only in accordance with the law.

VII. STANDARD OF CARE

No canon or ethical standard, or the agency enforcement of a canon, ethical standard, or agency disciplinary rule, shall be admissible as evidence of a standard of care or negligence in any civil action other than administrative or disciplinary proceedings.



POLICY/PROCEDURE NUMBER: 05-S.O.-005 Page 1 of 4

SUBJECT: FIRE AND FIRE ALARM RESPONSE PROCEDURES

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2015

REVIEW DATE: January 7, 2016

AMENDS/SUPERSEDES: February 25, 2008 version; March 10, 2005 version; January 27, 2010 version; February 16, 2011 version; January 8, 2014 version.

IACLEA STANDARD: 9.1.6, 17.1.2

CSU POLICE DEPARTMENTS SYSTEMWIDE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE – No

APPROVED: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to set forth the primary responsibilities of, and to define the role of, the California State University, Northridge Department of Police Services officers in actual fire and fire alarm emergency response incidents. Additionally, this policy sets forth the procedures for outside agency notifications, incident command procedures and building evacuation procedures.

II. ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY POLICE AT FIRE SCENES

The primary responsibilities of the Department of Police Services at a fire scene are to open all fire lanes and direct responding Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) apparatus; to provide initial evacuation notifications; to assist in the preservation of life; the protection of property; the prevention of crime; the control of crowds and the direction of vehicular traffic (including removal of vehicles which interfere with firefighting efforts).

Although the LAFD is the public agency in charge of and directly responsible for the handling of fires, the Department of Police Services also has an important role to play. Due to the patrol function, University police officers are often the first to discover a fire, the first on the scene and the first to alert and assist the occupants of a burning building or residence hall. Police officers may be assisted in fire scene response by parking enforcement officers who are authorized to lead fire engine companies to CSUN buildings and assist in the direction of traffic around a fire scene.

Police officers must also be aware of the possibility of arson and be observant for any person acting suspiciously at a fire scene. It should be noted, however, that the basic responsibility for the investigation of fires of incendiary or suspicious origin is with LAFD officials.

III. DISPATCHER RESPONSIBILITIES

Upon receiving from any source an alarm of fire, alert of a fire, report of a smell of smoke or any other type of call for service in which the possibility exists of a potential fire situation the dispatcher shall immediately notify:

1. The appropriate University police patrol units to respond to the scene (including the shift supervisor).
2. Los Angeles City Fire Department
3. California State University, Northridge PPM
4. Housing Office (if a residence hall is involved)
5. Environmental Health and Safety
6. Patrol Operations Commander (or designee if not available)
7. Chief of Police (working fires only)

NOTE: The California Health and Safety Code, section 13107 requires that all fires or explosions in state owned and state occupied facilities must be investigated by the State Fire Marshal. The notification task is the responsibility of the shift supervisor. In the event the shift supervisor is occupied, the dispatcher will be directed to be responsible for this task.

If the alarm of fire is received directly from PPM, the police dispatcher should determine if PPM has notified LAFD. The police dispatcher should verify with the LAFD that there is an alarm call and that they are enroute (or if PPM has not made any notification, LAFD is alerted immediately by police dispatch). CSUN units are to be advised of the LAFD notification when it is accomplished, as well as any other emergency responders en route to the scene.

It should be noted that no matter how vague a report involving the potential for a fire (i.e. smell of smoke, fire alarm of unknown origin, etc.), dispatchers shall err on the side of life safety and immediately notify the LAFD. In the event that University Police officers are the first to arrive on a scene and determine there is no fire or the call involves burned food on a stove or some other minor situation, the dispatcher shall transmit this information directly to the LAFD. The LAFD shall determine whether or not they will continue to respond to campus. Should the LAFD continue to respond, the shift supervisor shall be responsible for maintaining the police command post until the LAFD responds to campus and then clears the scene.

In advising CSUN Police units to respond to the scene, the dispatcher (and patrol supervisor) should ensure that units are coordinated so as to allow all fire lanes in the affected area to be open.

IV. FIRE INCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES

When an officer on patrol learns of the existence of a fire of such character as to require the services of the fire department and/or other additional resource/assistance need, that

officer shall immediately notify police dispatch via the radio of their request for additional resources (regardless of whether or not any other citizen has given an alarm).

Upon arrival at a fire scene, officers assigned to patrol vehicles shall position the vehicle outside the fire lanes in such a manner that they do not obstruct the passage of fire or other emergency vehicles. Every precaution should be taken to avoid police vehicles being blocked so that they are unable to further respond. The shift supervisor should ensure that initial responders do not block roadways.

Incident Command Post

The first responding officer to a fire scene or alarm of fire shall immediately establish the Incident Command post and act as Incident Commander (I/C), reviewing the ICS 9 Critical Tasks list. The I/C shall immediately notify CSUN dispatch of the exact location of the Incident Command Post and the name of the Incident Commander. Transfer of command of the I/C may occur when a more qualified person (e.g. shift supervisor) assumes command, a jurisdictional or agency change in command is required (e.g. fire department arrives on the scene) or a regular shift change occurs on an ongoing incident.

The I/C is responsible for managing the emergency response by setting objectives, the strategy, and directing the tactical response. Essentially the I/C is responsible for implementing ICS protocol (NIMS/SEMS) for fire response situations. Refer to policy # 08-S.O.-019 Unusual Occurrence –All Hazard plan for details involving the command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administrative ICS functions.

Unified Command

When LAFD responds to CSUN and University Police have already established a Command Post, the CSUN command post shall be moved to the site of the LAFD command post and merged for unified command. The shift supervisor will respond to the incident command post as soon as possible after being notified of the incident by police dispatch. He /she will assume the role of incident commander unless the scene is already operating under unified command. The shift supervisor will coordinate with internal CSUN emergency responders. In the event of an actual fire or other real emergency, the Patrol Operations Commander shall, if at all possible, respond to the Command Post and assume Incident Commander responsibility.

Evacuation of Buildings

Officers responding to fire scenes should ascertain alarm location(s) from the building annunciator panel. Simultaneously, building evacuation (with special attention given to persons with disabilities) and preventing any person who has exited a fire involved building from reentering the building should be priority tasks. Officers will interface with floor and building marshals and enlist their assistance in manning exits.

Officers shall utilize bullhorns (on a floor by floor basis) as the primary means to direct building occupants to evacuate a building. In inclement weather, evacuees will be directed to the nearest building or residence for shelter. In situations which involve a lengthy period of time for people to be out of a building or residence, community members are to be kept informed (via bullhorns) as to the situation at hand.

After officers have done as much as is reasonably possible to preserve life and to secure the scene for the firefighters, the officer's attention should be directed toward the detection of any suspicious persons or circumstances which might suggest that the fire is the result of a criminal act. Officers should identify and interview anyone who arrived at the scene prior to the first police and fire units or anyone who makes mention of having observed any suspicious people in the vicinity.

V. EMERGENCY PERIOD COMMUNICATIONS

Reports of fire constitute a form of emergency. During emergency periods all routine communications will cease at the instruction of the dispatcher or patrol supervisor. Personnel at the emergency scene will limit themselves to important communications which affect the emergency. All other personnel will maintain radio and telephone silence during this period (except in the event of another emergency situation) until such time as the dispatcher gives instructions to resume routine communications.

VI. INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION

RIMS police reports shall be submitted for all fire and fire alarm calls except false alarms or false reports of water flows (in these instances radio log entries will be sufficient documentation). Fire reports shall be submitted at the end of the watch and shall include the time of the alarm, portion of the structure involved (first, second, etc. floor or entire structure, etc.), any injuries involved and medical care provided; the type of structure involved (academic building, administration building, dormitory, etc.); cause of the fire if known and estimated damage (if known); and the name of the LAFD officer in charge of the scene. An Incident Command post report shall also be submitted before the end of watch by the Incident Commander when the Incident Command Post is established.



POLICY/PROCEDURE NUMBER: 06-L.E.-003

Page 1 of 4 with one Appendix

SUBJECT: DIGITAL VOICE RECORDING DEVICES

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2015

REVIEW DATE: January 7, 2016

AMENDS/SUPERSEDES: March 30, 2006 version; November, 8, 2007 version; January 27, 2010 version; February 16, 2011 version; January 8, 2014 version.

IACLEA STANDARD: 9.1.7

CSU POLICE DEPARTMENTS SYSTEMWIDE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE – NO

APPROVED: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

I. PURPOSE

This policy is intended to provide police officers of the California State University, Northridge Police Department with instructions on when and how to use digital recording devices so that officers may reliably audio record their contacts with the public in accordance with state and federal laws.

II. POLICY

All sworn personnel of this Department shall use department-issued digital recorders. A police officer may surreptitiously record conversations when such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his/her official duties, where the recordings are consistent with this policy, and as long as the person that is being recorded would have no reasonable expectation of privacy about the conversation. This policy does not govern the use of surreptitious recording devices used in undercover operations.

III. DEFINITIONS

- A. Digital Recorder: A recording device that uses digital technology to record and store audio files.
- B. Penal Code 632: Prohibits an individual from surreptitiously recording a conversation in which any party to the conversation has a reasonable belief that the conversation is private or confidential.

- C. Penal Code 633: Expressly exempts a law enforcement officer from this prohibition when acting within the scope of his/her authority.

IV. PROCEDURES

- A. This agency has adopted the use of the digital recorder to accomplish several primary objectives:

1. Digital recorders allow for accurate documentation of statements made during police/public contacts, arrests, and critical incidents. They also serve to enhance the accuracy of officer reports and testimony in court.
2. Voice recordings also enhance this Department's ability to review probable cause for arrest, officer and suspect interaction, evidence for investigative and prosecutorial purposes, and to provide additional information for officer evaluation and training.
3. The digital recorder may also be useful in documenting crime and accident scenes or other events to include the confiscation and documentation of evidence or contraband.

- B. When and How to Use the Digital Recorder

1. The digital recorder shall be activated and remain activated in order to ensure the integrity of the recording unless the contact involves an area restricted by this policy (see Section C, below).
2. If an officer fails to record the entire contact or interrupts the recording, the officer shall file a written report explaining why the recording was interrupted or terminated.
3. Incidents in which an officer should activate his/her digital recorder include but are not limited to:
 - a. Traffic stops
 - b. Arrests
 - c. Contacts in which the contacted party is argumentative, unresponsive or otherwise hostile.
 - d. Anytime the officer reasonably believes that such a recording may be of use in documenting the incident or contact, provided the incident is within the course and scope of their duty as stated in Penal Code section 633.

- C. Restrictions on Using the Digital Recorder

Digital recorders shall only be used in conjunction with official duties, including but not limited to the investigation of crime or other violations of the law. Officers may not activate digital recorders for personal use or to surreptitiously record:

1. Communications with other police personnel without the permission of the Chief of Police.
2. Conversations that concern matters over which the person being recorded would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

D. Procedures for Digital Recorder Use

1. Digital recording devices are issued primarily to uniform personnel as authorized by this Department. Officers who are assigned digital recorders must utilize such equipment unless otherwise authorized by supervisory personnel.
2. Police personnel shall use only recorders issued by this Department.
3. Assigned digital recording devices are the responsibility of the individual officer and will be used with reasonable care to ensure proper functioning. Equipment malfunctions shall be brought to the attention of the officer's supervisor as soon as possible so that a replacement unit may be procured.
4. Officers shall inspect and test their assigned digital recorders prior to each shift in order to verify proper functioning and shall notify their supervisor of any problems.
5. Officers shall ensure that they have an adequate supply of memory on their digital recorder to complete their tour of duty.
6. Officers shall not in any manner alter digitally recorded audio files.
7. Officers are encouraged to inform their supervisor of any audio-recorded sequences that may be of value for training purposes.
8. Officers shall note in incident, arrest, and related reports when audio recordings were made during the incident in question.
9. Officers shall download recordings made during their shift to the Department's storage file and copied onto a CD-R prior to their end of watch. (Instructions in Appendix A).
10. All CD-R discs will be stored in the Department's Records Division.

E. Control and Management

1. Audio files containing information that may be of value for case prosecution in any criminal or civil adversarial proceeding shall be safeguarded in the same manner as other forms of evidence. Master copies shall not be released without authorization of the Chief of Police or her/his designee. Duplicate copies may be made and released for review by prosecutors and others with a right or authorization to review such information by court order or by permission from the Chief of Police.
2. Audio files identified for use in criminal or civil cases shall be maintained for at least six months after the statute of limitations has expired and in criminal cases until there has been a final disposition or as otherwise directed by court order.
3. Audio files not identified for use in court proceedings or adversarial or departmental uses shall be maintained in secure storage for two (2) years at which time they'll be purged from the records system. All other audio files will be maintained a minimum 2 years and will continued to be stored so long as they are deemed needed for a specific purpose by the Captain, Special Services. All files shall be maintained in the Department's Record's Unit in a manner that allows for efficient identification and retrieval.

4. All recorded interviews of suspects should include the date, approximate time, names of the involved officers, location of the interview, and type of incident. This information should be stated by the officer at the beginning and ending of each recording.
5. Any time that an officer reasonably believes that a recorded contact may be of benefit in a non-criminal matter (e.g., a hostile contact, etc.), the officer shall place the recording onto the appropriate storage media (CD-R).
6. Under the circumstances listed above in Item 5, the officer shall notify a supervisor of the existence of the recording as soon as practicable. The supervisor shall note the information on their supervisor's daily synopsis. Such notation shall be titled "Digital Recording" and note the nature of the recording.
7. All CD-R discs shall be filed by CR number or, in the event that the incident is not noted by CR number, filed under the officer's name and should include the date, time, and name of the individual recorded, if known.

F. Supervisory Responsibilities

1. Supervisory personnel shall ensure that officers are equipped with digital recorder devices and utilize them in accordance with the policy and procedures defined herein.
2. At least on a monthly basis, supervisors will randomly review digital recordings to ensure that the equipment is operating properly and that officers are using the devices appropriately and in accordance with policy, and to identify any areas in which additional training or guidance is required. Said reviews will be noted on the Supervisor's Equipment Checklist as per the Department's *Uniform and Personal Appearance Policy (06-P.A.-005)*, Section III.B, Inspection Checklist.

V. APPENDIX

A. Instructions for the OLYMPUS Digital Voice Recorder

Appendix "A"

Instructions for the OLYMPUS Digital Voice Recorder

The purpose of this directive is to instruct all sworn officers on how to record, playback and download voice recordings. This is broken down into ten basic procedures: Inserting Batteries; Hold; Setting Time/Date; Recording; Overwrite Recording; Insert Recording; Playback; Erasing; Connecting to PC using cradle; and Running DSS Player (downloading and playing voice files).

Inserting Batteries

- 1) Lightly press down on the arrow and slide the battery cover open.
- 2) Insert two AAA alkaline batteries, observing the correct polarity.
- 3) Close the battery cover completely.

Hold

Setting the **HOLD** switch to the HOLD position:

*If you set the recorder to HOLD status by sliding the **HOLD** switch in the direction of the arrow, the current conditions will be preserved, and all buttons and switches except the HOLD switch will be disabled. This feature is useful when the recorder has to be carried in a bag or pocket.*

Remember to reset the **HOLD** switch when using the recorder.

Setting Time/Date

If you have set the time and date, information as to when an audio file is recorded is stored automatically with that file.

- 1) Press and hold the **FOLDER/MENU** button for 1 second or longer.
- 2) Press the **FF/+** or **REW/-** button until "TIME&DATE" flashes on the display.
- 3) Press the **REC/SET** button.
- 4) Set the hour.
 - Press the **FF/+** or **REW/-** button to set the hour.
 - Press the **REC/SET** button to accept the hour.
- 5) Set the minute.
 - Press the **FF/+** or **REW/-** button to set the minute.
 - Press the **REC/SET** button to accept the minute.
- 6) Set the year.
 - Press the **FF/+** or **REW/-** button to set the year.
 - Press the **REC/SET** button to accept the year.
- 7) Set the month.
 - Press the **FF/+** or **REW/-** button to set the month.
 - Press the **REC/SET** button to accept the month.
- 8) Set the date.
 - Press the **FF/+** or **REW/-** button to set the date.
 - Press the **REC/SET** button to accept the date.

- 9) Press the **STOP** button to end.

Recording

The recorder provides five folders: A, B, C, D, and E.

- 1) Press the **FOLDER/MENU** button to choose a folder.
The folder name and total number of recorded files is displayed for approximately 2 seconds.
- 2) Press the **NEW** button to create a new file.
New file number, current recording mode and remaining recording time are displayed.
- 3) Press the **REC/SET** button to start recording.
The record/play indicator lamp glows red.
Aim the microphone at the sound source.
Current recording time and remaining recording time are displayed.
- 4) Press **STOP** button to stop recording.
If you want to append additional recordings to the same file, press the **REC/SET** button once again.

Pause Recording

1. Pause
Press the **REC/SET** button while recording.
"REC PAUSE" will flash on the display.
2. Resume Recording
Press the **REC/SET** button again.

Recording will resume at the point of interruption.

Overwrite Recording

You can overwrite a previously recorded file from any point within the file. Note that overwritten recordings will be erased.

- 1) Choose and play the file you want to overwrite.
- 2) Press the **STOP** button where you want to start overwriting.
Current playback time and total recording time are displayed.
- 3) Press the **REC/SET** button to start overwriting.
The record/play indicator lamp glows red.
- 4) Press the **STOP** button to stop overwriting.

Insert Recording

Additional recordings can be inserted into previously recorded files.

- 1) Choose and play the file you want to insert.
- 2) While playing a file, press the **FOLDER/MENU** button if you want to insert additional recording.
"INSERT REC?" appears on the display.
- 3) Press the **REC/SET** button to start inserting additional recording.
Remaining recording time is displayed.

- 4) Press the **STOP** button to stop inserting additional recording.

Playback

- 1) Press the **Play** button to start playback.
The record/play indicator lamp glows green.
Current playback time and total recording time of the file is displayed.
- 2) Adjust the **VOLUME** control to your liking.
- 3) Press the **STOP** button at any point you want to stop the playback.
 Resume playback by pressing **PLAY** button again.

Playback functions

1. Fast Playback (F.PLAY)
2. Slow Playback (S.PLAY)
3. Fast Forward (FF)
4. Rewind (REW)
5. Cue (CUE)
6. Review (REV)

Erasing

Erasing One File at a Time

- 1) Press the **FOLDER/MENU** Button to choose a folder.
The folder name is displayed for approximately 2 seconds.
- 2) Press the **FF/+** or **REW/-** button to choose the file you want to erase.
- 3) Press the **ERASE** button.
"FILE ERASE?" flashes on the display for approximately 8 seconds.
File to be erased is displayed.
- 4) Press the **ERASE** button once more when "FILE ERASE?" is flashing.
The display changes to "FILE ERASE!" and erasing will start.
"ERASE DONE" is displayed when the file is erased.

Erase All Files from a Folder

- 1) Press the **FOLDER/Menu** button to choose the folder from which you want to erase all files.
The folder name is displayed for approximately 2 seconds.
- 2) Press the **ERASE** button for 3 seconds or longer.
"ALL ERASE?" flashes on the display for approximately 8 seconds.
- 3) Press the **ERASE** button once more when "ALL ERASE?" is flashing.
The Display changes to "ALL ERASE!" and erasing will start.
"ERASE DONE" is displayed when the files are erased.

Connecting to PC Using the Cradle

- 1) Make sure that the recorder is stopped, and place it in the cradle.
- 2) Insert the recorder so that its bottom slot meets the hook on the front of the cradle (at the low end).
- 3) Hold the top of the recorder and push it against the cradle until it clicks.
"REMOTE" is displayed on recorder if the USB Cable is connected.

- 4) Remove the recorder from the cradle.
- 5) Make sure that the recorder's record/play indicator lamp isn't flashing, and remove the recorder from the cradle.
- 6) Holding the cradle with your hand, raise the recorder from the top end to remove it from the hook.

Running DSS Player (Downloading and Playing Voice Files)

- 1) Connect the recorder to the PC.
- 2) Click on the DSS Player Icon.
- 3) Download Selected Files.
 1. Select the folder
From the Device Manager window, select the folder that contains the voice file you would like to download.
 2. Select the voice file
Select the voice file you would like to download from the Voice File List Box. To select more than one file, hold either the [Ctrl] or [Shift] key and select files.
 3. Download the voice file
From the [Download] menu, click on [Download Selected Files].
 4. Download complete
Once the transmission screen closes and the record/play indicator lamp on the recorder goes dark, the downloading is completed.
NOTE: NEVER disconnect the USB connecting cable while the record/play indicator lamp is flashing, If you do, the data will be destroyed.
 5. Play a Voice File
 - 1) Select the folder.
Select the folder that contains the voice file you would like to play.
 - 2) Select the voice file.
Select the voice file to play from the Voice File List Box.
 - 3) Play the voice file.
Click on the > (play) button of the Play Control Bar.



POLICY/PROCEDURE NUMBER: 07-C.I.-005

Page 1 of 8 with one Appendix

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2015

REVIEW DATE: January 7, 2016

AMENDS/SUPERSEDES: July 12, 2007 version; January 27, 2010 version; February 16, 2011 version; January 8, 2014 version.

IACLEA STANDARDS: 13.1.1, 13.1.2, 13.1.3, 13.1.4, 13.1.5, 13.1.7, 13.2.1, 13.2.2

CSU POLICE DEPARTMENTS SYSTEMWIDE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE – No

APPROVED: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

I. PURPOSE

To delineate the duties and responsibilities of officers assigned to the investigations unit; to formulate policies and procedures governing preliminary and follow-up investigations, and to outline procedures related to specialized investigative techniques.

II. POLICY

It is the policy of this department to conduct thorough preliminary and follow-up investigations of all crimes against persons and major property offenses, in an effort to successfully identify and prosecute violators.

III. DEFINITIONS

- A. Crime Scene - The location where a crime occurred or where an indication of a crime exists.
- B. Crime Scene Processing - The specific actions taken at a crime or accident scene, consisting of taking photographs, preparing the crime or collision diagram, and collecting and preserving physical evidence.
- C. Defendant Informant - An informant who is subject to arrest and prosecution for a state or federal offense, or a defendant in a pending case who expects compensation for his assistance in the form of judicial or prosecutorial consideration.
- D. Follow-up Investigation - An extension of the preliminary investigation; the purpose of which is to provide additional investigation in order to clear a case, arrest an offender, and/or recover stolen property.

- E. Informant - Any person who, under the direction of a specific officer and with or without expectation of compensation, furnishes or performs a lawful service for the department in its investigations and operations.
- F. Physical Evidence - Any substance or material found or recovered in connection with a criminal investigation.
- G. Preliminary Investigation - An inquiry of limited scope undertaken to verify whether or not an allegation merits further inquiry as a full investigation; the initial report in which a crime is alleged; or the initial documentation of a matter requiring further investigation.
- H. Reasonable Belief - The facts and circumstances the officer knows, or should know, are such as to cause a rational and prudent person to act or think in a similar way under similar circumstances.
- I. Restricted-Use Informant - A person who meets any of the following criteria shall be considered a restricted-use informant, subject to use as authorized below:
 - 1. A person under 18 years of age: May be used as an informant only after obtaining written consent from the juvenile's parent or guardian.
 - 2. A person on probation or parole (federal or state): May be used as an informant only with the consent of the agency supervising the person.
- J. Witness - A person who possesses information or evidence relevant to the investigation of a specified crime.

IV. PROCEDURES

A. Investigations Unit Organization

- 1. The investigations unit shall normally consist of a minimum of two investigators (or more when staffing allows) who hold the rank of sergeant or corporal. One detective sergeant shall be designated as the senior or supervising investigator for each of the investigative units (e.g., Major Crimes Unit and Special/Sensitive Crimes Unit) and shall report directly to the Captain, Special Services Division.
- 2. Investigators shall normally work a 5-day/8-hour work schedule and may temporarily work a 4-day/10-hour work schedule as approved by the operations captain based on operational need; all schedules are subject to change; and both supervising investigators will be provided department cell phones or compensated for use of personal cell phones in accordance with university policy.

B. Investigator Duties

- 1. The primary functions of the investigations unit are the prompt, efficient, and effective investigation of all crimes resulting in arrest by patrol officers that occur on campus or within one mile from the exterior boundaries of the campus, the identification and apprehension of individuals committing those crimes, and the preparation of cases for prosecution.
- 2. Duties normally assigned to the investigations unit include:

- a. Investigating criminal cases and submitting follow-up reports documenting all actions taken. When applicable, cases may be assigned to uniform patrol personnel.
- b. Reviewing preliminary investigation reports for thoroughness and accuracy. If an arrest is made, filing the case with the district attorney's or city attorney's office and preparing the case for prosecution ;
- c. Maintaining liaison with, and providing assistance to other law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system;
- d. Providing victim/witness assistance information and support, as required.
- e. Investigation of non-criminal and suspicious circumstances as directed by the Chief of Police.

C. 24-Hour Coverage and Investigations Unit Response

- 1. The patrol supervisor on duty may request that an investigator respond to a crime scene at his or her discretion.
- 2. The procedure for notifying a detective sergeant/investigator shall be as follows:
 - a. The patrol supervisor will request that the dispatcher contact the appropriate investigations sergeant (e.g., Major Crimes Unit or Special/Sensitive Crimes Unit as specified within policy #07-O.A.-005 – Organization, Administration, and Direction) and advise him/her of the incident.
 - b. The investigations sergeant who was contacted will determine if one or more investigators should respond to the scene.
 - c. Anytime a detective sergeant is in a position where they would not be available to take a call during a given time period, they shall notify the dispatcher. The Special Services Captain, or designated command staff member in his/her absence, shall also be notified in this instance.
 - d. If neither detective sergeant can be located following the commission of a serious crime, either a member of the patrol division with past investigative experience will be used or LAPD Devonshire Division will be contacted and one of their detectives will be requested to respond.
- 3. Incidents where a detective sergeant should be notified and requested to respond include:
 - a. All shootings;
 - b. Incidents involving serious life-threatening injuries or death;
 - c. Armed robberies;
 - d. Explosions or explosives;
 - e. Arson with extensive damage or evidence to be collected;
 - f. All sexual assaults and child molestation cases;
 - g. All abductions;
 - h. Incidents involving extensive evidence or where an immediate follow-up is required and the patrol division does not have the resources to conduct the follow-up.
- 4. A detective sergeant should also be notified about the following types of cases for consultation and determination regarding whether an investigative response is necessary:

- a. Domestic violence;
 - b. Stalking (criminal and non-criminal as specified within VAWA & Title IX);
 - c. Dating violence (criminal and non-criminal as specified within VAWA & Title IX);
 - d. Felony computer crimes.
5. If an investigator is requested to respond to the scene of an incident, the scene will remain secured by the patrol officer(s) until the investigator arrives unless otherwise directed by a supervisor or the responding investigator.
 6. When the investigator arrives, he/she will assume responsibility and supervision for the crime scene and investigation unless relieved by a higher authority.

D. Preliminary Investigation Procedures

1. Patrol officers will be responsible for conducting careful, thorough, and accurate preliminary investigations and are expected to continue with the investigation and follow-up as needed.
2. Steps to be followed in conducting preliminary investigations include:
 - a. Providing for the safety of victims, suspects, and witnesses, rendering aid for injured parties and requesting appropriate medical attention, if necessary;
 - b. Determining whether a criminal offense has been committed or attempted and if so, the precise nature and circumstances of the offense;
 - c. Protecting the crime scene to ensure that evidence is not lost or contaminated;
 - d. Maintaining the integrity and security of the crime scene by requesting necessary resources and arranging for the collection of evidence;
 - e. Observing and accurately documenting the scene conditions, all events, unusual conditions, and statements;
 - f. Locating and obtaining complete identification information on all victims, witnesses, complainants, and other involved parties;
 - g. Identifying suspect(s) and effecting an arrest if it can be accomplished at the scene or through immediate pursuit;
 - h. Relaying to other officers, via the police radio, all available data including description, method and direction of flight, and other relevant information concerning wanted persons or vehicles;
 - i. Interviewing and obtaining statements from victims, witnesses, complainants and, if legally possible, from suspects. If an investigator is to respond to the scene, the patrol supervisor should coordinate all interviews with the investigator;
 - j. Arranging for the collection of evidence;
 - k. Preparing the preliminary crime/incident report fully and accurately.
3. Investigators will prepare the initial crime/incident report and conduct the preliminary investigation of all felony and serious misdemeanor cases that are reported directly to them fully and accurately.

E. Procedures to be Employed in Criminal Investigations

1. Information Development

The collection and recording of facts surrounding an offense involving persons, objects, actions, times, places, and methods/means of operation, which may be obtained via:

- a. Examination of evidence;
- b. Review of preliminary reports;
- c. Interviews with suspects, victims and witnesses;
- d. Background investigations (i.e., record checks);
- e. Review of applicable statutes;
- f. Review of university records.

2. Interviews and Interrogation

Interviews of victims and witnesses and interrogation of suspects are conducted to obtain information relevant to an offense and subsequent prosecution.

- a. Formal interviews and interrogations are to be recorded.
- b. The following guidelines will facilitate the interview and interrogation process:
 - i. Review all elements of the offense;
 - ii. Review all reports, statements, and supporting documents prior to the interviews;
 - iii. Plan the time, place, content, and order of the interviews;
 - iv. If functional, prepare a list of questions or factors to employ in the solicitation of critical information.

3. Collection, Preservation, and Use of Physical Evidence

The proper collection and preservation of physical evidence will serve to ensure its integrity and thus aid in the identification and prosecution of offenders.

- a. The following guidelines should be followed when processing a crime scene, as well as those addressed in *Policy/Procedure Number 07-C.I.-004 (Crime Scene Processing and the Collection and Preservation of Evidence)*:
 - i. Approach the scene carefully;
 - ii. Secure and protect the scene;
 - iii. Conduct a preliminary scene survey for potential evidence locations;
 - iv. Take detailed notes and document them in subsequent reports;
 - v. Photograph scenes prior to removing any evidence or processing for fingerprints (except for burglaries from motor vehicles);
 - vi. Note the location where each item of evidence was found;
 - vii. Package each item of evidence in accordance with *Policy/Procedure Number 06-C.I.-003 (Property and Evidence Packaging and Control)*;
 - viii. Maintain the chain-of-custody on all items of evidence.

4. Execution of Background Investigations

- a. Officers who conduct background investigations must follow and comply with CLETS/NCIC user agreements to protect the confidentiality of computerized

criminal record data. Any information obtained is restricted to use during a criminal investigation.

- b. A number of sources can be used to obtain information when conducting background investigations, including:
 - i. Hometown, neighboring law enforcement agencies;
 - ii. DOJ, FBI, and other federal, state, county, and municipal agencies
 - iii. CLETS/JDIC/NCIC database systems
 - iv. Department of Motor Vehicles;
 - v. Relatives, friends, acquaintances, and neighbors;
 - vi. Business associates;
 - vii. Present/past employers and co-workers;
 - viii. Educational institutions.

5. Surveillance

Surveillance is defined as the observation of a person who is suspected of committing an offense, or of a place which is likely to be the location of a criminal offense.

- a. Surveillance can either be conducted in person or through the use of covert camera equipment;
- b. Personal surveillance can be performed in a vehicle or on foot;
- c. Involved supervisors and officers will discuss and determine the best method of surveillance;
- d. Communications procedures will be discussed and coordinated with involved sworn and dispatch personnel;
- e. Notification will be made to watch personnel and to any outside agency that may be involved or affected;
- f. The watch commander may authorize the use of unmarked vehicles for use in surveillance by patrol officers;
- g. Surveillance through the use of covert camera equipment will be in accordance with all applicable federal and state laws:
 - i. The Chief of Police must authorize the use of covert camera equipment;
 - ii. Where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, covert camera equipment will not be used without obtaining a court order.

Note: See department policy/procedure 10-S.O.-23 (Investigation of Vice, Drugs, and Organized Crime) for further requirements in the authorization, command, communication, and documentation of surveillance operations.

F. Assignment of Follow-up Investigations

- 1. The appropriate detective sergeant will review all crime reports written by patrol officers within their area(s) of responsibility (as assigned based on the Major Crimes and Special Sensitive Crimes Unit areas of responsibility) and determine whether or not the case requires a follow-up investigation.
- 2. If the detective sergeant determines that a follow-up investigation is appropriate, he/she will assign the case back to patrol or to investigations.

3. Cases normally assigned to investigations include:
 - a. Part I offenses and serious Part II offenses;
 - b. Cases that require follow-up activities off-campus;
 - c. Cases with workable leads and/or recovered physical evidence.
4. Follow-up investigations will normally be assigned to patrol officers where there is the potential for developing additional information as a result of recontacting the victim or complainant.
 - a. In the majority of these investigations follow-up contact can be made over the telephone.
 - b. Patrol sergeants will note follow-up investigations assigned to patrol officers and ensure that they are completed in a timely manner.
5. Investigators and patrol officers shall document all follow-up activities with supplemental reports in RIMS.
6. The above case screening and case file management processes are addressed in detail in Policy/Procedure Number 05-C.I.-001.

G. Follow-up Investigation Procedures

1. Maintaining contact with principals in any investigation is valuable for building public confidence in the department as well as indicating that the investigating officer is genuinely concerned about the welfare of the victim and other persons associated with the case. In all cases, the individual assigned to the follow-up investigation will recontact the victim/complainant within 30 days of the initial report of the offense.
2. Follow-up investigations will include:
 - a. Reviewing and analyzing all reports prepared during the preliminary investigation phase, department records involving similar cases, and laboratory examination results, if applicable;
 - b. Conducting additional interviews of witnesses, victims/complainants and interrogation of possible suspects;
 - c. Seeking additional information from uniformed officers;
 - d. Revisiting the crime scene, planning, organizing and conducting searches, and collecting additional physical evidence;
 - e. Attempting to identify and apprehend suspects, through use of such investigative techniques as photo line-ups, field show-ups, and/or physical line-ups;
 - f. Determining suspects' method of operation and possible involvement in other unsolved crimes;
 - g. Checking suspects' criminal and campus conduct histories;
 - h. Performing additional follow-up at the request of the prosecuting attorney;
 - i. Analyzing electronic access logs and electronic media;
 - j. Reviewing publicly accessible information on social media sites;
 - k. And preparing cases for court presentation and/or administrative referral to campus judicial systems.

H. Use of Checklists to Aid in Criminal Investigations

1. Investigative checklists are designed as guidelines to an investigation.
2. The department's Incident Report format that is derived from RIMS contains checklists to ensure that proper information is obtained in each case.
3. For more complicated investigations, the department has designed checklists to assist investigators.

I. Sharing of Investigative Information with Other Operational Components

1. The periodic attendance of investigators at patrol shift briefings is designed to facilitate the exchange of critical information and to strengthen the relationship between the two units. The Detective Sergeants are responsible for ensuring that this happens on a periodic basis and that the shift supervisor documents their attendance and briefing discussions within the supervisors daily shift log.
2. During shift briefings, investigators shall:
 - a. Update patrol staff on all requirements and changes instituted by the district attorney and city attorney offices;
 - b. Conduct periodic training on new laws, court decisions, and investigative/interview procedures (NOTE: all training is to be documented with the training coordinator);
 - c. Review evidence-gathering techniques and other appropriate investigative or crime prevention information.
 - d. And provide information relating to crimes and incidents occurring on campus or in proximity that could have an impact on patrol strategies.
3. Investigators shall also share information through shift briefings and/or electronic correspondence with units such as communications, crime prevention/crime analysis, and the department administration.

J. Informants

1. This agency does not use informants, defendant informants, restricted-use, or confidential informants.
2. Should circumstances arise when the use of an informant would be conducive to the successful investigation and eventual prosecution of a criminal case, the case will be referred to the Los Angeles Police Department.
3. The title *informant* does not apply to sources of information. A *source of information* is a person or organization, not under the direction of a specific officer, who provides information without becoming a party to the investigation itself, such as a concerned citizen who witnesses an event of interest.

V. APPENDIX

A. Offense Report Checklists

The training information provided herein contains offense report checklists that can assist officers in gathering critical information for commonly reported offenses.

THEFT – Investigative Checklist

Information particularly important for theft cases includes:

- ☐ Identification of the property owner or person charged with care, custody, and control of the property
- ☐ Thorough identification of the reporting person, witnesses or other involved persons
- ☐ Property descriptions, which should include all available identifiers such as serial numbers, owner-applied numbers and unique features or markings which are necessary for entering an item as stolen property into CLETS. A thorough physical description of the item is frequently helpful when attempting to identify ownership of recovered stolen property, particularly for common items such as textbooks.
- ☐ Complete suspect's or witness's identifying information, in particular the suspect's or witness's current location or physical address
- ☐ Fair market value assessment of stolen property (not replacement or initial purchase price)
- ☐ An established timeframe for the theft, specifically, the date/time the item was last seen, the date/time the property was discovered missing, and the date/time the theft was reported.

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

THEFT OF VEHICLE (AKA AUTO THEFT) – Investigative Checklist

Information particularly important for auto theft cases includes:

- ☐ Identification of the property owner or person charged with care, custody, and control of the vehicle
- ☐ Thorough identification of the reporting person, witnesses or other involved persons
- ☐ Complete suspect's or witness's identifying information, in particular the suspect's or witness's current location or physical address
- ☐ Fair market value assessment of the stolen vehicle (not replacement or initial purchase price)
- ☐ An established timeframe for the theft, specifically, the date/time the vehicle was last seen, the date/time it was discovered missing, and the date/time the theft was reported.
- ☐ A thorough description of the stolen vehicle, particularly license number, vehicle identification number (VIN), special features and markings, defects or damage, mileage and fuel level
- ☐ Alarm status and/or anti-theft devices in use at the time of the theft
- ☐ The approximate driving and seating position of the driver's equipment and seat as left by the owner/operator
- ☐ Thorough description of the contents of the vehicle
- ☐ Non-complainant property left in the vehicle
- ☐ CLETS entry date/time and NCIC number
- ☐ Insurance policy information, including company name and agent's name/phone number
- ☐ Recovery information, particularly the date/time, location and vehicle condition

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

BURGLARY OF HABITATION OR BUILDING – Investigative Checklist

Information particularly important for burglary cases includes:

- ☐ Identification of the property owner or person charged with care, custody, and control of the property
- ☐ Thorough identification of the reporting person, witnesses or other involved persons
- ☐ Property descriptions, which should include all available identifiers such as serial numbers, owner-applied numbers and unique features or markings which are necessary for entering an item as stolen property into CLETS. A thorough physical description of the item is frequently helpful when attempting to identify ownership of recovered stolen property, particularly for common items such as textbooks.
- ☐ Complete suspect's or witness's identifying information, in particular the suspect's or witness's current location or physical address
- ☐ Fair market value assessment of stolen property (not replacement or initial purchase price)
- ☐ An established timeframe for the theft, specifically, the date/time the property was last seen, the date/time it was discovered missing, and the date/time the burglary was reported.
- ☐ A detailed description of the investigation of the crime scene for latent fingerprints and the collection, processing, and storage of other evidence
- ☐ Method of operation, point of entry, method of entry and description of instrument or tool used
- ☐ Alarm status and/or anti-theft devices in use at the time of the burglary
- ☐ Obvious high value property not taken
- ☐ Information about visitors or persons with access to the premises other than the complainant
- ☐ Non-complainant property left on the premises
- ☐ Unusual damage or damage not made to gain entry, suggesting unusual behavior of the suspect

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

BURGLARY FROM A MOTOR VEHICLE (BFMV) – Investigative Checklist

Information particularly important for BFMV cases includes:

- ☐ Identification of the property owner or person charged with care, custody, and control of the property
- ☐ Thorough identification of the reporting person, witnesses or other involved persons
- ☐ Property descriptions, which should include all available identifiers such as serial numbers, owner-applied numbers and unique features or markings which are necessary for entering an item as stolen property into CLETS. A thorough physical description of the item is frequently helpful when attempting to identify ownership of recovered stolen property, particularly for common items such as textbooks.
- ☐ Complete suspect's or witness's identifying information, in particular the suspect's or witness's current location or physical address
- ☐ Fair market value assessment of stolen property (not replacement or initial purchase price)
- ☐ An established timeframe for the theft, specifically, the date/time the property was last seen, the date/time it was discovered missing, and the date/time the burglary was reported.
- ☐ A detailed description of the investigation of the crime scene for latent fingerprints and the collection, processing, and storage of other evidence
- ☐ Method of operation, point of entry, method of entry and description of instrument or tool used
- ☐ Alarm status and/or anti-theft devices in use at the time of the burglary
- ☐ Completed evidence processing with a careful description of collection, processing and storage of evidence
- ☐ Obvious high value property not taken
- ☐ Non-complainant property left in vehicle

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

ASSAULT – Investigative Checklist

Information particularly important for assault cases includes:

- ☐ Complete victim identification
- ☐ Thorough identification of the reporting person, witness or other involved persons
- ☐ Complete suspect's or witness's identifying information, in particular the suspect's or witness's current location or physical address
- ☐ Thorough and detailed description of the victim's injuries
- ☐ Thorough and detailed description of the suspect's actions causing the injury
- ☐ Pre-assault contact and/or relationship
- ☐ Incident of previous assaults involving the same victim or suspect
- ☐ The victim's desire to prosecute
- ☐ Notifying the victim of the existence of provisions of the Crime Victims' Compensation Act

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

VANDALISM – Investigative Checklist

Information particularly important for vandalism cases includes:

- ☐ Identification of the property owner or person charged with care, custody, and control of the property
- ☐ Thorough identification of the reporting person, witnesses or other involved persons
- ☐ Complete description of the vandalized property, the nature of the damage sustained and an estimated cost estimate
- ☐ Complete suspect's or witness's identifying information, in particular the suspect's or witness's current location or physical address
- ☐ Fair market value assessment of vandalized property (not replacement or initial purchase price)
- ☐ An established timeframe for the vandalism, specifically, the date/time the item was last seen intact, the date/time the damage was discovered, and the date/time the vandalism was reported.
- ☐ A detailed description of the investigation of the crime scene for latent fingerprints and the collection, processing, and storage of other evidence
- ☐ Method of operation, point of entry, method of entry and description of instrument or tool used
- ☐ Alarm status and/or anti-theft devices in use at the time of the vandalism
- ☐ Completed evidence processing with a careful description of collection, processing and storage of evidence
- ☐ Obvious high value property not vandalized
- ☐ Non-complainant property not vandalized

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – Investigative Checklist (Page 1)

Information particularly important for investigations of physical assaults, violations of restraining orders, and property crimes involving domestic relationship cases includes:

- ☐ Arrival at Scene
 - ☐ Determine location and condition of victims.
 - ☐ Determine if suspect is still at location.
 - ☐ Distinguish aggressor from victim, especially if both are injured.
 - ☐ Determine if any weapon is involved.
 - ☐ Determine what, if any, crime has occurred.
 - ☐ Request ambulance if injuries require.
 - ☐ Separate suspect and witnesses. Note: This includes removing victim from suspect's line of sight.
- ☐ Preliminary Investigation
 - ☐ Interview victim and witnesses including children, separately.
 - ☐ Write down statements verbatim.
 - ☐ Determine suspect's and victim's actions
 - ☐ Note and document victim's conditions (i.e., smeared makeup, torn clothing, injuries, emotional condition, color of skin, "complained of" internal injuries, etc.).
 - ☐ Document statements or unusual/relevant noise heard while approaching location.
 - ☐ If victim has a restraining order against suspect, obtain a copy of the order and valid proof of service and attach to report. If defendant has not been served, complete service. If no restraining order exists, determine if EPO is appropriate and inform victim how to obtain permanent restraining order.
 - ☐ If paramedics were called to the scene, obtain their names, RA unit number, and LAFD station address.
 - ☐ Record spontaneous statements (both suspect and victim) verbatim.
 - ☐ Determine 911 caller, identify, and interview. In addition, request recorded 911 call from the department's digital PYXIS recorder.
 - ☐ Determine if sexual assault occurred, and the need for MT. Complete sexual assault checklist as required per sexual assault policy.
- ☐ If Suspect is Taken into Custody
 - ☐ Prevent communication between suspect and victim/witnesses.
 - ☐ Record alibi statements.
 - ☐ Advise suspect of the Miranda Admonition.
 - ☐ Attempt to interview suspect after obtaining signed waiver.
 - ☐ Document statements (including those made to booking officer or jailer) verbatim.
 - ☐ Warn victim that the suspect could be released from custody soon.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Checklist (Page 2)

- ☐ Evidence
 - ☐ Document condition of crime scene (disarray of physical surroundings) with detailed descriptions.
 - ☐ Photograph crime scene.
 - ☐ Recover weapons/firearms (12028.5 PC) and book and/or photograph weapons and other evidence, e.g., bloody clothing, destroyed property, etc.
 - ☐ Ensure that victim's/suspect's injuries are photographed.
 - ☐ Note if there is any evidence of alcohol and/or drug use.
- ☐ Medical Treatment (MT)
 - ☐ Transport victim to hospital for MT if necessary (last resort).
 - ☐ Obtain copy of MT report and attach to police report.
 - ☐ If sexual assault, complete procedures for sexual assault response.
- ☐ Completing Crime Report
 - ☐ Maintain objectivity in reporting. Avoid personal opinions regarding comments from victim/suspect.
 - ☐ Ensure that elements of all involved crimes are included in the report.
 - ☐ Document any injuries that victim has sustained.
 - ☐ Document the following:
 - ☐ Was victim advised of private person's arrest?
 - ☐ Was victim photographed?
 - ☐ Did officers give victim referrals?
 - ☐ Does victim/witness speak fluent English?
 - ☐ Is there a history of violence whether reported or not?
 - ☐ Include restraining order information and prior violations (whether reported or not).
 - ☐ Include alternative telephone numbers for victim and witnesses, e.g., business, relatives, and friends.
 - ☐ Note whether children were present.
 - ☐ Out of the suspect's presence, inquire where victim will spend the night.
- ☐ Follow-Up Investigations
 - ☐ Conduct investigation as though victim were unable to testify.
 - ☐ Do not ask victim if she/he wants to prosecute. However, if victim expresses reluctance to testify, note reasons.
 - ☐ Determine if a history of violence exists (reported or not).
 - ☐ Run incident index in RIMS for victim and suspect.
 - ☐ Was the victim reluctant to come forward on past incidents? If so, why? (e.g., fear for self/children, safety, etc.)
 - ☐ View the victim's injuries. If injuries are observed, document in follow-up.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Checklist (Page 3)

- ☐ Verify photos have been taken (if not, request photos or take them yourself).
- ☐ Recommend follow-up photos 2-3 days later if appropriate (some bruises are more easily photographed at that time).
- ☐ Document all MT.
- ☐ If paramedics were called to the scene, obtain their names and statements.
- ☐ If victim has received additional MT, obtain name/address of doctor.
- ☐ Ask victim about contacts with defendant since crime occurred, e.g., threats, intimidation, phone calls, visits to jail, etc.
- ☐ Determine if there are any pending cases involving the defendant and/or victim.
- ☐ Interview witnesses to corroborate either party's statements and to substantiate or refute alibi statements.
- ☐ Interview "fresh witnesses" (those witnesses who talked to or saw parties immediately after the incident).
- ☐ Obtain prior reports and present cases to filing deputy district attorney or deputy city attorney.

- ☐ Interview Suspect
 - ☐ Obtain CII and JDIC rap sheets for suspect and check out-of-state and FBI records.
 - ☐ Document suspect's description of "provoking behavior," e.g., nagging, dinner unprepared, etc.
 - ☐ Photograph offensive injuries (hands, knuckles)
 - ☐ Photograph other injuries (inflicted by victim in self-defense)
 - ☐ Determine and document whether or not suspect is on parole and/or probation.
 - ☐ If suspect is on parole, get a parole hold placed, inform parole agent, and obtain agent's name and phone numbers.
 - ☐ If suspect is on felony probation, inform probation officer and obtain officer's name and phone number.
 - ☐ If suspect is on misdemeanor probation in CSUN or LAPD jurisdiction, verify that it is still active.

- ☐ Applicable Domestic Violence Laws
 - a. Definitions: Penal Code 13700 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)
 - b. Authority of peace officer to take temporary custody of firearm at scene of domestic violence. Penal Code 12028.5(a)
 - c. Order of Court (i.e. restraining order) – PC 136.2(f)
 - d. Contempt of Court – PC 166(a)(4), 166(b)(1), and 166(c)(4). Note: you need both a prior conviction and either an act of violence or credible threat of violence.
 - e. Battery – PC 243(e)(1)
 - f. Rape of Spouse – PC 262
 - g. Spousal or Cohabitant Abuse – PC 273.5
 - h. Violation of Protective Order to Prevent Domestic Violence – PC 273.6
 - i. Child Abduction – PC 277
 - j. Unlawful Detention or Concealment – PC 278
 - k. Violation of Custody Decree – PC 278.5
 - l. Terrorist Threats – PC 422

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Checklist (Page 4)

- m. Trespass (Battered Women's Shelters) – PC 602(u)
- n. Stalking – PC 646.9(a)
- o. Peace Officer at Domestic Calls
 - i. PC 836(b) – It shall be mandatory that the officer make a good faith effort to inform the victim of his/her right to make a private person's arrest and how to do so safely.
 - ii. PC 836(c)(1) – If probable cause exists that a provision of a protective order has been violated by the person the order is issued against and serviced to, the arresting officer may arrest without a warrant and take the person into custody whether or not the violation occurred in the presence of the arresting officer.

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

CRIME SCENE – Investigative Checklist

This crime scene checklist is being provided as a tool to assist officers in addressing the critical aspects of a crime scene. In addition to this document, refer to *Policy/Procedure Number 07-C.I.-004 (Crime Scene Processing and the Collection and Preservation of Evidence)* for thorough and detailed instructions.

- ☐ COMPOSITE SKETCH – Can victim remember suspect?
- ☐ CRIME ALERTS/BULLETINS
- ☐ CRIME REPORT – Was a crime report completed?
- ☐ CRIME SCENE BROADCAST – Has patrol put one out? If not, direct patrol to do so.
- ☐ CRIME SCENE LOG
- ☐ DNA – Consult with investigations
- ☐ EVIDENCE COLLECTION – Consult with investigations
- ☐ FIELD SHOW-UP – If suspect is in custody, transport victim to suspect, etc.
- ☐ INJURIES – Follow-up to hospital, interview victim, document extent of injuries, obtain treating physician's name, obtain patient number for report
- ☐ INTERVIEWS – Victim, witnesses, neighbors, etc.
- ☐ NOTIFICATIONS –
- ☐ PHOTOS – Consult with investigations
- ☐ PRINTS – Consult with investigations
- ☐ SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS – Look for cameras at location, neighboring buildings, across the street, etc.

Investigating Officer Signature

Date

SEXUAL ASSAULT – Investigative Checklist

See Department Policy/Procedure #02-S.O.-001 (Sexual Assault Response and Investigation) for checklist information.

DEATH INVESTIGATION – Investigative Checklist

Death investigations are covered under the Memorandum of Understanding negotiated between California State University, Northridge and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

Officers responding to the report of a death should secure the scene, immediately notify the Chief of Police and the Captain of Patrol Operations, and contact LAPD/Devonshire Division, who will handle the subsequent investigation.



POLICY/PROCEDURE NUMBER: 08-S.O.-019

Page 1 of 19 with four Appendices

SUBJECT: UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE – ALL HAZARD PLAN

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2015

REVIEW DATE: January 7, 2016

AMENDS/SUPERSEDES: SOP #200-18 (Major Incident Response Plan – Unusual Occurrences), August 15, 2000; Procedural Directive #2003-001 (Incident Command Post Deployment Procedures), January 13, 2003; Procedural Directive #2004-002 (Incident Command Post Deployment Procedures), April 15, 2004; Procedural Directive #2004-005 (EOC Trailer Set-up), July 29, 2004; 2007-006: Traffic Management during Campus Closures or Evacuations, September 13, 2007; February 15, 2008 version; January 27, 2010 version; February 16, 2011 version; January 8, 2014 version.

IACLEA STANDARDS: 1.2.3, 9.1.6, 17.1.1, 17.1.2, 17.1.3, 17.1.4, 17.1.5, 17.2.1

CSU POLICE DEPARTMENTS SYSTEMWIDE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE – YES

APPROVED: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance to department staff regarding response considerations when the Incident Command System (ICS) is utilized during field response to critical incidents. This policy augments and provides supplemental considerations regarding natural and manmade disasters and unusual occurrences or events, as a supplement to the university's *Emergency Operations Plan* and other critical incidents that are not discussed in other department policies or procedural directives.

II. POLICY

It shall be the policy of this department to respond to planned and unplanned disasters or emergencies that occur on this campus, or in our sphere of influence when requested, in a professional and informed manner utilizing Incident Command System (ICS) as incorporated in both California's Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

III. DEFINITIONS

- A. Condensed Emergency Operations Plan: A condensed version of the Emergency Operations Plan that includes checklists, Campus Closure Integrated Communication Protocol, information for immediate response to event specific incidents and the activation of the Emergency Operations Center. This is a controlled document distributed to EOC team members.
- B. Critical Incidents: Situations, generally of an emergency nature, resulting from disasters, both natural and man-made, that includes civil disturbances, earthquakes, floods, pandemics, explosions, riots, disorders, violence from dissident gatherings and marches, labor disputes, and terrorist activities.
- C. EAS (Emergency Alert System): The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is a national public warning system that requires broadcasters, cable television systems, wireless cable systems, satellite digital audio radio service (SDARS) providers and, direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service providers to provide the communications capability to the President to address the American public during a National emergency. The system also may be used by state and local authorities to deliver important emergency information such as AMBER alerts and weather information targeted to a specific area.
- D. Emergency Management and Preparedness Coordinator: The employee of the Department who is given the responsibility to coordinate all emergency management planning and operations for the campus.
- E. Emergency Situation: An actual or potential condition that poses an immediate threat to life or property.
- F. EOC (Emergency Operations Center): The EOC is the location where the campus emergency management team is deployed to coordinate the response to an emergency event impacting the campus. It is the central command coordination point for disaster response.
- G. EOC Team: Campus personnel trained in support functions related to emergency management as per NIMS, SEMS and ICS.
- H. EOP (Emergency Operations Plan): A preparedness document which establishes policies, procedures and organizational structure for response to emergency/disaster situations associated with natural disasters of all types. The plan incorporates the concepts and principles of SEMS, NIMS, and ICS.
- I. Evacuation: The organized, phased and supervised withdrawal, dispersal or removal of civilians from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe areas.
- J. Exercise: A gathering of individuals, inclusive of government and private sector persons, to develop plans, practice simulated implementation, and discuss each agency's role in handling critical incidents. This could include tabletop, functional, and/or full field exercises.
- K. IAP (Incident Action Plan): A written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident.
- L. Incident Commander: The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and the release of resources. Has overall authority and responsibility for management of all incident operations on scene.
- M. ICP (Incident Command Post): The field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command functions are performed.
- O. ICS (Incident Command System): A system for command, control, and coordination of a response that provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual persons and agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident while protecting life, property, and the environment. There are five major components: Command, Operation, Planning, Logistics, and Finance.

- P. NIMS (National Incident Management System): A comprehensive, national approach to incident management that is applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across all functional disciplines.
- Q. SEMS (Standardized Emergency Management System): An organizational framework and guidance system for emergency operations at each level of the state's emergency management system. Provides the umbrella under which all response agencies must function in an integrated fashion. Required by the state of California for managing response to multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional emergencies.
- R. Staging Area: Location established where resources can be placed while awaiting a tactical assignment.
- S. Unified Command: A procedure used at incidents which allows all agencies with geographical, legal or functional responsibility to establish a common set of incident objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan. Unified Command procedures assure that agencies do not lose their individual responsibility, authority, or accountability.

IV. ADMINISTRATION

- A. The Chief of Police is responsible for the implementation and maintenance for the emergency management system on the CSUN campus (as delegated by President Harrison per Executive Order 1056). The Emergency Management and Preparedness Coordinator is responsible for the day to day planning and updating of all emergency plans and, on an annual basis, will conduct a review of the plans providing the Chief of Police with suggested revisions for the emergency operations and unusual occurrence plans. The annual review shall ensure all plans are current and properly integrate into the university's emergency response plan(s).
- B. The CSUN Emergency Operations Plan is an all hazard plan that serves as the primary guide for planning the campus response to critical incidents associated with natural disasters, technological incidents and national security emergencies. This plan incorporates the concepts and principles of the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) into the emergency operations of the campus. The Chief of Police with assistance from the Emergency Management and Preparedness Coordinator is responsible for annual plan updates as needed.
- C. Two copies of the complete Emergency Operations Plan are kept in Dispatch. A copy of the Condensed Emergency Operations Plan is kept in Dispatch and two copies are kept in the shift supervisor's office.
- D. The Campus Closure Integrated Communication Protocol supplements the CSUN Emergency Operations Plan by providing detailed guidelines for communication with members of the campus community when classes are canceled or the campus is closed due to an emergency or another unforeseen circumstance. The CSUN Emergency Operations Plan provides specific guidelines on notifications, mobilization of the Crisis Action Team and possible activation of the EOC. Upon activation of the EOC, the EOP supersedes this protocol. (See Appendix C)
- E. The Emergency Management Coordinator will complete a documented inspection of all equipment designated for use in unusual occurrence situations on a bi-annual basis to ensure operational readiness.

- F. In the event of a terrorist attack, or the threat or likelihood of an attack, the National Terrorism Alert System (NTAS) from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be issued through state, local and tribal partners, the news media and directly to the public via the following channels:

- Via the official DHS NTAS webpage – <http://www.dhs.gov/alerts>
- Via email signup at – <http://www.dhs.gov/alerts>
- Via the following social media outlets –
 - Facebook – <http://facebook.com/NTASAlerts>
 - Twitter – <http://www.twitter.com/NTASAlerts>
- Via data feeds, web widgets and graphics at <http://www.dhs.gov/alerts>

The public can also expect to see alerts in places, both public and private, such as transit hubs, airports and government buildings.

The on-duty dispatcher shall monitor the DHS NTAS webpage noted above for threat notifications involving the geographic area(s) that include the campus and surrounding community. Alerts may also be monitored via the social media outlets noted above. If the NTAS is activated, the on-duty dispatcher shall continuously monitor the DHS data feed outlets relaying any pertinent information to field personnel and command staff as outlined in Policy/Procedure Number 07-S.O.-013 (Terrorism Response), Section IV, Sub-section B, National Terrorism Advisory System.

- G. CBRNE – First Responder Training

All first responders employed by the CSUN Department of Police Services shall receive training to meet all federal, state, and university requirements as listed in the Department training policy (04-T.C.-001). Training subjects include, but are not limited to:

- 1) Terrorism
- 2) Introduction to the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS)
- 3) Introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS-100)
- 4) National Incident Management System (IS-700)
- 5) Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
- 6) First Aid
- 7) Personal Protective Equipment for CBRNE Response
- 8) Hazardous and CBRNE Material Incidents


V. PROCEDURES

- A. Incident Command System

The Incident Command System (ICS) is a system for command, control, and coordination of a response that provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual persons and agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing an incident while protecting life, property, and the environment. It allows emergency services agencies to effectively communicate and can be utilized for any type or size of emergency, ranging from a minor incident to a major situation involving multiple agencies.

There are five major components of ICS: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance. When responding to planned and unplanned disasters, emergencies or

unusual occurrences, the principles of Incident Command System, as incorporated in both SEMS and NIMS, will be utilized.



1. Pursuant to SEMS and NIMS regulations, all officers and EOC personnel shall be trained in the Incident Command System and understand the responsibilities of the command and general staff positions. ICS shall be implemented during incidents which require multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictional involvement, whether they are single discipline (e.g., all fire services or all law enforcement) or multi-discipline.
2. Establishing ICS is required whenever an emergency incident involves more than one response agency. However, ICS will be implemented when deemed necessary by the Chief of Police, Captains, Lieutenant, shift supervisor or Emergency Management Coordinator.
3. The criteria for ICS activation is as follows:
 - a. Any unusual or emergency occurrence or incident on campus that requires a multiple agency response.
 - b. Major on-campus incidents (when directed by the Chief of Police, captains, Lieutenant, or shift supervisor), such as large planned or unplanned events that cause or have the potential to cause, a major disturbance on campus; terrorist events; or incidents that may raise a safety concern to the campus community or to our sphere of influence. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:

- i. Planned events:
 - 1) Dignitary visit
 - 2) Large sporting/concert event
 - 3) Parade or march
 - 4) Commencement
- ii. Unplanned events:
 - 1) Officer-involved shooting
 - 2) Civil Disorder
 - 3) Active Shooter
 - 4) Hostage situation
 - 5) Aircraft accident
 - 6) Hazardous material spill
 - 7) Fire and/or explosion
- iii. Disasters and major emergencies:
 - 1) Earthquake
 - 2) Flood
 - 3) Pandemic

B. The **Command Section**, whether utilizing a single Incident Commander or functioning as part of a Unified Command Team, is responsible for the overall management of the emergency, the development and implementation of strategic goals and objectives, and for approving the ordering and release of university or mutual-aid resources during an emergency.

- 1. The Incident Commander will initiate the incident action planning of the event by making immediate and necessary staff assignments/missions and activating the incident command system. The Incident Commander will insure the establishment of the incident command post.
 - a. The Incident Commander will utilize the *9 Critical Tasks in the First 30 Minutes* pocket card as a reference for the first immediate actions to be taken:
 - 1) Assess the situation quickly
 - 2) Is emergency notification required? (first 15 minutes)
Utilize Blackboard Connect emergency notification system to send message.
 - 3) Secure and establish control and communications
 - 4) Identify the hot zone
 - 5) Establish the inner perimeter
 - 6) Establish the outer perimeter
 - 7) Establish Incident Command Post
 - 8) Establish the staging area
 - 9) Identify and request additional resources, as needed
- 2. The Incident Commander assigned to any unusual occurrence shall utilize the "Unusual Occurrence/Incident Command Checklist" as a reference to document notifications and actions taken. (See appendix A)

3. The Incident Commander assigned to any unusual occurrence shall utilize Incident Command Operation Boards and the CSUN Department of Police Services Incident Command Book to assist in the management, control, and documentation of the incident. The Command Operation Boards and the Incident Command Book are located in the ICS Jump Kit in the supervisor's vehicle.
4. Senior officers of succeeding levels of authority who assume command of the scene shall communicate transfer of command of the incident to all field responders through radio dispatch and note it in all documentation.
5. The Emergency Operations Plan will serve as the primary guide to planning responses to critical incidents and natural/ manmade disasters, as well as civil disturbances.
6. As time permits, the Incident Commander will begin implementing the ICS organization specific to the incident. Not all incidents require all sections listed below; however, in a full ICS incident, these sections would be required to be activated at some point:
 - a. Command Section (Incident Commander)
 - b. Operations Section.
 - c. Planning and Intelligence Section.
 - d. Logistics Section
 - e. Finance Section
7. The Incident Commander has responsibility for operating and coordinating all emergency operations within the campus' jurisdiction, utilizing SEMS, NIMS and ICS, to include:
 - a. Establishing the incident objectives;
 - b. Brief command and general staff and make initial assignments, including specific delegation of authority;
 - c. Requesting mutual-aid assistance with approval of the Chief of Police and the university's Emergency Operations Executive;
 - d. Providing a liaison with nearby jurisdictions and appropriate state and federal agencies; and
 - e. The effective operation and coordination of the Incident Command Post (ICP).
8. When the Chief of Police, Captains, Lieutenant, or in their absence, the on-duty shift supervisor has determined that an emergency or critical incident is occurring or is about to occur, recall of all necessary and available department personnel may be directed. All available staff who receive notification are expected to respond to the designated staging area for briefing, equipment issue, and assignment.
9. At the time personnel are notified to respond for deployment, they will be advised of the staging area location where they are to report.
 - a. The university Department of Police Services will be utilized as the

- primary assembly area. Alternate assembly areas may include a field command post or other designated area(s).
- b. It is imperative that an accurate accounting of all personnel and their assignments is made. This serves two basic purposes. First, it allows the Incident Commander to know where all staff and equipment are assigned. Secondly, it allows for tracking for possible billing purposes at a later date.
10. When ICS is activated, a Safety Officer position will be also be activated, with responsibility for maintaining the safety of all affected personnel, to include recommending and developing measures for assuring personnel safety, and assessing and/or anticipating hazardous and unsafe operational conditions or situations.
 - a. One Safety Officer will be assigned for each incident. Additional officers may represent assisting agencies or jurisdictions.
 - b. When the Incident Command Post is activated, the Safety Officer will report to the ICP to provide overall safety oversight.
 - c. In the event of a hazardous materials incident, the Hazmat Incident Response Team Safety Officer will be assigned as an Assistant Safety Officer, reporting directly to the Safety Officer.
 11. Supervisors or patrol officers may find that they will be required, due to staff shortages or assignments, to perform all duties listed above until such time as sufficient personnel have arrived.
 12. In incidents where ICS is being utilized with multi-agencies, a command post with an identified chain of command will be established with all participating agencies having equal input. However, the final authority rests with the California State University, Northridge Incident Commander for actions taken on university property.
 - a. Consideration may be given to utilizing the Emergency Operations Center, the Mobile Command Post trailer, or the shift supervisor vehicle (as a mobile command vehicle), to establish a command post in a location closer to the reported incident.
 - b. When establishing the Incident Command Post location:
 - i. Position the ICP away from the general noise and confusion that are often associated with an emergency situation.
 - ii. Position the ICP outside the area of present and potential hazards.
 - iii. Position the ICP within view of the incident whenever possible.
 - c. In order to prepare for the deployment and use of the trailer, it is essential for designated personnel to be aware of the proper set-up procedures. Of equal importance is appropriate oversight for the deployment of the command post trailer.
 - d. Authorization for deployment and use of the trailer must be granted by the Chief of Police, or in her/his absence, the officer-in-charge of the department. Should an officer-in-charge authorize the deployment of the

Mobile Command Post trailer, notification shall be made immediately to the Chief of Police.

- e. The set-up procedure checklist for the command post trailer shall be followed. (See Appendix B) The set-up procedure shall not be undertaken with fewer than two persons.
 - f. To assist with communications when the command post has been activated, an additional dispatcher will be called in to assist with communications coordination.
 - g. All available communications equipment, radio frequencies, unit designators, etc., will be identified and employed as needed.
 - h. All responding personnel will either be issued radios on the department frequency or will be provided a radio for monitoring radio traffic.
 - i. The Incident Commander will designate which radio frequencies will be utilized by different assisting agencies.
 - j. Available situational maps for the incident location will be obtained as soon as practical. In those instances where no maps are available, the Incident Commander will direct that a map be prepared by the person most knowledgeable of the area and/or situation.
13. The Incident Commander must determine the control means to be employed, depending upon the type of event and the degree of violence. Before taking enforcement action, the Incident Commander will consider the following factors
- a. Will the situation grow worse by action or inaction? If only scattered individuals are violent, it may be advisable to make selective arrests of those individuals rather than disperse the entire crowd.
 - b. Consider available resources.
 - c. Establish safe and clear escape routes.
 - d. Assemble arrest team(s).
 - e. Have loudspeaker capability.
 - f. Designate an individual to videotape the event, as well as an officer to protect that person.
 - g. Inspect arrest kits.
 - h. If proper, warn of an unlawful assembly.
 - i. Accomplish dispersal and/or arrests.
- *Also reference Policy/Procedure Number 08-S.O.-016 (Event Management and Crowd Control Procedures).
14. The Chief of Police, or her/his designee, is responsible for coordinating operations with any on-site emergency management personnel.
- a. The Emergency Management Coordinator will normally be delegated the responsibility for liaison with emergency management personnel.
 - b. The campus EOC Team will be activated when required and directed to report to the Emergency Operations Center.
 - c. The Chief of Police or in her/his absence, the designated officer in charge when functioning as the EOC Manager, will supervise the EOC team and make assignments.

15. In the field, mutual-aid support and agency liaison will be coordinated through the assigned Liaison Officer.
 - a. When utilizing resources from other agencies, the Liaison Officer will be responsible for identifying and reporting the names of personnel and type of equipment used by the other agencies, to the Finance/Administrative Section.
 - b. When practical, the integrity of individual agency personnel from mutual-aid resources will be maintained. This is normally accomplished by providing specific unit assignments to other-agency personnel.
16. A request for federal law enforcement or National Guard assistance, or any form of military support, will be made by the Chief of Police in consultation with the university President, and will adhere to California State Government Code, Sections 8555-8561.
 - a. Assistance from federal sources shall be of last resort and only requested when regional resources are unable or unavailable to assist.
 - b. Requests for Martial Law will be made by the Chief of Police in consultation with the university President. The Governor of the State of California will make the final determination whether or not Martial Law will be declared.
17. The senior member of each unit assigned a task will, upon conclusion of the incident, complete an After-action Report which will be forwarded to the Planning Section for inclusion in the overall After-action Report. The overall After-action Report will be completed by an individual designated by the Chief of Police or Incident Commander.
18. There shall only be one central point for information release on any incident. This responsibility falls upon the Incident Commander who shall conduct all briefings, or delegate that authority to a single responsible person.
 - a. A public information officer will be designated and will perform those duties identified in, and in accordance with, Policy/Procedure Number 05-S.O.-008 (Media Relations).
 - b. The Public Information Officer (PIO) will be kept informed in an effort to control rumors and to facilitate community relations, through periodic media releases as appropriate.
 - c. Press conferences will be conducted by the PIO in an area designated by the Incident Commander.
19. When dealing with casualties or the potential for casualties, immediate consideration must be given to the safe evacuation, as well as the removal of any deceased persons.
 - a. Coordination must be maintained with emergency medical personnel and any coroners' representatives on-scene.
 - b. A location for triage, as well as a temporary morgue, must be identified as soon as practical after the incident occurs.
 - c. An accounting of all casualty information will be maintained and

relinquished to the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office, unless otherwise directed by that office.

20. The Incident Commander must ensure that all staff understand their legal authority in emergency/critical incidents. Section 409.5 of the California Penal Code defines the authority given to peace officers to close disaster areas, as well as exclusion from police command post areas, and unauthorized entry into disaster areas.
- C. The Operations Section, which includes on-scene field response personnel, assists in formulating and interpreting strategy established by the Incident Commander, and implements it tactically according to the Emergency Operations Plan, university operating guidelines, and the provisions of this document. The Operations Section will also be responsible for conducting the post-incident investigations.
1. The Operations Section Chief activates and supervises organizational elements in accordance with the Incident Action Plan, and is responsible for coordination of all CSUN response elements for the duration of the incident, as well as directing its execution and requesting additional resources, as needed.
 2. The Operations Section Chief also directs the preparation of unit operational plans and requests for release of resources, makes expedient changes to the Incident Action Plan as necessary, and reports such changes to the Incident Commander and the Planning Section Chief.
 3. The Operations Section, via the field incident commander, is responsible for establishing perimeters throughout the incident as well as maintaining security of the command post and incident scene.
 4. Traffic Control will be the primary responsibility of the Parking and Transportation Services Department in accordance with Policy/Procedure Number 07-L.E.-006 (Traffic Direction and Control).
 - a. Parking service officers and auxiliary personnel will be utilized for low-risk traffic control duties.
 - b. In dangerous situations, sworn university/other-agency sworn staff will be used.
 - c. Traffic control plans will be identified and adhered to in an effort to ensure that vehicles are not allowed into incident areas.
 5. The Operations Section Chief must understand that transportation of staff to/from incident locations may be limited by terrain, building collapses, etc.
 - a. When able, staff will be transported in marked or unmarked department vehicles to/from the incident location.
 - b. Due to the limited number of department vehicles, vehicles will be occupied to the maximum safe capacity based on incident requirements.
 - c. The number and types of vehicles/staff will be governed by the incident size, terrain, distance from where staff are based, and the type and number of staff required to contain the incident.
 - d. Alternate modes of transportation such as Metrolink, privately owned

automobiles, other-agency vehicles or other vehicles assigned to the university may be used, as needed.

- e. All prisoners will be transported in authorized police vehicles unless otherwise directed by the Incident Commander or Operations Section Chief. Policy/Procedure Number 08-L.E.-013 (Arrest Procedures and Alternatives to Arrest), Policy/Procedure Number 08-S.O.-017 (Mass Arrests), and Policy/Procedure Number 08-L.E.-009 (Prisoner Transportation), provide additional details on the transporting of prisoners and address processing and confinement information.
 - i. Operational plans must consider the use of a court and prosecutorial liaison if required.
 - ii. The Incident Commander will identify those responsible for approving and processing all reports.

6. Access Controls and Evacuations

When an area is considered unsafe or is to be evacuated, a perimeter will be set up and access controls will be established.

- a. Access controls may be established prior to an evacuation in order to limit the number of persons in a hazardous area or to facilitate an evacuation.
- b. Control points will be established to ensure that only authorized personnel are permitted to enter, pass through, or remain within controlled areas.
- c. Various personnel and devices, such as the following, will be required to control access:
 - i. Control point(s);
 - ii. Personnel to direct traffic and staff control points;
 - iii. Patrols within and outside secured areas;
 - iv. Two-way radios to communicate with personnel inside and outside secured areas;
 - v. Signs to control or restrict traffic;
 - vi. Adjacent highway markers indicating closure of the areas;
 - vii. Markers on surface roads leading into secured areas.

D. Emergency Response and Evacuations

- 1. When a significant emergency or dangerous situation is reported to the Department of Police Services, police personnel shall be dispatched to the scene to assess and handle the incident accordingly under ICS protocols and department policy. The shift supervisor shall notify their respective Patrol Operations Commander (Captain or Lieutenant), or Captain of Special Services in their absence, of the situation as soon as reasonably possible. The Command Staff member notified will notify the Chief of Police of the incident and any confirmation that a significant emergency or dangerous situation exists.

Upon confirmation that an emergency or dangerous situation exists involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of students or staff occurring on campus,

an emergency notification shall be made to the campus community. The assessment and confirmation of an emergency situation by responding police personnel should be determined within 15 minutes of the call, with an emergency notification being crafted within minutes thereafter and immediately disseminated to the campus community.

2. Immediate Emergency Notifications

The responsibility for a campus emergency management program as required by Federal, State and CSU system mandates has been delegated to the Department of Police services. The Department is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of an emergency management program on campus and the developments and implementation of programs and projects in emergency planning, training, response, and recovery.

In general, when a critical incident/emergency occurs the Chief of Police will notify the Crisis Action Team and if the emergency operations center has not already been established, will determine if the activation of the Emergency Operations center and Emergency Operations Plan will commence. The CSUN Crisis Action Team includes the President, Provost and Vice President Administration and Finance, Vice President of Student Affairs, Chief of Police and other senior management staff. The Crisis Action Team is responsible for the management of the emergency and coordination of the campus response.

- a. The Blackboard Connect emergency communications system will be used to immediately notify the campus community upon the confirmation of a significant emergency or dangerous situation involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of students, staff or faculty occurring on the campus, unless issuing a notification will, in the judgment of the first responders (including but not limited to: CSUN Department of Police Services, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Fire and Emergency Medical Services) would compromise the efforts to assist a victim or to contain, respond to or otherwise mitigate the emergency.
- b. The emergency notification procedures are described in the Campus Integrated Communication Protocol which supplements the CSUN Emergency Operations Plan. The first notification will be initiated and crafted by the Chief of Police or the Public Information Officer, the Emergency Manager, or the Shift Supervisor in the interest of time. The Chief of Police or officer in charge in her/his absence will assess and identify the campus population to be notified and content to be delivered given the emerging situation(s). The content and dissemination of timely follow-up notices (i.e., informative updates sent approximately every 30 minutes) will involve CSUN Marketing and Communications Department, Crisis Action Team, and the Chief of Police or officer in charge in his/her absence. These messages may include information regarding the status of the incident and of the campus, information regarding emergency guidelines which are to be followed such as evacuation, shelter in place, etc. These follow up notifications will continue until the situation has been mitigated and the campus returns to

a normal status.

Notification systems include:

- i. Blackboard Connect is the campus mass communication system which allows messages to be sent via cellphone, work phone, home phone, email and text messages.
 - ii. Outdoor Public Address System – operated by the CSUN Police
 - iii. CSUN Phone Message system which can send voice and/or text messages via the CSUN VOIP phone system.
 - iv. Emergency Signage.
 - v. CSUN Web Site Home page will stream emergency information (<http://www.csun.edu>).
 - vi. CSUN Campus State Information lines – an 866 number is provided for both faculty and staff and one for students and community which can be accessed at any time for current information on the status of the campus.
 - vii. Messages will be posted on CSUN Facebook and Twitter as well as on the Police Services Facebook site and updated as appropriate throughout the event.
 - viii. Emergency notifications will also be posted on the CSUN Matador Information Network Display (MIND). Currently there are 26 locations of MIND screens around the campus and we have the capability to send the information that is posted on the MIND screens to the Housing Cable Channel which can be accessed by about 3,000 students in the residence hall.
5. University police through the direction of the Chief of Police, or in her/his absence the designated officer in charge, will have primary responsibility for safe and orderly evacuation of the university. The Emergency Management Coordinator may assist the Law Enforcement Coordinator in constituting and briefing the evacuation teams who may consist of Police, Community Service Assistants, Parking Officers, Building Marshals, CSUN CERT members, Physical Plant Management personnel, etc.
 6. Upon receiving notification of an impending critical incident that requires closure or evacuation of the campus community, the Law Enforcement Coordinator will refer to the campus operation status definitions as defined within the Campus Closure Integrated Communications Protocol, i.e, Open, Partial Closure, Closed and Evacuation.
 - a. The Department's response will involve a two step process. The first step is to implement the traffic flow plan (see Appendix D) and manage the roadways for egress of vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
 - b. The second step is to administer the campus closure or evacuation notification within each campus building utilizing the checklist (see Appendix D).

7. The Law Enforcement Coordinator will then begin to constitute the evacuation teams as identified above, and establish a staging site near the EOC for personnel deployment and information. The Law Enforcement Coordinator will:
 - a. Determine which team members can initiate evacuation procedures from their work area.
 - b. Establish evacuation teams and assign them to specific evacuation zones.
 - c. Assign team leaders and confirm their radio call signs.
 - d. Ensure that all team leaders know who is assigned to their team.
 - e. Ensure that all personnel are briefed thoroughly on their areas of responsibility.
 - f. Know what posture will be used to gain compliance from individuals to be evacuated.
 - g. Ensure that a communications plan is put into effect for the teams and that dispatch is briefed on the evacuation procedures.
 8. Evacuation Team Leaders, once selected, will:
 - a. Marshal their individual teams and ensure that all members understand their responsibilities and the area(s) to be covered.
 - b. Assign team members to evacuation assignments on
 - c. Ensure that all team members have a working flashlight and adequate communications capability.
 - d. Confirm the method for transporting their specific teams to their area(s) of responsibility.
 9. Evacuation team members will respond to the University Police Station or stay at their workstation, as determined by the Law Enforcement Coordinator. After receiving a briefing from the Evacuation Team Leader on the current situation and the exact evacuation procedures to be used, Team Members will ensure that:
 - a. They have an operational flashlight.
 - b. They know what team they are assigned to and who their Team Leader is.
 - c. They ask any questions that they may have in order to preclude unnecessary confusion or misunderstanding.
 10. Since University Police personnel are most familiar with the buildings on campus, they will be responsible for public facility security of the university unless otherwise directed by the Chief of Police, her/his designee, or the Incident Commander. Once a building, sector, or other location has been secured, other agencies may be utilized to maintain security of the building, sector, etc. until relieved.
- E. The ***Planning Section*** is responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and use of information regarding the development of the incident and status of resources.
1. The Section Chief is also responsible for:
 - a. Gathering and assembling information and intelligence for alternative strategies;

- b. Providing periodic predictions on incident potential;
 - c. Reporting significant changes in incident status;
 - d. Compiling and disseminating incident status information;
 - e. Overseeing the preparation of the incident demobilization plan.
- 2. There are five phases in the planning process:
 - a. Understand the situation;
 - b. Establish incident objectives;
 - c. Develop tactical direction and resource assignments;
 - d. Prepare the plan;
 - e. Evaluate and revise the plan, as necessary.
- 3. Accurate Information is needed to:
 - a. Understand the current situation;
 - b. Predict the probable course of incident events;
 - c. Prepare alternative strategies and control operations for the incident.
- 4. The Planning Section Chief conducts the Planning Meeting and is responsible for producing a written Incident Action Plan (IAP), if so directed by the Incident Commander. The Planning Section Chief activates and supervises units within the Planning Section.
- 5. The Incident Action Plan (IAP) is prepared by the Planning Section, with input from the appropriate sections and branches of the Command Post. It should be developed and documented at the outset of the incident and revised continually throughout the response.
 - a. The planning process facilitates the development of an IAP in an orderly and systematic manner.
 - b. Incidents vary in kind, complexity, size, and requirements for detailed and written plans. In an initial response to an incident that is readily controlled, a written plan may not be necessary.
 - c. Larger, more complex incidents will require an IAP to coordinate activities.
 - d. The Incident Commander may direct that a written IAP be developed for any incident.
 - e. The level of detail required in an IAP will vary according to the size and complexity of the response.
 - f. The plan must be accurate and completely transmit information gathered during the planning process.
 - g. The plan must be prepared and distributed prior to the operations shift briefing.
 - h. A plan should be prepared for each operational period (i.e., the time scheduled for executing a given set of operational objectives/ actions) as specified in the IAP.
- 6. Situation Analysis will be required to gather, organize and disseminate information and intelligence regarding incident status. The Planning function is

also responsible for the evaluation, analysis, and display of that information for use by the Incident Command Post staff.

7. The Planning Section will establish a protocol and plan that will allow for the immediate de-escalation and demobilization of the reported incident. The demobilization plan will ensure an orderly, safe, and cost-effective release of personnel and equipment.
 8. The Planning Section is also responsible for the final incident documentation package. This package should include all records that help document the methods used to manage and mitigate the incident. The documentation package may include, but is not limited to:
 - a. IAPS for every operational period;
 - b. All incident maps;
 - c. Facility maps;
 - d. Transportation maps and records;
 - e. Any incident displays that have been produced;
 - f. All press releases or public information records;
 - g. Unit logs;
 - h. Complete financial records and accounting of incident expenses.
- F. The **Logistics Section** is responsible for providing facilities, services, and materials in support of the emergency incident.
1. The Logistics Section Chief ensures that all logistics functions supporting the response structure are carried out. These include all incident facilities, transportation, supplies, equipment, fueling, food service, telecommunications, and personnel. The Logistics Section Chief reports to the Incident Commander on all matters pertaining to section activities.
 2. The Logistics Section Chief is responsible for ensuring that the ordering of all resources are through appropriate procurement methods and.
 3. The Logistics Section provides logistical support to all other sections within the Incident Command Post, activates and supervises the service and support branches and units within the Logistics Section, and participates in the development and implementation of the Incident Action Plan.
 4. The University Police, as well as the university as a whole, has a limited amount of equipment available in the event of an emergency or critical incident.
 - a. Logistics staff must communicate field needs to the appropriate on- or off-campus personnel to ensure equipment needs are met.
 - b. The Chief of Police, Emergency Management Coordinator, and Procurement and Contract Unit Coordinators all have access to department credit cards that are available for use to rent or purchase any equipment needed in an emergency or critical incident.

5. The Logistics Section will procure transportation for staff to/from incident locations which may be limited by terrain, building collapses, etc. Reference this policy, page 10, section D, items 1 – 5.
 6. Medical support will be provided by the activation of the Medical Unit, by responding LAFD Paramedics, by the staff physician(s) and response team from the Klotz Student Health Center, by the Counseling Center, and/or by a contracted EMS Services company.
 - a. A medical plan will be put in place to directly support the needs of the Incident Command Post Staff and all field responders.
 - b. Individuals tasked with this role will first obtain information on any injuries that occurred during initial response operations, and then identify and coordinate planning with the Safety Officer to determine:
 - i. Level of emergency medical activities performed prior to activation of the Unit;
 - ii. Number and location of aid stations;
 - iii. Number and location of stand-by ambulances, helicopters, and medical personnel assigned to the incident;
 - iv. Potential for special medical problems, i.e., hypothermia, dehydration, heat stroke, exposure to hazardous materials, etc.;
 - v. Additional Medical supplies needed.
 7. Specialized teams participating in the critical incident response, such as the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) Bomb Squad, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, LAFD Haz-Mat Team, CSUN Hazmat Incident Response Team, and CSU Critical Response Unit, as well as other campus personnel certified as Light Urban Search and Rescue specialists, will be responsible for providing and maintaining any specialized equipment needed for the response. The Logistics Section will assist these groups in the research and procurement of additional resources as needed.
- G. The Finance Section is responsible for all financial and cost analysis aspects of the incident, to include maintaining an audit trail, billing, invoice payments, and documentation of labor, materials, and services used during incident activities.
1. The Finance Section Chief has the major responsibility for preparing documentation for cost reimbursement in the event of a federally declared disaster.
 2. The Finance Section Chief ensures that all local, state and federal rules and laws are complied with in regard to spending.
 3. A Compensation Branch position responsible for personnel time recording will be activated when required. This function will:
 - a. Ensure that an audit trail is maintained covering billing, invoice payments, and documentation of labor and services used during emergency incident activities.
 - b. Track and record personnel time, ensuring all obligation documents

initiated at the emergency incident are properly reported, prepared, and completed.

4. Expenses will be recorded in order to maintain an audit trail covering billing, invoice payments, and documentation of services used during emergency incident activities, ensuring that all obligation documents initiated at the emergency incident are properly reported, prepared, and completed.
 5. Additional resources will be provided through the Purchasing Branch, which is responsible for developing a procurement plan to ensure that goods and services are procured to meet the needs of the emergency incident. The Purchasing Branch, working closely with the Logistics Section will implement the procurement plan and perform all incident ordering.
 6. Liability issues arising from deaths, injuries, or property damage occurring during an emergency incident will be handled by the Cost Recovery Branch Coordinator, who is responsible for administering financial matters. The Finance Section is responsible for gathering evidence and preparing claims documentation for any event involving damage to public or private properties which could result in a claim against the university.
- H. In order to enhance emergency response to hazards described in the Emergency Operations Plan, the Department will conduct tabletop exercises, mock training sessions, functional exercises, and will participate in regional drills whenever possible. Exercises will be documented through the use of planning documents, operation plans, exercise plans and After-action and Corrective-action Reports.

On an annual basis, a functional exercise will be conducted to include the Crisis Action Team, EOC personnel, response personnel (CSUN Police, CSUN HazMat response team, CSUN CERT team, CSUN Building Marshals, etc.) and other CSUN community members. Exercises will be documented through the use of planning documents, operation plans, exercise plans and After-action and Corrective-action Reports to include a description, date, time, and whether the test was announced or unannounced. A notice will be sent to the entire campus community via email in conjunction with the test publicizing the campus emergency response and evacuation procedures; goals and objectives for the exercise; whether it was announced or unannounced; and lessons learned from the exercise.

- I. All sworn personnel and department EOC personnel will receive annual training on the All Hazard Plan, the Incident Command System, and in critical incident response, and an annual training exercise will be conducted. Training will be documented in the individual employee's training record in the same manner as all other training the employee attends.

VI. APPENDICES

- A. Unusual Occurrence/Incident Command Checklist
- B. Mobile Command Post Trailer Set Up Procedure Checklist
- C. Campus Closure Integrated Communication Protocol
- D. The Traffic Flow Plan



Mobile Command Post Trailer Set Up Procedure Checklist

- ☐ Open valves to LPG tanks if necessary.
- ☐ Start heat or air conditioning as necessary.
- ☐ Test CO and smoke alarms.
- ☐ Set-up interior tables and chairs as needed.
- ☐ Deploy interior equipment as needed.
- ☐ Unlock outside storage as needed.
- ☐ Establish perimeter as needed (cones, tape).
- ☐ Deploy exterior furniture and equipment (awning, etc.) as needed.
- ☐ Deploy roof top equipment (antenna, satellite dish) as needed.

Appendix "B"



California State University, Northridge
Department of Police Services

UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE/INCIDENT COMMAND CHECKLIST

INCIDENT NAME:	INCIDENT LOCATION:
DATE/TIME:	INCIDENT COMMANDER:
DATE/TIME:	INCIDENT COMMANDER:
DATE/TIME:	INCIDENT COMMANDER:
INITIAL RESPONSE - PRIOR TO ARRIVAL	COMMENTS/NOTATIONS
<input type="checkbox"/> Determine type of incident to map best/safe response route (fire, gas leak, hazmat, bomb, active shooter, WMD, etc.).	
<input type="checkbox"/> Weather Considerations	
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel available	
<input type="checkbox"/> Life safety considerations	
<input type="checkbox"/> Number of injured/killed • LAFD fire/rescue notification if necessary	
<input type="checkbox"/> Safety assessment for on-scene personnel: • Personnel safety equipment (PPE)	
<input type="checkbox"/> Safety assessment for community: • Sheltering in place • Evacuation locations if necessary	
<input type="checkbox"/> Safety assessment for property	
ON SCENE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT	
<input type="checkbox"/> Secure and Establish Control and Communications: • Assume and Announce Command of the scene to dispatch/all units	
<input type="checkbox"/> Establish Incident Command Post	
<input type="checkbox"/> Deploy Orange Cone	
<input type="checkbox"/> Put on Vests	
<input type="checkbox"/> Advise dispatch location of CP	
<input type="checkbox"/> Identify the Hot Zone	
<input type="checkbox"/> Establish Inner Perimeter • Strictly controlled area	
<input type="checkbox"/> Establish Outer Perimeter • Provide for crowd & traffic control points • Control access/egress to & from scene	
<input type="checkbox"/> Establish Staging Area	
<input type="checkbox"/> Assign tracking of personnel • Who is Assigned? • Where are they assigned?	

NOTE: Complete and check-off those tasks that are applicable to the incident.

Appendix "B -- continued"



California State University, Northridge
Department of Police Services

UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE/INCIDENT COMMAND CHECKLIST - PAGE TWO

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INITIAL RESPONSE - PRIOR TO ARRIVAL	COMMENTS/NOTATIONS
<input type="checkbox"/> Notifications (notify dispatch to make the calls)	
<input type="checkbox"/> Chief of Police	
<input type="checkbox"/> Captain, Patrol Services	
<input type="checkbox"/> Captain, Parking & Transportation Services	
<input type="checkbox"/> Detective On Call	
<input type="checkbox"/> DPS Public Information Officer	
<input type="checkbox"/> Other:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Other:	
<input type="checkbox"/> Develop process to brief incoming personnel	
<input type="checkbox"/> Identify & Request Additional Resources	ETA ASSIGNMENT
<input type="checkbox"/> • LAPD/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • LAPD Bomb Sq/SWAT/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • LAUSD/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • CHP/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • LAFD/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • HAZMAT/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • K-9/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • CSUN Resources:/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • PPM • Student Health • Counseling Svcs.	/
<input type="checkbox"/> • OTHER:/Contact Name:	/
<input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Considerations	
<input type="checkbox"/> Deployment Tactics	• Other: _____
• Perimeter(s) containment	• Barricaded Suspect
• Active shooter	• EOD
• Search & rescue teams	• K-9
• HAZMAT teams	• Other: _____
• Evacuation Teams	• Other: _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Investigative Needs	
• Investigate ALL incidents - criminal, non criminal, natural disasters	
TRANSFER OF COMMAND OR RETURN TO NORMAL OPERATIONS	
<input type="checkbox"/> ANNOUNCE TRANSFER OF COMMAND VIA RADIO	
Brief Incoming Commander	
Share all notes, personnel locations, actions taken and incident objectives.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Demobilize resources as appropriate.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Debrief Incident with all personnel and prepare after-action/corrective action report.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Return personnel to normal operations.	

CAMPUS CLOSURE INTEGRATED COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL

This protocol supplements the *CSUN Emergency Operations Plan* by providing detailed guidelines for communication with members of the campus community when classes are canceled or the campus is closed due to an emergency or another unforeseen circumstance. The *Emergency Operations Plan* provides specific guidelines on notifications, mobilization of the Crisis Action Team, and possible activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Upon activation of the EOC, the *Emergency Operations Plan* supersedes this protocol.

- **Incident-Initial Response**

Mobilize the Crisis Action Team

- Crisis Action Team Members include: President, Provost and VP for Academic Affairs, VP of Admin. and Finance, VP for Student Affairs and Dean of Students, VP for University Advancement, VP for Information Technology, Executive Director, University Corporation, Chief of Police, Associate VP for Marketing and Communications, and President’s Chief of Staff or their designees.
- Members of the Crisis Action Team will meet or confer by telephone to:
 - Manage and coordinate the initial CSU Northridge response.
 - If necessary, activate the CSU Northridge Emergency Operations Center (EOC). (Note: Key factors that normally trigger EOC activation include: emergency response resources beyond the CSU Northridge capability, an emergency of long duration, major policy decisions must or may be required, local or state emergency will be declared, activation of the EOC will be advantageous to the successful management of the emergency.)
- **Communication of Message**
 1. Upon activation of the EOC (*campus closed or evacuated*), the EOC organizational structure will be followed.
 2. In the event that activation of the EOC is not warranted (*open, classes canceled*), the following communication protocol will be used, with each office contacting its listed reports. (At the discretion of the Crisis Action Team, some EOC procedures could also be utilized.)
 - The Marketing and Communications department is responsible for crafting and delivering University messages via the following methods:
 - On- and off-campus news media

- CSUN Web Site – Activate Campus Update web page (<http://www.csun.edu/pubrels/notice.html>)
 - Activate CSUN Social Media pathways (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, etc.)
 - Activate toll-free campus information lines; general CSUN information line (x1200) will refer callers to the following dedicated toll-free numbers:
 - CSUN students and community members: 1-866-515-2786
 - CSUN Faculty and Staff: 1-866-535-2786
 - The following individuals, in order of availability, have been trained in updating the general CSUN information line:
 - Janice Johnson, Information Technology (x2212)
 - Eric Senesac, Information Technology (x4761)
 - Information placed on Campus Infoscreen TV monitors
 - Information placed on the Electronic Marquee on Zelzah Avenue
 - Request public advisory information on campus radio station KCSN-FM
- Police Services manages the Mass Communication System for the University utilizing the **Blackboard Connect Notification System**. This system incorporates notification via email and/or phone and/or text message to the campus community. Additionally, this system sends a full screen alert to campus computers.
- The following individuals, in order of availability, have been trained in sending a message via Blackboard Connect:
- Christina Villalobos, Police Services (x7922);
 - Carmen Chandler, University Advancement (x2129);
 - Greg Nicols, Information Technology (x4113);
 - Francesca Vega, Governmental Affairs (x7489);
 - Jeffrey Noblitt, Marketing and Communication (x5672);
 - Lieutenant Mark Benavidez, Police Services (x3901);
 - Captain Fred Fernandez, Police Services (x3961);
 - Captain Scott VanScoy, Police Services (x2764);
 - Chief Anne Glavin, Police Services (x2201)
- As per procedure, when notification is sent via Blackboard Connect, the same message will be sent as a voice and text message using the **CSUN Phone Messaging System (Informacast)**. This system is managed by campus Information Technology.
- The following individuals, in order of availability, have been trained in sending a message using the CSUN Phone Messaging System:
 - Greg Nicols, Information Technology (x4113);
 - Janice Johnson, Information Technology (x2212);
 - Eric Senesac, Information Technology (x4761)
 - Christina Villalobos, Police Services (x7922);
 - Randy Reynaldo, President's Office (x2121)
- **The Carillon** may be utilized, as appropriate, to broadcast a message of campus closure or evacuation. Police Services manages this outdoor broadcast system.

The following individuals, in order of availability, have been trained in the use of the emergency public address broadcast system (Carillon) to send a message to the campus:

- Christina Villalobos, Police Services (x7922);
- Lieutenant Mark Benavidez, Police Services (x3901);
- Captain Fred Fernandez, Police Services (x3961);
- Captain Scott VanScoy, Police Services (x2764);
- Chief Anne Glavin, Police Services (x2201);
- Carmen Chandler, University Advancement (x2129);
- Shante Morgan, University Advancement (x6288);
- Jeff Craig, PPM (x4878)

3. Other division leadership will use the message crafted by Marketing and Communications to notify their respective constituents with special notifications as follows:

- President's Office
 - Notify Chancellor's Office (required if EOC is activated)
 - Notify Director, Intercollegiate Athletics
- IT (in coordination with Marketing and Communications)
 - Broadcast voice mail and e-mail
 - Activate toll-free lines (faculty and staff, students and community)
- Academic Affairs
 - Provost's Office will contact deans and AVPs by telephone (The Library is contacted first and will follow its own protocol)
 - Dean's offices, by telephone or personally, relay message to all department chairs
 - AVPs will, in turn, contact all direct reports
 - During business hours, a standard message (sign) could be downloaded, printed, and posted on classroom doors by departments or by building marshals
 - Notify Individual College Satellite Operations Centers via Academic Affairs Liaison (EOP organization structure)
- Police Services
 - Northridge Academy High School
 - Emergency signage may be placed along the campus perimeter and within the campus to alert to the campus status (evacuation, closed, partial closure, testing of emergency communications).
 - Notify all information booths
 - Activate building marshal system — marshals can notify building occupants of closures
 - Activate the campus CERT team
 - Police officers may be sent out around campus with bullhorns to assist with

evacuations if appropriate and as staffing allows.

- The University Corporation
 - TUC contacts all managed buildings and outlying operations
 - TUC contacts tenants and outsource providers
 - TUC becomes the liaison with EOP for Food Services
- Student Affairs
 - The office of the Vice President of Student Affairs will notify Student Affairs offices

4. Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities:

Each unit has responsibility for assuring communication with individuals with disabilities who are in the facility. In the case of campus closure or evacuation, the building marshals are responsible for locating individuals with physical disabilities in the facility and assisting them to the designated area for evacuation.

5. When the campus is reopened, each of the aforementioned areas will be responsible for canceling their respective procedures.

Annual Review

This protocol needs to be reviewed annually by the Chief of Police as part of the Campus Emergency Operations Plan.

Definitions

Open

All classes and offices function normally.

Partial Closure

In certain low risk situations, the Crisis Action Team may keep the University open but will cancel classes. This action will be determined on a case-by-case basis. Classes that are in session at the time of the decision will be canceled immediately and all students will be dismissed to leave campus without penalty.

Because circumstances vary widely, decisions regarding other faculty and staff activities will be made by the Crisis Action Team on a case-by-case basis.

Closed

- 1) Emergency Operations Center is normally activated in emergency situations.
- 2) All students, faculty, and staff (except essential emergency personnel) leave campus. (The Crisis Action Team will make a separate determination regarding other campus activities, e.g., athletic events, performances, rehearsals, contracts with external organizations, etc.)

3) Essential Emergency Personnel

Each Division is responsible for final determination as to which of its personnel are essential. Essential Personnel are generally defined as the faculty and staff who are required to report to their designated work location, to ensure the operation of essential functions or departments during an emergency or when the University has suspended operations.

Vice Presidents for each division should determine which functions are essential, and have senior management determine how to staff those functions during an emergency or suspension of normal operations. Once the essential staffing plan for a department is determined, the Vice President or his/her designee is responsible for communicating the information to all personnel in the respective division. In some departments, a tier system has been utilized to address the scope of the situation.

The following areas are considered the core essential personnel for the University for the majority of emergencies and critical incidents. Other personnel may also be needed for a particular emergency situation but that determination shall be made by the senior management designee in each of the areas listed in letters b. through e. below.

- a. The Crisis Action Team: Includes: President, Provost and VP for Academic Affairs, VP of Admin. and Finance, VP for Student Affairs and Dean of Students, VP for University Advancement, VP for Information Technology, Executive Director, University Corporation, Chief of Police, Associate VP for Marketing and Communications, and President's Chief of Staff or their designees
- b. Department of Police Services Tier I personnel.
- c. Physical Plant Management Tier I personnel.
- d. Environmental Health and Safety Tier I personnel.
- e. IT Tier I personnel.

Evacuated

- 1) Emergency Operations Center is activated.
- 2) All campus personnel are subject to the directives of Emergency Operations Center Director.
- 3) All campus occupants, except administration specifically assigned as liaisons to the Emergency Operations Center and essential emergency personnel, shall leave campus immediately.
- 4) Buildings will be secured with no reentry permitted until the controlling emergency agency provides clearance.

Shelter in Place

This advisory instructs individuals to seek immediate shelter inside a campus facility or residence hall. This course of action may be required during an emergency situation, such as an act of violence, weather emergency, chemical spill, etc., as directed by emergency personnel. Sheltering in place will keep individuals inside an area that provides more protection.

Any notification to shelter in place will be incident specific and may apply to the entire campus or just certain facilities. As such, the mode of issuing a shelter in place notification will be determined by the emergency team in place (i.e., Crisis Action Team or EOC), using any or all of the communication protocols described in this document.

(rev. June 2014)

Appendix “D”

The Traffic Flow Plan

The Traffic Flow Plan is based on a campus-wide closure or evacuation but can be adjusted to fit other situations. The staffing is based on a cooperative effort by the entire Police Services Department. As noted on the Traffic Flow Plan legend, traffic control positions can be staffed by police or parking officers. Police and parking vehicles can be utilized to supplement or replace barriers. An organized traffic plan is essential to minimize total gridlock on egress of a campus the size of CSUN. The Traffic Flow Plan will be implemented prior to announcing a campus-wide closure or evacuation when possible.

The watch supervisor will ensure all positions will be filled according to the Traffic Flow Plan when staffing is available. Initially, parking lots G-1, G-3, and G-4 will be placed on a second priority status and will be allowed to self regulate. If positions cannot be filled to cover all priority 1 and priority 2 areas, the supervisor will take into account key traffic migration locations, such as the officer posted in front of the parking lot D-6 south entrance who will assist traffic moving northbound from the “B” parking lots. Pedestrian traffic will also be a factor affecting the flow of traffic. The most impacted areas will occur on Etiwanda as people attempt to get to their vehicles in the B-3 & B-5 parking structures and “B” parking lots.

Parking electronic signs will be posted on the corner of Nordhoff Street and Zelzah Avenue, Nordhoff Street and Darby Avenue, & Plummer Street and Reseda Boulevard. Each electronic sign has the ability to hold up to six rows of eight letters. Each sign will indicate campus closed and student pick-up locations. For example, CAMPUS CLOSED, STUDENT PICK UP, LOT G-3 LOT D-1. In addition, the campus color-based emergency signage program will be implemented with the following signs to be posted as directed by the Chief of Police or his/her designee.

- **ORANGE:** Campus Evacuated – all but essential/emergency personnel must leave immediately
- **RED:** Campus (or area) CLOSED to all but essential/emergency personnel (e.g., for critical incident situations.)
- **YELLOW:** Campus classes and activities CANCELLED by President (e.g., wildfires seriously affecting air quality and personal safety)
- **GREEN:** Campus OPEN and situation back to normal (posted only after Orange, Red or Yellow)

Special Needs Persons

Officers working at assigned positions near locations where children or disabled persons are picked-up shall grant access to parents or care-takers to these locations. Inside the campus core are two locations, the A.S. Children’s Center and Brown Center. Both of these locations can be reached through Plummer Street (east/west) or northbound Lindley Avenue. These locations will be announced for the above listed special access by the shift supervisor during campus evacuations.

Notifications to Community

Prioritizing how the campus community will be notified of the evacuation will depend on the type of the incident. In past incidents of natural causes such as rain or nearby fires, early notifications were provided to those campus entities providing services to the elderly, disabled, children, and those with special needs. Early notifications to these groups (i.e., A.S. Children’s Center, Brown Center, Office of Disability Resources) shall be made prior to the initiation of the traffic control plan and campus notifications, thus

allowing them additional time to prepare for their special needs in parent/care-taker notification and specific departmental closure/evacuation procedures.

Mass Notification Process

The campus has several mass notification systems in place that could assist during a closure or evacuation. The below shall only be utilized as directed by the Chief of Police or her/his designee.

1. Information placed on campus info screen TV monitors.
2. Implementation of the campus color-based emergency signage program.
3. Broadcasted information to be placed over the Carillon's public announcement (PA) system.
4. KCSN-FM, campus radio station
5. ConnectEd mass notification system
6. Campus Digital Information Sign (Located in parking G-3)
7. Voice mail message to be placed over all campus telephones.
8. Use of the police vehicle external PA systems.
9. Use of the mega horns (i.e., portable PA) in each police vehicle.
10. Use of CSUN Phone Message System
11. Emergency information will stream on the CSUN Home page

Building Closure/Evacuation Check-Off Process

Supervisors coordinating a campus closure/evacuation will use the building closure check-off list to ensure all building locations are given notification. The attached check off list contains bolded entries indicating special consideration when prioritizing the building closure(s) or evacuations. The watch supervisor shall coordinate the action plan in an incident command system, initially determining the appropriate location in which to operate the incident command post in accordance with SEMS/NIMS.

Personnel assigned to give closure or evacuation announcements inside the buildings will read a brief written statement approved by the Chief of Police or her/his designee. The message will be read using a megaphone while walking throughout the building corridors/hallways on each floor. Posting of approved campus closure literature will also be placed on perimeter doors of each building. Once the buildings have been closed and/or evacuated each location will be secured and the shift supervisor will be notified. The shift supervisor will notify the Chief of Police or her/his designee when all the buildings have been closed and/or evacuated.

Parking lot closures will occur after the parking lots become empty. Refer to the Parking Lot Closures document for placement of officers and traffic cones. Entrance Closures locations will be conducted as part of the Traffic Flow Plan, northbound Lindley Avenue from Nordhoff Street, westbound Plummer Street at Darby Avenue, and northbound Bertrand Avenue from Prairie Street.

BUILDING CLOSURES/EVACUATIONS**Note: List notification & closure confirmation times below.****EARLY NOTIFICATION GROUPS**

- 1) Time: _____ ASSOCIATED STUDENTS CHILDREN CENTER (Children)
- 2) Time: _____ BAYRAMIAN HALL / (Center on Disabilities)
- 3) Time: _____ CADAVER ROOM – 1576 JACARANDA HALL
- 4) Time: _____ CHISHOLM HALL / (NCOD - Disabled)
- 5) Time: _____ MONTEREY HALL / (Children, Elderly, and Disabled)
- 6) Time: _____ REDWOOD HALL / (Brown Center – Elderly and Disabled)
- 7) Time: _____ STUDENT HEALTH CENTER
- 8) Time: _____ VIVARIUM - EUCALPTUS HALL 2000

BEAT 1

- 1) Time: _____ AP 710A, 710B, and & 701 Trailers in lot B4
- 2) Time: _____ ARBOR GRILL
- 3) Time: _____ ART AND DESIGN CENTER (Art Gallery)
- 4) Time: _____ ASIAN HOUSE
- 5) Time: _____ BANK
- 6) Time: _____ BAYRAMIAN HALL
- 7) Time: _____ BLACK HOUSE
- 8) Time: _____ CHICANO HOUSE
- 9) Time: _____ CHILD AND FAMILY STUDIES LAB SCHOOL
- 10) Time: _____ CITRUS HALL (Planetarium)
- 11) Time: _____ CYPRESS HALL (Recital Hall)
- 12) Time: _____ EDUCATION (Noski Auditorium)
- 13) Time: _____ EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION
- 14) Time: _____ EUCALYPTUS HALL
- 15) Time: _____ JACARANDA HALL (Johnson Auditorium)
- 16) Time: _____ JEROME RICHFIELD HALL
- 17) Time: _____ JUNIPER HALL
- 18) Time: _____ LITTLE THEATRE
- 19) Time: _____ LIVE OAK HALL
- 20) Time: _____ MAGNOLIA HALL
- 21) Time: _____ MANZANITA HALL (Amer Screening Room)
- 22) Time: _____ MATADOR BOOKSTORE COMPLEX (College of Extended Learning)
- 23) Time: _____ MATADOR HALL (Fitness Center/Nautilus)
- 24) Time: _____ MFA STUDIOS
- 25) Time: _____ NORDHOFF HALL (Campus Theater, Studio Theater, Little Theater)
- 26) Time: _____ OVIATT LIBRARY
- 27) Time: _____ PHYSICAL PLANT MGMT./CORP. YARD
- 28) Time: _____ POLICE SERVICES
- 29) Time: _____ RECITAL HALL
- 30) Time: _____ SAGEBRUSH HALL

- 31) Time: _____ SANTA SUSANA HALL
- 32) Time: _____ SEQUOIA HALL (Marilyn Mangram Center)
- 33) Time: _____ SIERRA HALL
- 34) Time: _____ SIERRA TOWER
- 35) Time: _____ UNIVERSITY HALL
- 36) Time: _____ VALLEY PERFORMING ARTS CENTER

BEAT 2

- 1) Time: _____ BROWN CENTER
- 2) Time: _____ CHAPARRAL HALL
- 3) Time: _____ INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS OFFICE
- 4) Time: _____ JEANNE CHISHOLM HALL/NCOD
- 5) Time: _____ KLOTZ STUDENT HEALTH CENTER
- 6) Time: _____ MATADOME
- 7) Time: _____ MONTEREY HALL
- 8) Time: _____ PLAZA DEL SOL PERFORMING HALL
- 9) Time: _____ REDWOOD HALL
- 10) Time: _____ UNIVERSITY CLUB
- 11) Time: _____ UNIVERSITY STUDENT UNION (Plaza Del Sol Performance Hall, PUB,
Student Rec Center & Field; Computer Lab, etc.)

BEAT 3

- 12) Time: _____ NORTHRIDGE ACADEMY H.S.
- 13) Time: _____ SATELLITE STUDENT UNION
- 14) Time: _____ UNIVERSITY PARK APARTMENTS
- 15) Time: _____ UNIVERSITY VILLAGE APARTMENTS

PARKING LOT CLOSURES/EVACUATIONS

Note: List confirmation times of complete entrance and lot closures, and deployment of electronic and color-based signage.

Priority 1 Locations: **Proposed parking lot deployment**

Time: _____	B-1	Parking Officer
Time: _____	B-2	Cones
Time: _____	B-3	Parking Officer
Time: _____	B-4	Cones
Time: _____	B-5	Parking Officer
Time: _____	B-6	Parking Officer
Time: _____	C-6	Cones
Time: _____	D-1	Cones
Time: _____	D-6	Police Officer (North entrance)
Time: _____	D-6	Cones (South entrance)
Time: _____	E-5	Cones
Time: _____	E-6	Cones
Time: _____	D-1	Cones

Campus Street Entrance Closures:

Time: _____	Lindley Avenue, North of Nordhoff Street
Time: _____	Bertrand Avenue, North of Prairie Street
Time: _____	Bertrand Avenue

Electronic Signs:

Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Darby Avenue
Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Zelzah Avenue
Time: _____	Plummer Street and Reseda Boulevard

Color-Coded Signs:

Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Darby Avenue
Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Zelzah Avenue
Time: _____	Plummer Street and Reseda Boulevard
Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Darby Avenue
Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Zelzah Avenue
Time: _____	Plummer Street and Reseda Boulevard
Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Darby Avenue
Time: _____	Nordhoff Street and Zelzah Avenue
Time: _____	Plummer Street and Reseda Boulevard


Priority 2 Locations:


Time: _____	F-2	Cones
Time: _____	F-4	Cones
Time: _____	F-5	Cones
Time: _____	G-1	Cones
Time: _____	G-3	Parking Officer
Time: _____	G-4	Parking Officer

Priority 3 Locations:

Time: _____	F-8	Cones
Time: _____	F-9	Cones
Time: _____	F-10	Cones
Time: _____	G-7	Cones
Time: _____	G-8	Cones
Time: _____	G-9	Cones
Time: _____	G-10	Cones
Time: _____	G-12	Cones\

Appendix "D" Continued






PRIORITY AREA

2

LEGEND	
	Traffic Flow
	Road Barriers
	Emergency Signage
	CMS Boards
	Police/Parking Officer

Appendix "D" Continued



PRIORITY AREA

3

LEGEND	
	Traffic Flow
	Road Barriers
	Emergency Signage
	CMS Boards
	Police/Parking Officer

Checklist to Administer the Campus Closure or Evacuation Notification

- ☐ Designate/coordinate all available emergency personnel.
- ☐ Ensure command staff has been notified.
- ☐ Coordinate with command staff regarding development of an action plan.
 - a. Understand the situation: gather, record, analyze, and display a clear and accurate picture of the incident evolving at the moment.
 - b. Establish Incident Objectives: determine an effective strategy and formulate and prioritize the incident objectives, which also should include alternative strategies.
 - c. Developing tactical direction and resource assignments: determine the tactical direction and the specific resources needed for implementing the strategy for one operational period. Prior to formal planning meetings, each member of the command and general staff is responsible for gathering the necessary information so that they can successfully and collectively develop the plan.
 - d. Preparing a plan and approve plan: prepare the plan in a format that is appropriate for the size and complexity of the incident. For initial response, this will likely be notes for an oral briefing and oral assignments or orders. For incidents with multiple operational periods more formal written Incident Action Plans are necessary.
 - e. Evaluate and revise the plan: evaluate and revise the plan in order to ensure success. The command team must regularly compare planned progress with actual progress. Adjustments in the plan can then be made as new information emerges or conditions change or adjustments can be implemented in the Incident Action Plan for the next operational period.
 - f. Basically an Incident Action Plan addresses: **What** needs to be done? **Who** will do it? **When** will it get done? **How** will it get done? (resources to get job done) **How** do we communicate the information? **Other** "Need to Know" information.
 - g. Supervisors are to be cognizant of the significant difference between a campus closure and campus evacuation. They shall also ensure that the term "evacuation" is to be used by those making campus notifications after receiving approval to do so by the Chief of Police or her/his designee. Unlike an evacuation order, if a "campus closure" is put into effect, department personnel are not permitted to advise of an evacuation or force community members to evacuate university property.
- ☐ Gather the Campus Evacuation Traffic Flow Pattern & Building Closure and Parking Lot Closure documents.
- ☐ Create a resource list prior to briefings (i.e., available personnel, vehicles, equipment, supplies).
- ☐ Conduct a briefing for all Public Safety and other campus entities assisting with the operation and issue assignments and clarify roles and responsibilities.
- ☐ Establish an incident command post.
- ☐ Initiate notifications to special needs groups and ensure pickup location access as defined below within this document.
- ☐ Notify LAPD Devonshire, Valley Traffic Division and the CHP of closure(s)/evacuations.
- ☐ Coordinate pre-set up of campus closure equipment (i.e., barricades, traffic cones, notification signs).
- ☐ Coordinate a plan for facility evacuations.
- ☐ Set up traffic controls prior to initiating closure(s) and/or evacuations.
- ☐ Initiate campus color-based emergency signage program as directed by the Chief of Police or his/her designee.
- ☐ Place all public safety communications on emergency traffic only status.

Attachment "D" Continued

- ☐ Implement action plan and building notifications as directed by the Chief of Police or his/her designee.
- ☐ Enact parking lot closures as lots empty.



POLICY/PROCEDURE NUMBER: 08-L.E.-011 Page 1 of 17 with four Appendices

SUBJECT: USE OF FORCE

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2015

REVIEW DATE: January 7, 2016

AMENDS/SUPERSEDES: Use of Force, 200-25, October 22, 2001; Firearms Use and Training, 200-26, October 26, 2001; Procedural Directive : Change in Procedure for the Storage of Shotguns, 10/25/2002; Memo from Chief Glavin: Secondary Firearms Authorization Updates, 2/4/2003; Memo from Chief Glavin: Off Duty Weapons Updates, 2/4/2003; Procedural Directive 2003-005, Firearm Loading and Unloading Stations; Procedural Directive 2007-001, Firearms Range Attendance Requirements and Procedures; January 29, 2008 version; February 7, 2008 version; February 26, 2008 version; January 27, 2010 version; February 16, 2011 version; March 14, 2012 version; November 8, 2012 version; January 8, 2014 version.

IACLEA STANDARDS: 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.1.8, 7.1.9, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4

CSU POLICE DEPARTMENTS SYSTEMWIDE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINE – YES

APPROVED: Anne P. Glavin, Chief of Police

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this directive is to establish guidelines for the use of force by officers of this department. This order recognizes that the use of force by law enforcement personnel is a matter of critical concern both to the public and the law enforcement community and therefore requires constant evaluation and review.

California Penal Code Section 12031 (b) authorizes California State University, Northridge police officers to carry weapons. (See Department policy 02-O.A.-001, Law Enforcement Role, Constitutional and Statutory Authority, Area of Jurisdiction, and Off-Campus Response page 4, Section 5 for further information).

II. POLICY

A. California Penal Code Section 835(a) provides that:

Any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force to affect the arrest, to prevent escape, or to overcome resistance. A peace officer who makes or attempts to make an arrest need not retreat or desist from his/her efforts by reason of the resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested; nor shall such officer be deemed an aggressor or lose his/her right to self-defense by the use of reasonable force to effect the arrest, or to prevent escape, or to overcome resistance.

- B. The United States Supreme Court in Graham vs. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989) ruled that the use of force by police officers must be “objectively reasonable” and that officers must consider the following factors when considering what level of force, if any, to use.
 - 1. Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers and/or others.
 - 2. Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest.
 - 3. In circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving (“pace” of events) which require split-second judgments.
 - 4. The severity of the alleged crime at issue.
 - 5. Whether the suspect is attempting to evade arrest by flight.
- C. It is the policy of this department that officers shall use only that force which is reasonable to accomplish lawful objectives, given the facts and circumstances known at the time of the event. An officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life, including the officer’s own life, or in the defense of any person in danger of serious physical injury. In addition to recognizing the appropriate level of force option, officers must also make a conscious decision to de-escalate that force once the suspect submits or is under control.

III. DEFINITIONS:

- A. Critical Incident: An incident that is unusual, is violent, and involves perceived threat to, or actual loss of, human life. The incident is a significant emotional event that breaks through an individual’s normal coping mechanisms and may cause extreme psychological distress.
- B. Conducted Electrical Weapon (CEW): A weapon that uses electricity to override voluntary motor responses, or apply pain in order to gain compliance or overcome aggressive resistance. The department authorized CEW is the TASER model X26P and the auto shut-down performance power magazine (APPM).
- C. Deadly Force: Deadly force is that force which has a substantial risk of causing serious physical injury or death, also known as lethal force.
- D. Non-Deadly Intermediate Force: Intermediate force is that force which is unlikely, when properly used, to result in serious physical injury or death.
- E. Probable Cause: The facts or circumstances that lead an officer to “believe” a person has committed, is committing, or about to commit a crime.
- F. Reasonable Suspicion: The facts or circumstances that lead an officer to “suspect” a person has committed, is committing, or about to commit a crime.

- G. Vulnerable Population Groups: Vulnerable population groups include those who reasonably appear to be, or are known to be, children, elderly, medically infirm, pregnant, or users of a cardiac pace maker.
- H. Serious Physical Injury: A bodily injury that creates a substantial risk and may prove life-threatening or would be likely to cause serious harm to a person's health and physical well-being without immediate medical treatment (i.e., permanent or substantial injury whereby a person is **admitted** to a medical facility, loss of any body part or function, or permanent disfigurement).
- I. Use of Force Continuum – A chart designed to facilitate an understanding of appropriate levels of force by officers (i.e., what and when). It is based on the 9th Circuit Court rulings involving use of force cases and designed to be easily understood and readily recalled by the officer under the stress of confrontation. It is valuable as a training aid in preparing for situations which may require the use of force. The continuum is NOT a step by step process. (See appendix for force continuum chart.)

IV. PROCEDURES

A. Determining Appropriate Force Options

1. Given that no policy can realistically predict every possible situation an officer might encounter in the field, it is recognized that each officer must be entrusted with well-reasoned discretion in determining the appropriate use of force in each incident.

A number of factors are taken into consideration when an officer selects force options, and when evaluating whether an officer has used reasonable force. The department recognizes that officers are expected to make split-second decisions and that the amount of time available to evaluate and respond to a situation may impact an officer's decisions. Examples of factors which may affect an officer's force option selection include:

- a. The conduct of the individual being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);
 - b. Officer/subject factors (age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion, and ratio of officers versus subjects);
 - c. Whether the subject appears to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol;
 - d. Mental capacity of the subject;
 - e. Proximity to weapons;
 - f. Availability of other options;
 - g. Seriousness of the offense in question or reason for contact with the individual;
 - h. Officer's training and experience;
 - i. Potential for injury to citizens, officers and suspects;
 - j. Risk of escape; and
 - k. Other exigent circumstances.
2. An officer need not attempt to gain control over an individual by use of the lowest level of force when reason dictates and the officer can

articulate that a higher level of force is reasonable. Likewise the skipping of levels may be appropriate given the resistance encountered. In addition to recognizing the appropriate level of force option, officers must also make a conscious decision to de-escalate that force once the suspect submits or is under control.

B. Actions of Subject

1. Force options are dependent on the actions of the subject, as reasonably perceived by the officer or based on the officer's reasonable perception and the type of resistance that is encountered.
2. The general categories below are non-exclusive and are intended to serve as illustrations of actions of individual behavior that have been identified with respect to potential citizen contacts. These categories are as follows:
 - a. Cooperative – Subject is cooperative and complies with verbal commands or other directions.
 - b. Non-Responsive or Uncooperative – Subject is uncooperative when taken into custody or fails to respond to verbal commands or other directions.
 - c. Passive or Low- Level Resistance – Unarmed subject is passively or defensively refusing to comply with an officer's verbal commands or physical control techniques that does not involve the use of any physical force, control, or resistance of any kind.
 - d. Active Resistance or Aggression – Subject is attempting to interfere with the officer's actions by inflicting pain or physical injury to the officer without the use of a weapon or object.
 - e. Assault or Threat of Assault – Subject assumes a fighting stance, charges an officer or verbally or physically indicates an intent to commit an assault.
 - f. Life- Threatening Assault or Assault Likely to Cause Great Bodily Harm – Subject commits an attack using an object, a weapon, or an empty hand assault, wherein the officer reasonably believes that the assault will result in serious physical injury and/or death.

C. Officer Response Options

Officers are trained in the application and use of various force tactics. Force options depend on the nature and type of resistance encountered. Only weapons and ammunition authorized by the Chief of Police may be used by agency personnel in the performance of their responsibilities.

1. Professional Presence, Verbalization, and Restraining and Detaining – includes the display of authority as a peace officer and such non-verbal means of communication as body language, demeanor, and manner of approaching. Verbalization involves the directions and commands given to the subject. Restraining and detaining includes an officer laying hands

on a subject with the intention of gaining control. Examples include the use of firm grip, escort position, or grappling types of techniques designed to hold a subject down by using the weight of an officer's body. Also included in this level would be the application of temporary devices such as handcuffs and leg restraints (NOTE: the hobble restraint is prohibited by this department).

2. Compliance Techniques – includes joint manipulations, pressure point applications, and tie-down type techniques in control type configurations.
3. Non-Deadly Intermediate Force Options – includes chemical agents such as oleoresin capsicum base products and the use of impact weapons such as batons, 40 mm launcher, TASER, K9, and hands, feet, elbows, and knees to strike subject (NOTE: lateral vascular or other neck restraints are NOT authorized by this department).
4. Deadly Force Options – includes the use of a firearm or any force which has a reasonable likelihood of causing death or serious harm.

D. Non-Deadly Intermediate Force Options

Non-Deadly Intermediate force options include the following authorized weapons:

1. Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray – A chemical agent that is used for the temporary disabling of violent or otherwise resisting subjects. OC shall not be used when taking non-violent, non-responsive, or uncooperative persons into custody. OC is used to incapacitate those who violently resist or attack members of the Department or others. Only OC issued by the department may be utilized by officers.
2. Patrol Baton – The department-issued 26” collapsible ASP baton may be used whenever an officer is faced with a situation in which he/she must use reasonable force to incapacitate those who violently resist or attack members of the Department or others. The ASP baton shall not be used when taking non-violent, non-responsive, or uncooperative persons into custody; and is not approved for use as a compliance technique in control-type configurations.
3. Crowd Control Baton – Thirty-six inch (36”) crowd control batons are available for officer use and shall only be issued during crowd management situations as authorized by the Chief of Police or her/his designee. Officers must be trained on the care and use of the crowd control baton prior to its issuance as specified within the Department approved “Crowd Management” policy and lesson plan.
4. Safariland Single Shot 40mm Launcher – The Safariland 40 mm launcher is a single shot, weapon with specific direct impact ammunition to be used in situations when the suspect(s) are aggressively resisting police and/or threatening life and where a non-deadly intermediate force option can be reasonably deployed. The weapon can deploy impact rounds, marking rounds and OC rounds and requires shift supervisor approval for deployment and use. During protest and demonstration

situations (or other “crowd” events), only the Incident Commander shall determine deployment and use.

5. TASER – The TASER X26P is a conducted electrical weapon (CEW) that uses electricity to override voluntary motor responses, or apply pain in order to overcome resistance. The department authorized TASER is to be equipped with the department issued auto shut-down performance power magazine (APPM). The APPM is a modified TASER CEW battery which automatically shuts down the high voltage output of the CEW after a five (5) second cycle.

Use Requirements of the TASER CEW:

- The CEW is to be used to restrain violent individuals where alternative restrain tactics fail or are reasonably likely to fail and/or where it would be unsafe for officers to approach a subject to apply restraints. It is not intended to be a substitute for other non-deadly intermediate force options unless it would otherwise endanger the safety of officers or when it is not practicable due to the circumstances.
- When feasible, officers should verbally warn the suspect before discharging the CEW.
- The CEW is to be aimed at the subject, fired, and cycled in a manner consistent with and as outlined in training.
- Upon activating the CEW against a person, the officer shall energize the subject no longer than objectively reasonable to overcome active/aggressive resistance and bring the subject under control. The department issued CEW is set to disperse a full 5 second cycle, after which the officer shall evaluate the need to apply a second cycle. In determining the need for additional energy cycles, officers should be aware that an energized subject may not be able to respond to commands during or immediately following exposure. Each subsequent five (5) second cycle requires clear justification as to the reason(s) deployment of the CEW was needed. The officer should consider certain factors before additional applications of the CEW are given:
 - Whether the probes are making proper contact;
 - Whether the individual has the ability and has been given a reasonable opportunity to comply;
 - And whether verbal commands, other options or tactics may be more effective.
- If the subject does not respond to the CEW deployment in the anticipated control manner based on training and experience, officers shall consider transitioning to alternative resistance

control measures. Applied CEW cycles shall not normally exceed three (3). To minimize the number of cycles needed to overcome resistance and bring the subject under control, the subject should be secured as soon as practical while affected by the CEW power or immediately thereafter.

- The use of two or more CEWs simultaneously on the same subject should be avoided unless circumstances dictate the need. The use of the CEW “drive stun” mode should be used primarily to supplement the probe mode to complete the conductive circuit. The “drive stun” requires the same level of justification as a probe deployment.
- The CEW may be deployed to deal with a potentially dangerous animal, such as a dog, if the animal reasonably appears to pose an imminent threat to human safety and alternative methods are not reasonably available or would likely be ineffective.

The CEW shall not be used:

- On those who passively resist as defined in this policy.
- When facing persons who are not an imminent threat to the public or police officers.
- On a person who is complying with an officer’s commands.
- On a handcuffed or secured prisoner, absent overtly assaultive, self-destructive, or violently resistive behavior that cannot reasonably be controlled by other readily available means.
- In any environment where an officer reasonably believes that a flammable, volatile, or explosive material is present, including but not limited to OC spray with volatile propellant, gasoline, natural gas, or propane.
- When it is reasonable to believe that incapacitation of the subject may result in serious injury or death (i.e., subject may fall resulting in death or serious physical injury) and the circumstances presented do not justify that risk.
- When the officer cannot for safety or other reasons approach the subject to within the effective range of the CEW.
- During a demonstration or other lawful protest where the subject is only offering passive resistance.
- In the proximity of a deployed police K-9 unit.

Additional policy and procedural directives involving the deployment and use of CEWs, see remaining policy sections below and those within department policy #08-L.E.-012 - Deployment Use and Storage of Deadly and Non-Deadly Intermediate Force Weapons.

E. Deadly Force Options

Deadly force options include the following authorized lethal weapons:

1. Department issued firearm – Glock Models 22 and 27, .40 caliber loaded with .40 Smith and Wesson 180 grain hollow point department issued ammunition.
2. Department issued AR-15 style rifle loaded with .223 caliber Remington or 5.56 mm NATO, 64 grain soft point ammunition or other approved law enforcement type ammunition as ordered through the state contract. The department issued 30-round magazines shall be loaded with no more than 28 rounds so as not to damage the internal magazine coil springs.
3. Remington Model 870 12 gauge shotgun with 12 gauge, segmenting slug ammunition.
4. Authorized secondary weapons – an additional weapon is authorized to be carried as a secondary or backup weapon while on duty provided it has been authorized by the Chief of Police, inspected and approved by the department armorer/rangemaster and the officer has qualified with the approved weapon on the range. Officers wishing to carry an additional weapon must complete the Off-Duty/Secondary Weapon request form (see appendix of this policy). This approval process also requires a DOJ firearm registration check. Only one weapon will be approved for use as a secondary weapon.

Authorized secondary weapons must be double action or “safe action”, regardless of whether they are revolver or self-loading and all must have a capacity of at least five (5) rounds. Secondary firearms will be limited to the following: 9mm, 10mm, .38, .380, .357, .40, or .45 calibers.

5. Authorized off-duty weapons – officers have a legal right to carry firearms in an off-duty capacity. Officers who choose to carry firearms off-duty must do so in accordance with standards and procedures established by the Chief of Police. Officers may carry their on-duty weapon (Glock models 22 or 27) while off duty. Any officer who wishes to carry any other weapon while off duty must complete the Off-Duty/Secondary Weapon request form as listed in item 4 above. All of the same requirements that apply to secondary weapons also apply to off-duty weapons. No more than two firearms will be approved for off-duty use.

Carrying or using a firearm while under the influence of alcohol is prohibited.

6. All firearms carried by police officers on-duty and/or off-duty will be subject to a review, inspection, and approval by a certified department range master or armorer prior to use. A documented annual safety inspection of all authorized weapons (for both on and off-duty use) will also be conducted by a certified department rangemaster or armorer. Periodic inspections for serviceability may be conducted by a police supervisor. The Department armorer is responsible for all Department handgun, shotgun, rifle and other firearms repairs. Those repairs which cannot be serviced by the armorer will be sent out by the armorer to a

competent firearms repair vendor. Individual officers are responsible for repairs to their personally owned weapons.

7. The Department range master is responsible for ensuring that all department records and inventories on each weapon and ammunition authorized and approved by the Chief of Police for official use for this Department are properly completed and provided to the records unit for storage. This also includes those records relating to off-duty and secondary weapons.
8. Specialized Firearms – Officers assigned to the system-wide Critical Response Unit (CRU) receive specific training in the use of specialized firearms and may be required to deploy such weapons while in the performance of their duties. While using alternative/special firearms, those officers assigned to CRU will fall under the policy and procedures for the CRU team. However, anytime an officer from California State University, Northridge is involved with a use of force incident connected to the Critical Response Unit, they shall follow the procedures outlined in this directive for reporting the incident. This action will ensure that a constant record of force used by an individual officer is reviewed by this department.

F. Medical Aid after Use of Deadly or Non-Deadly Intermediate Force Weapons

Medical assistance shall be immediately obtained for any person(s) who has sustained visible injury, expressed a complaint of pain, or who has been rendered unconscious. Officers shall closely monitor the subject until arrival of paramedics.

Upon deployment and use of a CEW on a person, even when no complaint of pain or visible injury exists, an immediate request for medical response shall be made by the officer. CEW probes will be removed from the subject by officers unless removal of the probes poses a potential for serious bodily injury to the subject. The CEW probes once removed shall be treated as a biohazard risk and handled accordingly. CEW probes, wires, cartridge aphids, and related components are considered evidence and shall be protected and handled in accordance to department evidence collection, handling, and storage policies. Should the paramedics clear the subject upon evaluation, the officer may then transport the subject directly to the nearest LAPD or LASD medical prisoner intake center. The following persons however, should be transported to an emergency medical facility for treatment after exposure to a CEW:

- In cases where a subject was exposed to multiple CEW cycles;
- Subjects who are hit in a sensitive area (face, head, female breasts, genitals);
- Subjects who do not appear to be fully recovered within 10 minutes after being hit;
- And subjects who are in a potentially susceptible population category, such as those previously noted.

Photographs will be taken to document any injuries involving use of non-deadly intermediate force weapons to include the contact area(s) where CEW probes penetrated the flesh. All injuries shall be detailed in the written incident report (RIMS) as well as the Use of Force Report (see appendix of this policy).

G. Use of Deadly Force (Lethal Force)

Police officers may use deadly force only in the following circumstances:

1. When the police officer reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life, including the officer's own life, or in defense of any person in immediate danger of serious physical injury or death.
2. To protect the police officer or others from what is reasonably believed to be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm.
3. To prevent the escape of a fleeing felon whom the officer has probable cause to believe will pose an imminent threat to human life should escape occur.
4. "Greater Danger" theory. Firearms will not be discharged, nor other deadly force used, when it appears likely that an innocent person might be injured, unless the probability exists that a greater danger is posed by the suspect's continued actions toward the officer or other persons.

H. Display and Use of Firearms

Sworn officers will carry only firearms and ammunition authorized by the Department for duty use and are prohibited from carrying more than one handgun unless they are authorized by the department for one (1) backup handgun. The Department armorer or range master will inspect all firearms before they are issued to ensure they are functioning properly. The Department has a number of loading/unloading stations, including those located within the men's and women's locker rooms near the pistol lockers and the briefing room. All officers are required to load/unload their duty firearms and personal firearms in one of these stations, unless exigent circumstances exist.

Before using a firearm, police officers will, when feasible, identify themselves.

Police officers are authorized to display and use firearms:

1. When deadly force is authorized;
2. When an officer reasonably believes they might encounter a deadly force situation;
3. During range practice, competitive shooting, or recreational use;
4. To destroy an animal that represents a threat to the public safety, or as a humanitarian measure where the animal appears to be seriously injured. In this situation, officers must first obtain supervisory authorization and

ensure there is no risk to the public. Whenever possible, the animal control officer for the city should be contacted first to deal with the situation.

I. Restrictions When a Firearm is Exhibited

1. Except for maintenance or during training, police officers will not draw or exhibit their firearm unless circumstances create a reasonable belief that use of the firearm may be needed in conformance with this policy;
2. Warning shots are prohibited;
3. Police officers will not discharge a firearm from/at a moving vehicle unless a greater imminent danger to the officer or other person(s) is posed by the officer not discharging their firearm.

J. Weapons Training

The Department schedules annual training and qualification sessions for duty, off-duty, specialized firearms, and all non-deadly intermediate force weapons; and requires all sworn personnel to demonstrate proficiency in their care and use. Additionally, the department use of force policy and procedures will be reviewed annually. This requirement also applies to officers prior to the issuance of and authorization to carry any weapon. The Department's training coordinator is responsible for ensuring that this requirement is prepared, implemented and documented annually. All weapons proficiency training and qualification sessions will be provided and documented by a certified weapons instructor. TASER CEW instructors must be recertified biennially upon initial certification.

The Chief of Police, range master, training coordinator, and command staff will meet and review the use of force and firearms, and non-deadly intermediate force weapons training curriculum on an annual basis. In general, the Department will exceed the frequency of training on an annual basis; however, the Chief of Police will determine the frequency of proficiency requirements during the annual review process (normally in November of each year). The training coordinator, under the supervision of the range master, will be responsible for ensuring this review is scheduled at the beginning of each calendar year and will be responsible for issuing a training directive each year summarizing the upcoming year's firearms range procedures and attendance requirements. The Chief of Police, range master and range master's commanding officer will approve the final version of the annual firearms training proficiency course prior to issuance of the training directive.

Police officers who fail to qualify with their duty firearm(s) in accordance with Department procedures are subject to being relieved of their police authority by the Chief of Police until such time as remedial training measures are provided and the officer demonstrates proficiency with the weapon.

If an officer fails to demonstrate proficiency after remediation, and the range master indicates that proficiency will not be demonstrated, this will be grounds for termination of employment.

Sworn officers are not permitted to carry or use under law enforcement authority any firearm with which the police officer has not qualified during their most recent qualification period. Officers authorized to carry off-duty (personal firearms) and secondary firearms must qualify on the range on an annual basis with the authorized weapon and shall do so at the officer's own expense (for ammunition).

V. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

This section outlines the documentation and reporting of use of force, including use of force actions when an officer is assigned either through mutual aid or an agreement between Chiefs of Police (this includes actions involving officers assigned to the CSU CRU team).

A. A RIMS report and Use of Force report (see appendix) shall be submitted whenever an officer:

1. discharges a firearm, for other than training or recreational purposes;
2. takes an action that results in, or is alleged to have resulted in, injury or death of another person;
3. applies force through the use of deadly and/or non-deadly intermediate force weapons; or
4. applies weaponless physical force at a level as defined in the Use of Force Report, Sections "Level of Resistance" and "Police Force Used".
5. removes a firearm from the holster and points same at a human being (Use of Force Report – Use Level of Resistance – "Other")

In officer-involved shooting situations it is the responsibility of the shift supervisor to complete all required reports. If necessary, the supervisor may administratively order any officer from this department to immediately provide public safety information necessary to secure the scene and pursue suspects. Public safety information includes outstanding suspect information, number and direction of shots fired, parameters of the incident scene, identity of known witnesses and similar information.

Absent a voluntary statement from any officer(s), the initial on scene supervisor should not attempt to order any officer to provide other than public safety information.

In CEW use situations, including accidental discharge, the following information shall be articulated in a supplemental use-of-force narrative within the related RIMS report:

- The circumstances that necessitated the discharge. This should include the facts that support the officers' conclusion that the use of force was justified and necessary.
- The identity of the subject, all officers involved, and any known witnesses.
- The make, model, and serial number of the TASER CEW unit used.

Note: The department-issued CEWs are computer controlled and have the capacity of downloading operational data. They provide data that addresses date and time, duration, temperature, and battery status of all deployments. This information is invaluable in the administrative use of force investigation and claims of improper or excessive use of force involving the device. Following use of the CEW, the device will be secured by the shift supervisor who will download the unit's data into the designated CEW laptop computer.

- The range at which the unit was employed. A photograph of the officer's location and that of the suspect at the time of the CEW incident shall be included in the report.
 - The point(s) of impact on the subject. Photographs of the probes' impact location and a hand drawn picture of the person's body showing location of the probes' impact shall be included in the report.
 - Total number of 5-second cycles the subject was energized. No more than 3 cycles should normally be applied to the subject and a specific justification for each separate application/cycle is required.
 - The type of clothing the probes encountered.
 - The type of cartridge used.
 - The type of discharge (probe, contact, or cartridge on contact).
 - Officer's evaluation/opinion of the effectiveness of the device.
 - After-discharge actions taken by the officers. (i.e., restraints used, medical attention provided, etc.)
 - Any injuries observed or reported as a result of using the device. Photos of all injuries shall be taken and included in the report.
 - Specific facts and circumstances involving the "required" use of the CEW in the following manner:
 - In the "contact" mode, if applicable;
 - More than one CEW was used against the subject, if applicable;
 - More than 3 cycles applied to the subject, if applicable;
 - Used on an individual in a sensitive population group ((i.e., women who are pregnant, persons with pacemakers, those suffering debilitating illnesses, persons who are very old or very young, and persons of very small stature irrespective of age), if applicable.
- B. Officers utilizing force to subdue a subject or discharging a weapon will immediately, as soon as the situation is stabilized, notify their shift supervisor.
- C. The shift supervisor will respond to the location of the incident and conduct a preliminary investigation, after ensuring that those in need of medical attention receive it. The investigation will include:
1. assessment of the incident;
 2. collection of evidence

(CEW specific - when the CEW has been used operationally, the shift supervisor shall collect the CEW, CEW cartridge, wire leads, probes/darts, and three (3) AFIDs containing the cartridge serial number,

securing them all in a single paper bag with the probes being placed in two separate bio-hazard containers and in accordance with evidence packaging and control requirements. If the probes were in contact with a person, then the evidence bag should have "Bio-Hazard" written on the front of it. The wires are not to be wrapped around the cartridge. The CEW data storage shall be downloaded onto the department's designated CEW (i.e., TASER) laptop computer by the shift supervisor as soon as reasonably possible but no later than prior to the end of the shift. Once the CEW data has been downloaded, the unit may be inspected and redeployed for service as stated within department policy.);

3. witness identification;
4. photographing of injuries and general scene; and may include the use of department resources, such as Criminal Investigation personnel to assist.

The shift supervisor will ensure that the Use of Force report form is completed by all officers using force as defined within this policy and approve said report(s) prior to the end of watch on the date of occurrence. The Captain of Patrol Operations or his/her designee in his/her absence shall be notified as soon as possible of all firearm and non-deadly intermediate force option incidents (including accidental discharge) and incidents involving injuries or a death. The Captain or his/her designee in his/her absence is responsible for immediately notifying the Chief of Police.

D. RIMS Reporting for Use of Force Incidents

1. No Injury or Non-serious physical injury incidents

Officers involved in a use of force incident where no physical injury or a physical injury deemed non-serious in nature occurred (i.e., any physical injury outside the definition of "serious physical injury") is not considered a "critical incident" as defined within this policy. In as such, officers shall complete and have supervisory approval for their "Use of Force Report" form (attachment C) and RIMS report narrative (i.e., preliminary investigation) prior to the end of watch.

Note: This section (i.e., D.1) does not apply to officer-involved shooting incidents in that LAPD will manage the criminal investigation phase while a member of the department's command staff will manage the administrative investigation phase. (See Section E.4)

2. Serious physical injury incidents

Use of force incidents which result in a "serious physical injury" are considered "critical incidents" as defined within this policy. In such situations, the Captain of Patrol Operations or their designee in their absence shall be notified by the shift supervisor immediately. The Captain or their designee shall immediately notify the Chief of Police. Officers using force that fall within this category shall not complete a RIMS report of the crime/incident and subsequent use of force nor the "Use of Force Report"

form (attachment C). The “Use of Force Report” shall be completed by the shift supervisor prior to their end of watch.

The crime/incident and subsequent use of force however shall be investigated and documented by department investigators and/or LAPD as identified within this policy (See Section E.4). If no department investigators are available for response, then the shift supervisor will assign the most senior patrol officer to complete the preliminary investigation. Department investigator(s) or patrol officer(s) assigned to such incidents shall complete the investigation in accordance with department policies 07-O.A.-007 – Field Reporting and Management; 07-C.I.-004 – Crime Scene Processing and the Collection and Preservation of Evidence; 07-C.I.-005 – Criminal Investigation; and all others that may apply given the nature of the incident being investigated.

Assigned investigator(s) or patrol officer(s) in critical use of force incidents shall also collect and document specific information related to the following using a supplemental use-of-force investigatory RIMS narrative within the RIMS case report:

- Conduct and behavior of the subject being confronted as perceived by the officer at the time of the incident.
- The relative age, size, relative strength, and physical ability of the officer to the subject.
- Special skill level, knowledge, and experience of the officer.
- Injury or exhaustion of officer/suspect.
- Prior contacts with subject.
- The number of officers present versus suspects.
- Mental illness and/or potential influence of alcohol and drugs.
- Subject’s proximity to weapons.
- Weapons used or threatened to be used by the subject.
- Force options available to the officer.
- Seriousness of the offense, basis for subject contact, and information known about the subject by the officer.
- Potential for injury to the public, officer, or subject.
- Risk of escape.
- Degree of subject resistance.
- Use of restraints.
- Environmental factors.
- Other exigent circumstances.

When interviewing officers involved in such situations, investigators/officers shall be cognizant of the symptoms involving post-traumatic stress, such as time and space distortions, confusion, hearing and visual distortions associated with recalling details of the incident, as well as emotional impairment during questioning. In situations where such symptoms are observed, the investigator shall contact the Captain of Patrol Operations or their designee in their absence to discuss what information is crucial for the officer to provide verbally prior to being released from duty (i.e., end of

watch) and what information can be obtained from follow-up interviews within 48 hours after the incident.

Note: This section (i.e., D.2) does not apply to officer-involved shooting incidents in that LAPD will manage the criminal investigation phase while a member of the department's command staff will manage the administrative investigation phase. (See Section E.4)

E. Review of Use of Force Incidents

1. All reported uses of force will be reviewed by the Patrol Operations Captain to determine if:
 - a. department rules, policy or procedures were violated;
 - b. the relevant policy was clearly understandable and effective to cover the situation;
 - c. department training is currently adequate.
2. All findings of policy violations or training inadequacies will be reported to the Chief of Police for resolution and/or discipline via a written investigative report. The report shall be completed and submitted by a commanding officer within ten (10) days of the incident.
3. On an annual basis, the Chief of Police will designate a Command Staff officer to conduct a written, documented analysis of all use of force reports to determine patterns or trends that could indicate training needs, equipment upgrades, and/or policy modifications. The assigned command staff member shall also download the electronic data from all agency TASER Units. The data obtained will be reconciled with existing use-of-force reports to ensure accountability between the cycles recorded, and those documented in such reports and occurring in pre-shift testing. The Command Staff officer may be assisted in this analysis by any police supervisory staff they deem appropriate (i.e. range master, Non-Deadly Intermediate Force options instructor, etc.).
4. The Los Angeles Police Department, by virtue of agreement with the California State University, Northridge Police Department (05-O.A.-004 Memorandums of Agreement: LAPD and LASD, p. 2, Section 5 c. of the LAPD MOA section) shall be responsible for investigating any officer involved shootings or an in-custody death to determine whether any violation of criminal law may have occurred. This includes:
 - a. An officer, on or off duty, shoots and injures any person during the scope and course of employment.
 - b. An individual dies while in the custody or control of an officer or the department where the use of force may be a proximate cause of death.

F. Removal from Line Duty Assignment in Use of Force Incident

1. An officer involved in a use of force incident resulting in a death or serious physical injury shall be removed from line duty assignment, pending administrative review.
2. Where an officer's use of force involves a death, the officer shall be placed on administrative leave after completing all internal investigative requirements, until it is determined by the Chief of Police (after fitness for duty evaluation) that the officer is ready to return to duty.
3. The department will conduct both an administrative and criminal investigation of any use of force incident that involves a death or serious physical injury. (See Section E.4 above)

G. Request for Permission to Bring or Possess a Firearm on Campus

Penal Code 626.9 requires the written permission of the university or college President (or designee which is the CSUN Chief of Police) in order to bring or possess a firearm on campus (buildings or grounds). All such requests require the completion of the "Request for Permission to Bring or Possess a Firearm on Campus" form (see appendix) by the person requesting permission. The completed form is routed to the Chief of Police for review and further action if necessary (i.e. inspection of weapons used for movie sets by range master, etc.) The Chief of Police will determine whether or not permission will be granted after the review process.

VI. APPENDICES

- A. Use of Force Continuum – The Levels of Force: What & When
- B. Off Duty and Secondary Firearm Approval
- C. Use of Force Report
- D. Request for Permission to Bring or Possess a Firearm on Campus

USE OF FORCE CONTINNUM

"The levels of force: what & when"

Deadly Force (High)

- Any Method of Force Used which has Substantial Risk of Serious Physical Injury/Death
- Force used must be Objectively Reasonable
- Force used in the prevention of serious physical injury or death to another/fleeing felon. Probable Cause must exist to believe subject is a violent felon coupled with an imminent threat of harm/death to another.

Non-Deadly Intermediate Force (Moderate)

- Types of force include OC, CEW (probe deployment and/or drive stun), Impact Weapons, K9
- Force used must be Objectively Reasonable
- Effect Arrest, Overcome Resistance, Prevent Escape (PC 835a) - Plus Must have "Active Resistance" **AND** "Threat of Harm"

Non-Deadly (Low)

- Presence, Verbal, Empty Hand
- Force used must be Objectively Reasonable - "in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officer without regard to the underlying intent or motivation – Graham v. Connor (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1989)"
- Effect Arrest, Overcome Resistance, Prevent Escape (PC 835a)

Appendix "B"



**CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE
POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Off Duty and Secondary Firearm Approval

Please fill out the following information and return to Sergeant Jim Stotler's mailbox

DATE OF SUBMISSION: _____

NAME (PRINT): _____

Is this approval for:

☐ Off-Duty

☐ Secondary

☐ Both

Firearm Information:

Manufacturer: _____ Model: _____

Caliber: _____ Serial Number: _____

Type of Firearm (i.e. revolver, etc.): _____

Color: _____ Barrel Length: _____

I am requesting the approval of the above firearm for off-duty and/or secondary use. I have read the policy manual governing off-duty and secondary firearms. I have submitted this firearm to the department armorer for inspection. This firearm is registered to me and I have attached a copy of the DOJ print-out showing the firearm registration. I am also familiar with the use of this firearm and/or have received instruction from the department firearms instructor. I understand that the care, safe handling, and storage of this firearm is solely my responsibility.

Respectfully submitted,

Signature

Armorer Inspection (Signature)

APPROVED:

☐ YES

Chief's Signature: _____

Date

☐ NO

Reason for Denial: _____

cc: Submitting Officer, Rangemasters, Chief's File

01/2010

NOTE:

*Attach DOJ printout
showing firearm registration*

Appendix "C"

USE OF FORCE REPORT**UNIVERSITY POLICE
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE**

RIMS Case Number	SUSPECT	Name (Last, First, M.I.)			
Date of Incident		DOB	Age	Sex	Race
Time of Incident		Suspect appeared to be under the influence of <input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol <input type="checkbox"/> Narcotics <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing Apparent			
Classification of Incident		Location of Incident			

LEVEL OF RESISTANCE (may <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> more than one) <input type="checkbox"/> Unarmed suspect resisted control, had to be physically handled with minimal force, no blows were struck, all parties remained standing. <input type="checkbox"/> Plus - at least one more officer was needed for assistance. <input type="checkbox"/> Unarmed suspect resisted control, officer or suspect fell to the ground or blows were struck, NO police weapons were used. <input type="checkbox"/> Plus - at least one more officer was needed for assistance. <input type="checkbox"/> Unarmed suspect resisted control, police weapon(s) used. <input type="checkbox"/> Plus - at least one more officer was needed for assistance. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a club or similar weapon and threatened or attacked officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a knife or similar weapon and threatened or attacked officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a firearm threatened officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Suspect armed with a firearm shot at officer. <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	PURSUIT REPORT - See section V, pg. 7-8 of Vehicle Pursuit policy regarding reports Length of time of the pursuit: _____ Distance Traveled: _____ Involved Officers: _____ Initial Reason for Pursuit: _____ Starting point: _____ Ending point: _____ Disposition [arrest/citation/etc.] _____ Other Jurisdictions involved/assisted: _____ Property damage: _____	Charge(s) Resulting from Suspect's Resistance <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If Yes, list pending charge(s) _____ _____ Location of Incident <input type="checkbox"/> On Campus <input type="checkbox"/> Off Campus <input type="checkbox"/> Parking Lot <input type="checkbox"/> Roadway <input type="checkbox"/> Inside a Building <input type="checkbox"/> Inside PD Temporary Holding Facility <input type="checkbox"/> Other
--	--	--


Police Force Used (may <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> more than one) <input type="checkbox"/> Fists / Hands / Feet <input type="checkbox"/> OC Spray <input type="checkbox"/> Baton / ASP <input type="checkbox"/> Service Weapon pointed at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> Service Weapon fired at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> AR 15 pointed at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> AR 15 fired at suspect <input type="checkbox"/> TASER X26P <input type="checkbox"/> 40mm Launcher <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	Effect of Force / Resistance on Suspect / Police <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Suspect</th> <th>Police</th> <th>Observations</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>No visible injury; no complaint of pain.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>No visible injury; complaint of minor pain; no medical treatment required.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Minor visible injury (redness, swelling, abrasion); no medical treatment required.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Injury requiring outpatient medical treatment (stitches, x-rays, doctor's exam).</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Injury requiring hospitalization.</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td><input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>Death</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Suspect	Police	Observations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; no complaint of pain.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; complaint of minor pain; no medical treatment required.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Minor visible injury (redness, swelling, abrasion); no medical treatment required.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring outpatient medical treatment (stitches, x-rays, doctor's exam).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring hospitalization.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Death	Witnessing Officer(s) _____ Unit # _____ Shift Supervisor: Do the actions of the officer involved in the incident indicate a need for additional training? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If yes, provide additional written memorandum with specifics.
Suspect	Police	Observations																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; no complaint of pain.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No visible injury; complaint of minor pain; no medical treatment required.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Minor visible injury (redness, swelling, abrasion); no medical treatment required.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring outpatient medical treatment (stitches, x-rays, doctor's exam).																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Injury requiring hospitalization.																					
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Death																					
Involved Officer	ID #	Date of Report	Supervisor	ID #	Date																		

Command Level Review (Signature)	Date Reviewed	Finding: <input type="checkbox"/> Level of force/actions taken within departmental guidelines <input type="checkbox"/> Assigned for follow-up internal investigation
----------------------------------	---------------	--

USE OF FORCE REPORT - Page 2

UNIVERSITY POLICE
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

C.E.W. Incident Specific

APPLICATION <input type="checkbox"/> Display ONLY <input type="checkbox"/> Display & Laser <input type="checkbox"/> Display, Laser, & Arc <input type="checkbox"/> Drive-Stun <input type="checkbox"/> Probes	CYCLES <input type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____	CYCLE DURATION <input type="checkbox"/> 5 SECONDS <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____ <hr/> DURATION BETWEEN CYCLES
RANGE (Feet) <input type="checkbox"/> 0' – 5' <input type="checkbox"/> 6' – 10' <input type="checkbox"/> 11' – 15' <input type="checkbox"/> 16' – 21'	MISSED PROBES? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF YES, DESCRIBE LOCATION: _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	
EFFECTIVE? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF NOT, WHY? <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Heavy Clothing <input type="checkbox"/> Close Probe Strikes <input type="checkbox"/> Low Muscle Mass </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> Subject Moved <input type="checkbox"/> Missed <input type="checkbox"/> Malfunction </div> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> One Probe <input type="checkbox"/> Other : _____ _____ </div> </div>		
DID PROBES PENETRATE SKIN? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO IF YES, REMOVED BY: _____		
CHECKED BY MEDICAL <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> Suspect <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO </div> <div> Officer <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO </div> </div> MEDICAL CLEARANCE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO HOSPITAL / RA Unit: _____	<input type="checkbox"/> NO PHYSICAL FORCE USED <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; margin-top: 10px;"> <div> A – Drive Stun B – Probes C – Baton </div> <div> D – OC Spray E – Impact Munition F – Other _____ </div> </div>	

Note: Diagram to be completed for all Use of Force Incidents

Appendix "D" – Page 1



California State University, Northridge
Department of Police Services

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO BRING OR POSSESS A FIREARM ON CAMPUS

Individuals requesting permission to bring or possess a firearm upon the grounds or in the buildings of CSUN must complete the following information. This form will be reviewed by the Chief of Police and a follow-up interview may follow. The Chief of Police will determine whether or not permission will be granted after completion of this review process.

COMPLETED BY APPLICANT:			
First Name:	M.I.:	Last Name:	Today's Date:
<input type="checkbox"/> Student <input type="checkbox"/> Staff <input type="checkbox"/> Faculty			
If none of the above, state relationship to CSUN: _____			
Student or Employee ID#		Drivers License #	State:
Do you currently have a concealed weapons permit? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <i>* If yes, please attach a copy of your permit with this form</i>			
Address:			
Number & Street: _____			
City: _____		State: _____	Zip: _____
Campus Telephone # (If applicable):		Alternate Telephone #:	
Ext. _____		() _____	
Employer Information:			
Name of Employer: _____			
Number & Street: _____			
City: _____		State: _____	Zip: _____
Supervisor's Name: _____		Supervisor's Telephone #: () _____	
PERMISSION REQUEST:			
Reason for request:			

What are the date(s) and time(s) you are seeking permission to bring or possess a firearm on campus?			

Signature of person making request: _____			
COMPLETED BY DEPARTMENT RANGEMASTER AND/OR ARMORER:			
Name of Owner of firearm: _____		Is the firearm registered? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Type of firearm: _____		Serial #: _____	
Make: _____	Model: _____	Country of Manufacture: _____	
Frame No.: _____	Finish (describe): _____		

Continued on reverse

Appendix "D" – Page 2

Type: _____	Caliber: _____	
Date of Review: _____	Reviewed By: _____	Recommend: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Comments:		

COMPLETED BY POLICE ADMINISTRATION ONLY:		
Permission Granted?: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		
Special Requirements/Comments: _____		

Signature of Chief of Police: _____		Date: _____

COPIES: Copy to be forwarded to Rangemaster reviewing weapon and Captain Fernandez for distribution

G



CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY NORTHRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

To: Anne P. Glavin
Chief of Police

From: Scott G. VanScoy
Captain – Special Services

Date: June 3, 2016
Phone: (818) 677-2764
FAX: (818) 677-5816
EMAIL: scott.g.vanscoy@csun.edu
Mail Code: 8282

Subject: Request for Extension of IA Investigation (2016-I.A.-03)

This is a request for approval to extend the 30-day investigation of IA investigation 2016-I.A.-03 to June 13, 2016. The investigation was received on May 3, 2016, however it took me the entire 30 days to schedule all the subject officers and student/staff witnesses for an investigatory interview due to a variety of scheduling issues. The subject officer and applicable witnesses have been interviewed and now I'm in the process of documenting the interviews and evidence collected. It is expected the documentation part of the process will be completed by close of business June 13, 2016 with no additional time needed.

☒ ~~Granted~~
☐ Denied

AP Glavin 6/9/16

Chief of Police/Designee Signature of Approval

H


VanScoy, Scott G

From: cpoa@cpoa.org <cpoa@www-cpoa.ccsend.com> on behalf of cpoa@cpoa.org
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 9:46 AM
To: VanScoy, Scott G
Subject: CPOA Client Alerts - Attorney General States Agencies Can Notify D.A. of Names of Officers Who "May" Have Brady Material in Their Files

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CPOA CLIENT ALERT



October 19, 2015

Attorney General States Agencies Can Notify D.A. of Names of Officers Who "May" Have Brady Material in Their Files


On October 13, 2015, the California Attorney General (AG) issued a published opinion, No. 12-401, which states that "Penal Code Section 832.7(a), does not authorize a District Attorney (DA), for the purpose of complying with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in *Brady v. Maryland*, to directly review the personnel files of peace officers who will or are expected to be prosecution witnesses."




However, the Opinion also states that "To facilitate compliance with *Brady v. Maryland*, [a law enforcement agency] may lawfully release to the DA's office the names of officers against whom findings of dishonesty, moral turpitude, or bias have been sustained, and the dates of the earliest such conduct."

Analysis

Although the Opinion addresses whether the California Highway Patrol can provide such information, it applies to all law enforcement agencies. The issue arose when Greg Totten, the DA of Ventura County and the California District Attorneys' Association (CDAA) proposed a policy to facilitate compliance with the prosecutor's *Brady* obligations when an officer of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) is expected to testify as a witness. Since the CHP operates in all 58 counties, and there are 58 individual

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Written by: Martin J. Mayer, Esq. with the firm of Jones & Mayer.

The firm is located in Fullerton, California, and is a public sector law firm which focuses its attention on representing the interests of law enforcement in cities and counties throughout the State of California.

JONES & MAYER
3777 North Harbor Blvd.
Fullerton, CA 92835
P: 714.446.1400
F: 714.446.1448
Website: www.jones-mayer.com

DA's, the CDAA wanted to establish a uniform policy which could be utilized in all of those counties.

"The proposed policy calls for CHP to provide to the DA a list of names of officers who have sustained findings of misconduct against them that reflect moral turpitude, untruthfulness, or bias within the preceding five years (a "Brady list"). The CHP argues that the proposed policy is invalid under Penal Code Section 832.7(a), which provides that peace officer personnel records are confidential and may not be disclosed without a court order."

The AG notes that since these two questions were presented to her office for an opinion, three years ago, "the California Supreme Court issued an opinion in *People v. Superior Court (Johnson)*, which squarely considered and decided our first question. There, the Court held that 'the prosecution does not have unfettered access to confidential personnel records of police officers who are potential witnesses in criminal cases. Rather, it must follow the same procedures that apply to criminal defendants, i.e., make a Pitchess motion, in order to seek information in those records.'"

But, as to the second question, the Supreme Court praised the policy which existed between the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) and the San Francisco District Attorney which involved SFPD notifying the DA of potential Brady material in an officer's file.

The AG states, "We believe the Supreme Court's approval of the policy was logically necessary to its decision, and we therefore regard the *Johnson* decision as good authority for the proposition that such a policy is legally valid. We now explicitly find that Penal Code Section 832.7(a) does not preclude CHP from providing Brady list information to a DA for purposes of facilitating *Brady* compliance."

[For details on the *Johnson* decision, see Jones & Mayer Client Alert Memo dated July 10, 2015-Vol. 30 No. 17, "The District Attorney Must Serve A Pitchess Motion Before Accessing A Peace Officer's Personnel File."]

The AG's Opinion goes into great detail explaining the history of *Brady v. Maryland*, explaining the legal framework behind the law, and the reason for the conclusion reached in the AG's Opinion. It is an extensive and in depth explanation and analysis of the law. Among other things, the Opinion states that "(t)he Supreme Court later extended *Brady* to impose a duty on prosecutors to volunteer exculpatory matter to the defense even when no request is made, and that exculpatory matter includes impeachment evidence, such as evidence that bears on the credibility of a government witness. Evidence is 'material' for purposes of Brady 'only if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

"The prosecution's *Brady* obligation extends beyond evidence in the prosecutor's actual possession. Rather, the duty 'applies to evidence the prosecutor, or the prosecution team, knowingly possesses or has the right to possess. The prosecution team includes both investigative and prosecutorial agencies and personnel.' Thus, 'the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.' Indeed, the prosecutor is held accountable for evidence 'known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor,' and knowledge of such evidence is imputed to the prosecution."

The Opinion also extensively discusses the process established under *Pitchess v. Superior Court*, and the protections it provides for confidential personnel information of peace officers. The Opinion explains the relationship between *Brady* and *Pitchess* and how they work in conjunction with each other. "There is plainly some overlap between *Brady* and *Pitchess* principles."

The AG notes that "Pitchess, a state-created procedural mechanism for criminal defense discovery, must be viewed against the larger background of the People's *Brady* obligations, which have their foundation in the United States Constitution and cannot be defeated by state statutes. The prosecution's constitutional obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence is distinct and independent from the defendant's statutory right to obtain discovery from an officer's confidential files."

"The CDAA has proposed an 'External Brady Policy' ('the Policy') to govern the review of personnel files of CHP officer-witnesses for potential Brady information. The Policy is modeled on policies already in use by a number of DA's offices and law enforcement agencies."

"Under the proposed Policy, a qualified representative of CHP would examine the files of CHP officers who have been the subject of internal investigations or complaints, and files of CHP officers who have been arrested, for the purpose of identifying (1) officers against whom there have been sustained findings of misconduct within the preceding five years that reflect moral turpitude, untruthfulness, or bias on the part of the officer; and (2) officers who have been convicted of a moral turpitude offense, or who are on probation for any offense, or have criminal charges pending against them."

"Based on these CHP file examinations, a secure database

or list would be created containing the names of the officers who have sustained findings of misconduct against them that reflect moral turpitude, untruthfulness, or bias, and, for each officer, the earliest date of such misconduct. The conduct itself would not be described. Prosecutors would have access to this Brady list and could search it for the names of officers who have been subpoenaed to testify in upcoming criminal trials. Officers whose names are placed on the Brady list would be so informed, and would have the opportunity to administratively appeal the inclusion of their names on the list."

"If an officer whose name was on the Brady list were expected to be a witness in a criminal case, the DA would file a so-called Pitchess/Brady motion under Evidence Code Section 1043, with notice to both the CHP and defense counsel. A trial court would conduct an in camera review of the relevant records in order to determine what information should be disclosed and to issue any appropriate protective orders."

The CHP opposed this policy arguing that (1) they are not part of the "prosecution team." The AG found that, "when its officers act on the government's behalf or assist the government's case, both the officers and CHP itself are part of the prosecution team."

The CHP also argued that (2) a policy such as the one proposed improperly delegates the prosecution's Brady duty to CHP. The AG opines that since "its officers are part of a prosecution team, the law already imposes such a duty on CHP."

The next argument was that (3) the CHP is not qualified to determine what material in its officers' files is relevant for Brady purposes, because it lacks the perspective on the case that such a determination requires. The AG concludes that "a law enforcement agency can indeed be capable of facilitating compliance with *Brady* by screening its personnel files for certain categories of information.

The final argument was that (4) the compilation and disclosure of Brady list information would violate officers' privacy rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA). The AG states that POBRA "expressly contemplates that an officer's name may be placed on a Brady list or otherwise disclosed pursuant to Brady."

HOW THIS AFFECTS YOUR AGENCY

There is no doubt that *Brady v. Maryland*, and its progeny, "requires a prosecutor to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a defendant's case." As stated above, "(t)he Supreme Court later extended *Brady* to impose a duty on

prosecutors to volunteer exculpatory matter to the defense even when no request is made, and that exculpatory matter includes impeachment evidence, such as evidence that bears on the credibility of a government witness." That duty includes seeking out, among members of the prosecution team, material which would be classified as *Brady* material.

Furthermore, the California Supreme Court, in the *Johnson* case, concluded that the prosecutor did not have the right to access an officer's personnel file to identify any such material. But, the Court stated that the process established by the San Francisco Police Department was "laudatory," and that policy included this type of notification. There is no information provided to the DA as to the underlying charges discovered in the personnel file, only that there "may" be *Brady* material in the file of a material prosecution witness.

It is now necessary for law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to develop a process whereby the agency will alert the DA to the existence of such information. Failing to notify the DA will not serve any purpose since knowledge on the part of the law enforcement agency is imputed to the DA.

It is important to note that the failure to disclose *Brady* material will result in the overturning of a conviction, if one is obtained. That is, obviously, contrary to the wishes of either the agency or the prosecutor. As such, it is up to the respective organizations to come together and generate a process to comply with *Brady* obligations.

As with all legal matters, it is necessary to seek out and secure the advice and guidance of your agency's legal counsel. However, if you wish to discuss this matter in greater detail, feel free to contact me at (714) 446 - 1400 or via email at mjm@jones-mayer.com.

Information on www.jones-mayer.com is for general use and is not legal advice. The mailing of this Client Alert Memorandum is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute an attorney-client relationship.

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